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
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# FAITH AND SCIENCE;

OR,

HOW REVELATION AGREES WITH  
REASON, AND ASSISTS IT.

BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

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*Ipsa fide qua credit sanatur ut intelligat ampliora.*

*St. Aug. En. in Ps. cxviii, S. xviii.*

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## CONTENTS.

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	PAGE.
PROLOGUE . . . . .	5
CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM . . . . .	9
II. SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY . . . . .	20
III. THE THOMIST AND THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY . . . . .	67
IV. RATIONALISM . . . . .	95
V. REVELATION . . . . .	134
VI. FAITH AND SCIENCE . . . . .	170
INDEX . . . . .	217



## PROLOGUE.

Our age has no great relish for the higher philosophical studies, and apparently no great capacity to pursue them with any marked success. Its authors seek popularity, and philosophical studies can never be popular. Philosophy loses in depth and solidity just in proportion as it is taken out of the schools and submitted to the judgment of the multitude. The results of the profoundest philosophy are needed by the people and may be given them; but never can the people be so educated as to be able to follow and understand the processes by which these results are obtained. In philosophy, as in all the special sciences, the few must think for the many. The democratic principle is not of universal application, and truth and falsehood, any more than right and wrong, cannot be settled by a plurality of votes. The great want of the people, collectively as individually, is to be taught and governed. Their real good, their real interests, are always to be consulted and labored for, in obedience to the second great commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor

as thyself;" but the doctrine now so prevalent, that all is to be done by the people and nothing for them, or that every man is to be his own teacher, law-giver, priest, and king, belongs to that false order of thought with which Satan seduced our first parents, and which was revived and proclaimed as the pure gospel of Christ, the Lord, by the so-called reformers of the sixteenth century.

The good of the people in this life and in that which is to come depends on their apprehension and application of those great, immutable, and universal principles in accordance with which all things are created, directed, and governed, and which can be known and reduced to practice in the several departments of life only as supernaturally revealed, and as explained and set forth in their order by those who are fitted for this work by their special studies. Revelation, of course, supposes reason, and there can be no theology, or science of revelation, without philosophy, or the science of reason. Neither science is possible by itself alone, for the two are but integral parts of one whole. Hence, where there is no science of reason, or philosophy, there is no theology; faith disappears, and religion degenerates either into a more or less gross superstition, or into a simple affection of



man's emotional nature, as we see it does with the Methodists and other pietistic sects; and where there is no theology there is no philosophy, no science of reason, and reason itself grows feeble, gets bewildered, and falls into all manner of vagaries, wild and incoherent theories, intricate and frail as cobwebs, as we see in the speculations or generalizations of contemporary scientists like Darwin, Huxley, Lubbock, and others. It is only through theology that the principles and truths of revelation are set forth in their real order and relations, and applied to the needs of social and individual life; and it is by the aid of philosophy, or the science of reason, in its highest and purest form, that theology is constructed from revealed data. Who, then, can fail to see that to construct theology, or the science of revelation, or philosophy, or the science of reason, requires special studies and special aptitudes which are not possible in the case of the multitude, even if educated to the fullest extent practicable? Yet the results of the profoundest science of either enter into the child's catechism and are necessary to be known and observed by all men. We see, then, that while theological and philosophical sciences are needed for the instruction and benefit of the many, their cultivation and con-

struction must be the work of the few who alone can understand their problems and fathom their processes.

I make these remarks, perhaps not unnecessarily, when and where every rustic fancies that he is able to instruct the sage whose life has been devoted to the acquisition of science and wisdom, by way of apology for introducing a discussion which will be long and uninteresting, if not unintelligible, to a large majority of readers.

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# FAITH AND SCIENCE.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE PROBLEM.

Truth is eternal; principles are universal and unchangeable; but our subjective understanding of them and the application of them to the practical life of individuals and nations varies from age to age, from nation to nation, and even from individual to individual. The solutions of the problems of universal life adequate to the wants of one age cease to be adequate to the wants of another, and must, from time to time, be revised or renewed, or the human race falls into intellectual and moral anarchy; ceases to advance, and returns to barbarism.

The need of new solutions, or, rather, new applications of the old, seldom, perhaps never, grows out of what is called progress, or the march of mind, of which so much in our times is said, and not always wisely said; but, ordinarily at least, out of the obscuration of intellect and consequent feebleness of character, which render the old solutions partially or wholly unintelligible and too difficult for practice. That the human race, upon the whole, or taken in the entire series of ages which it traverses, is progressive, advances towards perfection, or the fulfilment of the divine purpose in its existence, is undoubtedly true, and it would be impious to question it; but not all changes are for the better, and in particular ages and nations it seems to decline and, so to speak, to march backwards, not forwards. Nations fall as well as rise; solitude reigns where once stood cities, and barbarous tribes roam over the sites of empires once renowned for their arts and science, their learning and polish, their industry and commerce, their political power and grandeur. Ruins cover the face of the earth as well as new erections, and not seldom disorder succeeds to order, weakness to strength, ignorance to intelligence, superstition to religion, barbarism to civilization. No, the old solutions

do not cease to satisfy because the world has outgrown them, or because too learned and wise, or too advanced to accept them; it is rather because the new generations have become too small to fit them or too little disciplined to be able to live in them, and can no more use them than they can wear the heavy plate armor or wield the sword of the warriors of the middle ages.

In western Europe intelligence and general culture were, from the commencement of the sixth century to the end of the tenth, far below what they were in the first four centuries of our era, and it is doubtful if the race has even yet regained the heights it had reached before the northern barbarians overran the Roman empire and seated themselves on its ruins. In no nation is civilization the work of a day, and in all it has so many obstacles of every sort to overcome and is so liable to so many and so frequent interruptions both from within and from without that ages on ages roll away with scarcely a perceptible advance. This age could hardly produce the "Summa Contra Gentiles" of St. Thomas, and that work, admirable as it is, is inferior to the "De Civitate Dei" of St. Augustine. The mediaeval doctors are inferior to the great fathers, and our theologians and

philosophers are inferior to the mediaeval doctors.

The need of revising the old solutions and adapting them to the wants of the new age that comes up grows undoubtedly out of the changes in mental and moral culture brought about by the vicissitudes of time and space. The problems are always the same and the principle of their solution is always the same; but the problems coming up under new forms or new aspects are not generally seen to be the same, nor are the old solutions seen to solve them under these new forms and aspects except by the few who make the subject a special study. The Hegelians are hardly aware that they only revive some of the forms of defunct gnosticism and only transfer to the West the Buddhism of the East; and it is doubtful if Mr. Herbert Spencer has reflected that he is only trying to galvanize into life the long-since exploded doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus, Epicurus and Protagoras, or seen that their refutation by Plato and Aristotle and the Christian fathers and doctors is equally a refutation of his own atomical theories which explain all the phenomena of life by mechanical, chemical and electrical action; nay, most likely has understood as little of that refutation as the child unborn.

These changes in our point of view, in the forms or aspects under which things present themselves, and which are ever-recurring, explain why theology and philosophy, in the respect that they are human sciences, do not and cannot take a fixed and permanent form, and why the work of the theologian and philosopher has to be renewed with each succeeding age and is a work ever beginning and never ending.

There is no lack of reverence for the past in seeking to adapt the old solutions to the wants of our age, if we do it, as we should, on the assumption that the new solutions are demanded by the changes which take place, not necessarily by the progress alleged to have been effected. It is natural that men who have mastered the problems and their solutions under the forms of a past age should be averse to any change in the form of the solutions, and it is equally natural that they who have done the same under the forms they assume in the present should take the new as an advance on the old, and denounce the adherents of the past as obscurantists, and applaud themselves as the friends of light and progress. Hence two parties spring up, the one called the party of the past and the other the party of the future, conservatives and radicals. The conservatives

resist all changes in the forms of the solutions given to the old problems in their new forms or aspects, and the radicals, instead of understanding that all that is needed is to adapt the old solutions to the problems as they now come up, insist that the past knew nothing of the matter and that absolutely new solutions are demanded. Each party, taken exclusively in the sense of its dominant tendency, breaks the continuity of life; the conservative by severing the connection of the past with the future, and the radical by severing the connection of the future with the past. Yet the quarrel is unnecessary, and would be avoided if both parties were to become aware that nothing is either needed or permissible but the adaptation of principles that never change and have always been received to the new forms or aspects under which the old problems with the changes of time and place come up.

Providence assigns each nation and each age its own work, and we who live now and do well the work demanded by our age and nation have no superiority to those great and good men who went before us; nay, may be far inferior to them in absolute merit. The "Summa Contra Gentiles" was a better book for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries than was the "De Civ-



itate Dei," but not so good a book for the fourth and fifth centuries; nor, considered without reference to the age, so great a work. No man is to suppose that because he may do the work given him better than it was done in the past he must be superior to those who did equally well the work which was assigned them to do. He will show himself very inferior to them if he fails to honor and reverence them as his superiors. It were too much for any man living to imagine that he can be to the world what Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, or St. Thomas is; but it is no foolish ambition for men now living to aspire to be to this age what those men were to their respective ages. Every theologian and philosopher may, and, indeed, should so aspire.

Without accepting in its full extent the positivist or Saint-Simonian notion that the present is an age of moral and intellectual anarchy because there has ceased to exist a moral and scientific doctrine fitted to command the assent of all intelligences and the love of all hearts, we may still say that there is great confusion of thought and much moral and intellectual disorder, and which can be healed by bringing out a doctrine and presenting it to all minds so as to command general assent and ready obedi-

ence. There certainly is discord in the intellectual and moral life of our age. Reason and faith, science and revelation, conservatism and progress, authority and liberty, are not harmonized in the prevailing doctrines of the day, are regarded to a great extent as antagonistic terms, as necessarily irreconcilable, and union and peace between their respective adherents as utterly impossible. He who embraces the one term, it is held, can do so only by repelling the other.

There is really, and many people say there is, no necessary antagonism between them, but few see that it is so, and fewer still show it to the understanding. The truth of what is said is very seldom clearly apprehended or inwardly felt to be truth. There is no honest denying that it is very generally felt that he who believes rejects reason, and that he who reasons is sure, if he has faith, to lose it; that he who asserts liberty denies authority; that he who defends the state denies the church, and he who defends the church denies the state; and that he who would cultivate science must abandon religion, and he who would retain religion must let go science. M. Proudhon only drew the logical conclusion of the premises very generally accepted and insisted on when he asserted that

God is a tyrant, and to maintain logically the liberty of man it is necessary to dethrone God and to deny totally his existence.

No doubt, for the Christian, both terms are sacred, and no doubt also that there is no real antagonism in the case, or that the antagonism which many so generally feel there is grows out of the unphilosophical character of modern thought. Yet in the actual state of men's understanding there is the antagonism stated, and most Christians who think as well as believe suffer from it in their own minds and hearts no less than do non-Christians. The evidence of it is found in the fact that they hold it more or less dangerous for believers to reason on the grounds of their faith, that they regard him who thinks boldly and freely on the difficulties presented in the revealed mysteries as in danger of making shipwreck of his faith and of falling into mere rationalism, and that more men remain believers by force of will than by force of reason, and hold it more prudent to seek to surround faith in the young with the warm and tender associations of the heart and to enlist from the earliest moment the sentiments and affections and even prejudices in its favor, than to confide its maintenance to intellectual culture and rational conviction. Certainly they

hold that the antagonism is more apparent than real, and that the two terms are opposites or contraries rather than contradictories; but while they so hold and firmly maintain the two terms, or series of terms, are in reality reconcilable, they do not themselves perceive, and much less set forth clearly, the ground on which they are or can be reconciled.

I speak of Christian believers generally; but there is a well-known class of believers, called sometimes supernaturalists, sometimes traditionalists, sometimes theocrats, and sometimes absolutists and obscurantists, who seem to reject the whole rational series and to found science as well as sanctity and salvation on faith alone. They push nature aside to make way for grace, deny liberty to make way for authority, and demolish science to make way for faith. They are not inaptly described in a periodical published in the early part of the eighteenth century as "reasoning against reason, using reason against the use of reason, and sometimes giving a pretty good reason why reason ought not to be used." They never can reduce their principle to practice, for it is only by reason that they can deny reason or restrict its freedom. However, by discarding nature they leave to grace no subject, and by rejecting rea-

son they render man incapable of receiving a revelation, as much so as a dog, a horse, or an ox. They do not get rid of antagonism; at best they "only create a solitude and call it peace."

On the other hand, the positivists, rationalists, naturalists, amongst whom must be reckoned a large number of eminent names in the physical sciences, sometimes called the exact sciences for the reason, most likely, because they are not exact, imagine that they get rid of antagonism by refusing to recognize the series of terms insisted on by the supernaturalists, and maintaining that reason and nature suffice for themselves, and then, when once we have got rid of superstition, priestcraft, and statecraft, refused to hearken to the theologians and metaphysicians, and planted our feet on the solid earth, we shall have scientific harmony and intellectual order, and the human race will pursue a course of uninterrupted progress, the waste places shall be built, springs of water shall break forth in the dry land, and the desert shall blossom as the rose. But they indulge in vain dreams, for exclusive naturalism, as will be shown hereafter, can no more suffice for itself than exclusive supernaturalism. Who has not heard of what Kant calls the antinomies of reason?

The two series of terms must be accepted, and neither can be surpressed without ruining the other, and the problem is, the two terms being given, how to reconcile them, or how to harmonize them in our theological and philosophical systems so that they may be mutually as friendly in our understandings as they are in the real order?

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## CHAPTER II.

### SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY.

Before entering on the discussion of the problem proposed in the previous chapter, it will be useful for the better comprehending of the argument, to explain briefly the principles of the philosophy on which it is based, and to show wherein they differ from those generally adopted.

When Dr. Brownson began the systematic exposition of his philosophical views in "The United States Democratic Review" (Brownson's Works, Vol. 1, p. 58), in 1842, he gave them the title of "Synthetic Philosophy." What he aimed at was a philosophy synthetic in its origin or

starting-point, in its method, and in its conclusions.

He therefore starts, as all philosophy must start, from thought; but instead of starting from the subject alone of thought, as do the psychologists, or from the object alone, as do the ontologists, he takes thought in its real synthesis of subject, object, and their nexus or relation. In his reasoning or philosophizing he used both synthesis and analysis, as all philosophers must do, but with him the synthesis controlled the analysis, and consequently in the conclusion he found a real synthesis presenting a whole with the several parts in their real relation and having their meaning and their truth in that relation. All minds of the first order are synthetic and comprehend the parts in their relation to the whole; whilst inferior minds are analytical and comprehend the whole only in its parts. St. Thomas teaches that in proportion as the mind is of a higher order it comprehends by fewer ideas, till we ascend to God, who comprehends by a single idea, and there is, as Balmes says, in the intellectual order a single truth which includes all others and from which they emanate. The synthesis aimed at is a real synthesis which presents things in their actual relations out of which they have no meaning



and even no existence. All the philosophical and theological errors now so numerous and prevalent seem to grow out of the studying and teaching of the truths of reason and of revelation, and reason and revelation themselves, the natural and the supernatural, as isolated facts, articles, or dogmas, without due reference to the catholic and universal principles which underlie them and are the principles alike of all existence and of all thought, without showing that all are connected with the whole and with one another, so that no one can be detached and denied without logically denying the whole. The synthesis constructed by the analytical method is merely a logical or abstract synthesis, of no more real value for the understanding of things in their principles than any other abstraction or mental conception.

St. Paul and the early Christian fathers generally may be classed as synthetic philosophers. The analytical method, in which the synthesis is secondary and factitious, first spread in Europe about the beginning of the sixth century, when Boetius wrote his *Dialogues and Commentaries on Porphyry*. Plato, soaring on the two wings of poetry and philosophy to the loftiest height ever reached by merely natural genius, borrowing from other philosophers, es-



pecially from Pythagoras and the east, but making whatever he borrowed his own by stamping it with the mark of originality, looked from a higher point of view upon the problems of the philosophers, and seizing the great principles underlying all thought and all existence, so far at least as they were accessible, embraced all in dialectic unity and harmony. He drew his arguments indiscriminately from what is called pure reason, and from reason as he found it modified or instructed by experience or tradition. Aristotle, on the contrary, excelled in the power of analysis and distinction; was unsurpassed in the knowledge acquired from books and from observation. His chief object was the study of nature, wherefore he discarded the ideal, and instead of proceeding like Plato from the universal to the particular, sought to attain by the particular to the universal, which consequently was only an abstract conception based on sensible experience and not on a real perception.

The early fathers of the church made but slight account of the peripatetic or analytic method, as slight as they did of the Stoic and the Epicurean philosophies. Their higher esteem for Plato on account of the greater harmony of his doctrines with those of revelation

may be noted in St. Justin, Athenagoras, Origen, Clement of Alexandria, St. Augustine, and generally in them all. The synthetic philosophy was better suited to their purpose of defending Christianity as a whole against paganism and of demonstrating the harmony of reason and revelation. Later, the disputes against the Monophysite, Monothelite, and other heresies, and especially those against Arianism and Islam, required greater subtlety in the art of distinction and dialectics, and more consideration was given to Aristotle. It would seem from this that when Christianity is to be defended as a whole against paganism, the synthetic philosophy has been preferred and the analytic when it is a question of particular dogmas. True, St. Thomas made use of it against the Arabs, but it was the only philosophy they accepted, and its use against them was very much of the nature of an argumentum ad hominem, and St. Thomas was clearly hampered by it, for his genius was eminently synthetic. We are now back where the early fathers found themselves, so far as concerns the great dispute we are engaged in, for the very existence of revelation, as well as its harmony with reason, is the great question of this age.

We see in our colleges able, learned, and pious

professors who devote their lives to teaching for the love of God and the good of souls, and our young men, the pride of the land, on leaving college falling into contemporary rationalism and infidelity. While they remain at college under the care of these learned and revered professors, surrounded by all possible helps and appliances for the preservation of faith and the cultivation of pious affections, there seems to be little danger; but when they come out, just at the period when the passions begin to unfold, and go forth into the world without any of the religious stimulants of the college, a large proportion of them wilt as the plant that has grown up in the shade wilts when exposed to the burning rays of a summer sun.

A serious defect in the education given is that too great a burden is imposed on the feeble faith of our age, and the reason of the pupil is not sufficiently pressed into its service; or, in other words, the professors fail to show the relation between the great universal principles which underlie all the dogmas of faith and the universal principles of reason, of all science, of all knowledge, and of all human belief. The philosophy they teach is not an adequate exponent of human reason, and therefore does not harmonize it throughout with the principles of

faith, and the harmony asserted is rather asserted than shown. The physical sciences taught are oftener theories, hypotheses, than sciences, and when not antagonistic to revelation are nowhere shown to be in dialectic harmony with it. So, in fact, the graduate goes forth into the world loving his religion, it may be, and determined to hold it fast, but with no reason for it but an external authority. The moment he finds it questioned he has no resource but to repeat the teachings of the very authority that is questioned and he is called upon to vindicate. His mind is distracted by an unpleasant dualism that bisects it, and he is unable to use the same universal principles in defending supernatural truth that he does in defending the truths of the natural or rational order. He may have been told, but he has never been made or enabled to see that the natural and the supernatural reciprocally demand each the other and are in reality but two parts of one dialectic whole. Christianity is teleological and does but complete, perfect, what is initial, inchoate, in nature.

The religious education stops short with doctrines and does not show the pupil by logical analysis that each doctrine of revelation, each proposition of faith, if you will, rests on a uni-

versal principle, always and everywhere believed, and which cannot be denied without denying the reason common to all men, nor doubted without denying that doubt is doubt. It is this fact that is either not brought out at all or not brought out in sufficient prominence by our colleges and universities. In former times this was hardly necessary. Doubt and denial were not then carried so far, a less inadequate philosophy was taught in the universities, and intellectual as well as moral and spiritual culture was far higher, not only in the educated classes, but in the community generally. To meet the new want, the professor may need to be trained in a department of thought which he has not hitherto been required to master, a new branch of science, which I may call the Philosophy of Religion.

For this purpose it becomes necessary to revise the generally received philosophy, correct its method and principles, and supply its defects, so as to harmonize it with common sense and tradition, and establish the identity of the principles of science and the principles of things, or the identity of the knowable and the real; that is, to show that the order of science follows the order of being, and in their principles they are identical, whether the science be

of the natural or of the supernatural.

There is, beyond a question, a necessity of more thorough instruction in logic and philosophy for non-professional students in our higher schools; but, unhappily, since Descartes, continuing the work of Luther and Calvin, detached it from theology, brought it out of the schools and submitted it to the judgment of people of the world, as they had theology itself, philosophy except with the theologians has been unsettled and well-nigh lost. As taught in connection with the revealed dogmas, it still subsists; but as a detached and separate science we can hardly say there is any philosophy worthy of the name now recognized. Out of a dozen or more text-books used in our colleges which I have examined, though they all have their special merits, there is not one that I can unreservedly recommend. Some of them adopt the ontological principle and method, and some of them the psychological principle and method, and others partly the one and partly the other, but without the scientific principle that unites them as indissoluble parts of one dialectic whole.

In theology the dogma corrects and renders nugatory any errors there may happen to be in the professor's philosophy as a detached or separate science. But, as disconnected with the-

ology and cultivated as simply the science of reason separately from the Christian dogmas, I know no text-book that is not more or less objectionable. Our professors nearly all profess to follow St. Thomas, but the difficulty is that they are unable to agree among themselves as to what is the philosophy St. Thomas actually taught. For myself, I think, from the little I know of the works of the Angel of the Schools, that there are problems in philosophy raised by modern scepticism which they do not solve, nor even treat; but in all questions which they do treat I should seriously distrust my own judgment if I found myself differing from their real sense; that is, as I understand them. Yet I find comparatively few who understand St. Thomas precisely as I do, and I have no right to set my understanding up against that of others who probably have spent more years than I have days in the study of his works.

One thing, however, I think, is certain, that St. Thomas was neither what in these days is called an ontologist nor a psychologist, and equally certain am I that neither exclusive ontology nor exclusive psychology accords either with Catholic theology or the necessary and indestructible elements of thought. The ontologist, properly so called, is not one who simply



holds that being, or, in scholastic language, ens, is the first immediate object of the mind, but that ens, or being, is the *primum philosophicum*, or sole principle, of philosophy, from which all in philosophy is logically deducible; the psychologist—I should prefer to say psychologist or psychologue—is, as I understand the term, not one who simply holds that the mind in philosophizing starts from a datum taken from our thought, but from the intuition of the human soul itself or its consciousness of its own existence, and who professes from that to deduce logically the universe, its principles and its creator, God and his attributes, as was the pretension of Descartes. I leave out for the moment the pseudontologists of Germany, for they are not ontologists at all, but mere psychologists. Their absolute is an abstraction, a logical or mental conception, not real being or *ens necessarium et reale*, as say the schoolmen, and take the real ontologists, like the Louvain professors, the Jesuits Fournier and Rothenflue, and others who hold that the ens intuitively presented as the first and immediate object of the intellect is real being, not a mental conception. These, by making ens their sole principle of philosophy, from which all existences are to be logically deducible, are not able logically to escape



pantheism. Nothing can be deduced logically from ens that does not necessarily follow from it or that is not necessarily contained in it, for deduction is simply analysis, and the conclusion that does not follow necessarily is invalid. The creative act cannot be deduced from the intuition of ens unless necessarily contained in it, and then the creation deduced would be a necessary creation and a necessary creation is no creation at all, for it gives nothing distinguishable from ens itself. The universe deduced from ens will be only a universe contained in ens and identical with ens itself, which is pantheism pure and simple.

But is exclusive psychology or psychologism any better? The psychologist holds from Descartes, who, in undertaking to reform philosophy, as Luther in undertaking to reform theology, has muddled it and virtually destroyed it. Their philosophical primum, or principle, is the "I am" in the famous "Cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore I am." I will not dwell here on the fact that this enthymem is a sheer paralogism, but will take it as Descartes himself, when hard pressed by his Jesuit opponent, explains it in one of his Letters, not as an argument adduced to prove one's own existence, but as the statement of the fact in which one finds or be-

comes conscious of it. The Cartesian doctrine, or psychologism, is that the soul, I myself, being given, I can deduce from it, after the manner of the geometers, God, creation, the universe and its principles and laws. But, I repeat, deduction is analysis, and I can logically deduce from my personal existence, or the soul, only what is in it; that is, myself and my subjective modes or affections. Consequently the God and the universe I deduce and construct with my conceptions of myself can be only myself and the modes and affections of my personal existence, which is what is called in the history of philosophical systems egoism, or that I am God, and all that is or exists.

Of course the text-books referred to, or any Catholic philosopher, draw, in fact, neither of these conclusions; they are saved from that by their theology. Practically no Catholic philosopher is a pure ontologist or a pure psychologist; my objection does not mean this, it only means that some adopt the ontological principle and method, others the psychological principle and method, which, if logically carried out, would lead to one or the other fatal extreme. Yet it is only among the heterodox, restrained by no creed and by no theological formula, that we can find the principle and method of either

freely developed and pushed to the last logical consequence. In the systems of the heterodox we may see whither lead unsound principles and methods which we ourselves may have adopted without suspecting their unsoundness or foreseeing their consequences.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Freeman Clarke, and all the American transcendentalists adopt the ontological principle and method, recognize only two categories, being and phenomena, the one real, the other in its distinction unreal, and are pure ontologists and excellent exponents of ontologism. All that is real they identify with being, and all that is not the one only being they resolve into phenomena, which is mere appearance, illusory, unreal. Being is one and universal; is all the real, the only force, substance, or activity, and you may call it God or nature as best suits your taste.

Take, for instance, the following noteworthy extract from a lecture on Religion by Mr. Emerson, the Corypheus of the school, and you will see very clearly what ontologism is when and where it is logically carried out:

"We can hardly," says Mr. Emerson, "take up a pamphlet or journal in these days which does not announce some new and important discovery in science or in practical art, in astronomy,

in chemistry, in navigation, in mechanics; and these announcements are no longer turned over to adepts, but are examined with avidity by all readers, and somewhat indirectly realized and made real to the community. Not only so, but we have long ago found that these facts of nature react directly on opinions of society and life. When Copernicus dismissed our little ball to its tiny insignificance in the solar system, and then in the vast ether in which that system revolves, the mortified inhabitant was forced to abate his claim to hold longer the central city of the God of Nature. The nebular theory spoiled our nursery clock. The new measures by geologists of the antiquity of the planet interfere with our sacred chronology. The new doctrine of the correlation of force showed that all force was one, whether in the form of gravity, of polarity, of heat, of light, of electricity, or of muscular force, suggesting also that will was not far off. Each is convertible into the other. That doctrine showed unity, dissolving all in itself. Then chemistry lately came to the aid of astronomy, and showed the substance of the atoms of the sun and stars to be identical with our own, the same chemical elements. Then the doctrine of compensations—the very word analogy—the doctrine of correspon-

cies, showed a unity still more stupendous. Still the animals disclosed the same intellect as in man, though initial, only working to humble ends—but, so far as it went, identical in aim with his, baffling him sometimes by showing more fertile good sense in the animal than in the hunter, but everywhere intelligible to us because like ours. Science corrects theology, line after line, until few of the lines are left. Its irresistible generalizations destroy the importance of persons and anecdotes, just as astronomy dealt with the old legends of Orion, and the Milky Way, and Hercules, and Cassiopea's Chair, or with the gypsy's and the astrologer's heaven to tell fortunes at a shilling a day. As the old astrologer did, so does this astronomy make mean, or national, or personal, interpretation of the universe impossible. It requires a history up to the style of the works, makes miracles, which were the material of the religious history of all barbarous nations, impossible, by supplying a truth which defies all prodigy to render. Though we see these grand laws only in glimpses, the glimpse is final, and the smallest inch of the ecliptic being once positively ascertained, determines the entire and enormous round for me as surely as if I saw it with the eyes.

"Science has made it impossible to introduce persons, or places, or the schemes of theologians, into the mind. The vast generalizations of science destroy such toy heavens. In this nineteenth century everything told us of a Creator must be on a scale in which he is known to us in his works, and not on the fond legends of an ignorant tribe. Astronomy, chemistry, botany, zoology, have made the old Calvinism and other once possible creeds impossible to be the foods of a new age. The truths of the ransom, of atonement, the song of the angels and the like, justification by faith, the vicarious sacrifice, are only a petrification of momentary tropes, by too frequent use, into articles of a creed. The unsparing, impassable solutions of science have disposed once for all of the dusty corners and cobwebs, and the middle-age Christianity is as dead as paganism."

There is no mistaking the thought that underlies these finely chiselled sentences, any more than there is their oracular tone. It is pure ontologism, and teaches that all reality, all substance, all force, is one and identical. A more perfect *reductio ad absurdum* it is impossible to conceive; yet grave men hold it to be wise and profound, almost divinely inspired. If all reality is resolvable into unity, who or what is

this Mr. Emerson himself, who gives forth his oracles? Is he the one universal being, force, or substance, or is he a mere illusion, an unreality, a nothing—as Carlisle would say—an unveracity? Whom is he speaking to and trying to convince of the truth of his doctrine, if all personal and other distinctions are unreal? The very attempt to state the doctrine refutes it; for it cannot be expressed in language without self-contradiction, or without asserting the falsity of the language that expresses it. Yet thousands who shrink from the absurd consequence hold and cherish the principle.

The appeal to science which Mr. Emerson makes in proof of his doctrine, or of the falseness of theology, is wholly inconclusive. It is idle, if all is one and identical, to talk to us of the discoveries of astronomy, to speak of the vastness of the celestial worlds, and the “tiny insignificance of our earth in the solar system,” or to dilate on the absurdity of regarding our earth as central. To unity there is no great, no small, no big, no little; its centre is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere. There is no comparison with only one term. All comparisons imply distinctions, and if all is resolved into unity, all distinctions are obliterated. The discovery of the correlation of forces proves,



Mr. Emerson thinks, that all forces are one and identical. But if all forces are one and identical, how can there be any correlation of forces? Chemistry has not proved, nor do its discoveries tend to prove, that all substances are one and identical; for it neither does nor can tell us what substance is. It does and can tell us only its phenomena, and if Mr. Emerson's doctrine be true, phenomena are unreal, and therefore nothing. Chemistry is as far from telling us the essence of substance as is mechanics. It can at best only give us sensible properties or effects, and these certainly are not one and identical.

I do not question the scientific facts alleged, but the generalizations from them are not incontrovertible. Scientists have a habit, not in all respects commendable, of stating as a fact what is really only their induction from what they take to be facts. In truth, no one who has not in his mind the real principles of the universe, and by which all facts are explained, is capable of observing and stating truly and adequately what are or are not facts. Facts are really cognizable only in the light of their principle. The scientific generalizations, which Mr. Emerson alleges, attain at best only to the type or law according to which all created forces, or



second causes, exist and operate, or produce their effects, and the most that they prove is the unity of this type or law, not by any means the unity and identity of all substances or forces. They prove, perhaps, the unity and identity of the cause producing and sustaining them; but even if so, science corrects not a single line of theology, for theology teaches, and always has taught, that the type, idea, or paradigm, after which all things are created, exist, and act, is the divine idea, one and eternal in the divine mind, and identical with the divine essence; for, as St. Thomas says, *idea in mente divina nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei*. According to theology, then, all existences must be created after one and the same type, and follow in their activity and development one and the same law, and therefore St. Thomas says again, *Deus est similitudo rerum omnium*. Science, then, as far as it goes, confirms theology, instead of correcting or upsetting it. It would not be amiss if those who try to show an antagonism between science and theology were to make themselves moderately familiar with what theologians of the first order actually teach. But this is aside from our present purpose, and I will only add Mr. Emerson betrays his lack rather than his mastery of science when

he makes will and gravitation identical. Will names a vis, or a force, gravitation names simply a fact, or a class of facts, and there is an obvious difference between the fact and the vis or force that produces it. So much for ontologism among the heterodox, when it is logically carried out, and proved to what contradictions and absurdities it leads.

Psychologism among the heterodox has free course, and is pushed, like ontologism, to its last consequence. Descartes, its founder, requires us to eliminate, at least provisorily, from our minds everything, or to doubt everything, except the simple consciousness of our personal existence, which, he maintains, it is impossible to doubt; and then from our personal existence to deduce God and the universe, or else not admit them. But he himself did neither. He invoked the veracity of God to prove the objective verity of his subjective ideas, or innate ideas, as he said, and then adduced the objective verity of his ideas to prove the being of God and the existence of the created universe, gravely asserting, "I think God, therefore God is." Kant adopted the Cartesian method and principle, and was faithful to both. From the psychological data, the soul and its modes or affections, he reduced all science to

the science of the subject, and denied the ability of the subject to cognize the objective. Aristotle had made the categories neither subjective nor objective, but forms of the ideal or logical world, a sort of *tertium quid* between the physical world and the mind, but nevertheless the medium of objective cognition. Kant makes them forms of the subject and of no validity out of the sphere of the subject, and consequently denied to the soul all means of knowing anything but its own modes and sentiments.

Fichte, a disciple of Kant, but a bolder spirit, adopts the Cartesian principle and method, but instead of saying, *cogito ergo sum*, he said, *volo ergo sum*, I will, therefore I am. If I am, I am being; if I am being, I am God, and then all that is, and there is nothing besides but my own productions. I am twofold, absolute and relative. In my projections I am relative, phenomenal; in myself, in my reality, I am absolute, universal, eternal, infinite. Hegel, a disciple of the same school starts not with the soul itself, but with an act of the soul, a mental conception, which, as all conceptions, is subjective, and takes as his principle the abstract being of conception, equivalent, he himself says, to not-being, and proceeds to construct God and the universe according to the logical process of thought.

As he starts from an abstraction, which is nothing, he has no difficulty in arriving, through abstractions joined to abstractions, at—nothing.

Descartes took for his *primum* the soul and its ideas. Berkeley starts from the ideas, which are only modes or affections of the soul, and very logically concludes that nothing exists but ideas, and resolves the external world into ideas, which subsist only in my mind, and, of course, have no existence when I am fast asleep and do not dream, or when I am dead. Thus subjective idealism lost the material world, and really all objective existence.

Condillac starts with the Berkeleian ideas borrowed from Descartes, resolves them and all being and existences into sensations, loses the soul as a substantive existence, and turns it into a sensation transformed, in which he only follows Descartes, who always speaks of the soul as *la pensee*, as the act, not as the actor. Yet there have been grave men who regarded Descartes as a philosopher.

These instances, which might be indefinitely multiplied, show that among the heterodox, for Descartes, whatever he professed, was no Catholic, men have actually drawn the absurd conclusions which I have said follow necessarily from adopting either the ontological or the psy-

chological principle and method alone. Both subject and object are lost or by turns denied by philosophers, and nothing remains. Hence a wide-spread distrust of reason or of the human mind itself marks our age. The heterodox world turn with a sort of disgust from the study of philosophy and take to the study of the physical sciences, perfectly unaware that without philosophy theology, the queen of the sciences, is impossible, and that without theology the physical sciences cannot be successfully cultivated, as is proved by the respect obtained for such monstrosities, labelled science, as the positivism of Auguste Comte, the physical basis of life by Professor Huxley, the production of life by the chemical, electrical, and mechanical arrangement of matter by Herbert Spencer, the origin of species by natural selection and the development of man from the monkey or tadpole by Charles Darwin. Having lost the science both of reason and revelation, the heterodox mind of the day seems to have lost common sense, and seeks to get effects without causes, to explain the origin of the world without a creator, and its government without moral law, and to conduct society without conscience, while all the time it boasts of its intelligence and the marvellous progress it has made and is making.

Ontologism and psychologism end alike in nescience and nihilism, the one losing the subject, and the other the object, and the physical sciences, cultivated without the light of theology, lose God, lose moral life, lose mental vigor, enfeeble and lower character, materialize intelligence, class man with the brutes, and resolve the universe into a gas, or develop it without a creator from nothing.

Our Catholic philosophers are, as I have said, restrained by their theology from running to these fearful extremes, which we meet among the heterodox, and in which they glory; and none of our text-books are either purely ontological or purely psychological, that is, none of them that I have seen and examined follow throughout, and strictly, either the ontological principle and method or the psychological principle and method. They all, as a matter of fact, make philosophy consist of logic, ontology, and psychology, and in the construction of their ontology they use psychological data, as they do ontological data in the construction of their psychology; but their authors seem to me, if they will permit me to say so, to hold, and by their avowed principle and method are required to hold, if inclining to the ontological principle and method, that they derive their psychological

data by deduction from the intuition of being, or, if inclining to the psychological principle and method, that they derive their ontological data inductively from the intuition of the soul, or the contingent. Yet I think, with all deference, that this is the effect of incomplete or inexact analysis of thought, rather than any defect of logical vigor or acumen. A few words of explanation, it seems to me, would remove all objections, and place the doctrine of these textbooks in complete harmony with Catholic theology and effect a perfect agreement between the two schools, without any sacrifice of principle on the part of either.

Cousin contended that he attained legitimately to ontology by the psychological method, or by induction from the facts of consciousness; Sir William Hamilton denies it, asserts that the ontological cannot be obtained from the psychological, and maintains that philosophy is restricted to logic and psychology. Sir William Hamilton, though well versed in the literature of philosophy, was no philosopher, not any more than was Herbert Spencer or J. Stuart Mill, men wholly destitute of philosophical genius, though not of philosophical talent. Yet the Scotsman and the Englishmen are right in denying that the ontological can be logically concluded from



psychological data; and the Frenchman, too, is right in maintaining that it can be obtained from a careful analysis of the facts of consciousness, for the facts of consciousness are not purely psychological. Cousin found in analyzing consciousness, or, more properly, thought, what he calls necessary or absolute ideas, which, in fact, are not psychological. They are inseparable from our intelligence, and without them no mind, no reason, no knowledge of any kind or degree, no act of intelligence is possible. So far he is right. All philosophers of any nerve recognize these necessary or absolute ideas. But Cousin attempts to obtain the ontological by induction from them, and fails, because he fails to perceive that they are themselves the ontological, or identically being itself. He took them to be abstract ideas, and did not understand that abstractions are nullities. What we call necessary and absolute ideas, as the one, the universal, the eternal, the immutable, and the perfect, which certainly enter into every thought, and without which no thought is possible, are not abstractions, or abstract ideas, as psychologists call them, but necessary, universal, eternal, immutable, and perfect being intuitively presented or apprehended. Hence St. Augustine says, as say Malebranche and Gerdil



after him, that in the intuition of the perfect, or in the idea of the perfect, we have intuition of God, or of perfect being, though we do not usually advert to the fact, or take note of it. But as ideas are so called in relation to the human mind, as they are detected in the mind, and as the mind does not and cannot apprehend them without apprehending its own existence and intellectual activity, it follows that the psychological principle is given along with them, and not derived by a logical process from them.

The two points on which philosophers, especially since Descartes, appear to me to be at fault are first, in not clearly apprehending that the necessary or absolute, the ideal, is ontological, or that these ideas, which they all recognize and assert as an indispensable element of thought, are identified in real and necessary being; and, secondly, in not distinctly recognizing the fact that the ontological principle, *ens*, and the psychological principle, *contingens*, are given the mind simultaneously in one and the same intuition, and that neither is obtained or obtainable by a discursive or logical process from the other.

The first grows out of not perceiving that abstractions are in themselves nothing, and that nothing is unintelligible, and can be no object

of intuition. Abstractions are mental conceptions, formed by the mind operating on their concretes intuitively presented. There is and can be no intuition of the abstract, for as abstract it exists only in the mind, though, as St. Thomas says, it exists in *mente cum fundamento in re*. There is no whiteness without the white, and no roundness without the round, either in *re* or in *mente*. As an abstraction, either is a mere conception, not an idea, and is apprehensible only in the intuition of the concrete from which it is abstracted. Necessary and absolute ideas cannot be abstractions formed by the mind, because they are intuitively held, and therefore must be objectively real, because the mind has intuition of no concretes from which it can abstract them, as roundness from the round, and because the mind does not and cannot exist and operate without them. They must then be real and necessary being, considered as facing, or as intelligible to the human intellect. They are then not data from which the ontological is obtained by a logical process, but are themselves the ontological intuitively affirmed.

The second failure grows out of the first. The mind never acts or operates without a consciousness or recognition of its own existence.

In this sense Descartes says truly, *Cogito ergo sum*, I think, therefore I exist. In every thought I have a direct or reflex consciousness of myself. But I do not think, or perform any mental operation, in which I think myself only, or without the aid or concurrence of the ontological, or the ideal. If I think such or such a thing is, or is not, is this, or is that, I think, besides the particular object of my thought, being, expressed by the substantive verb *is*. If I think such or such a thing is necessary, or that such or such a consequence follows necessarily from such or such premises, I think, I affirm, or have intuition of real and necessary being. I cannot think the contingent without thinking the necessary, the finite without thinking the infinite, the particular without thinking the universal, the imperfect without thinking the perfect, the temporary without thinking the eternal. These are all presented in thought as correlatives, and correlatives connote (connotant) each other, though we may be so intent on the one as not to advert to its correlative, and so take no note of it, or of the fact that it is actually included in the same thought. Kant has proved all this in explaining how what he calls synthetic judgments a priori are formed, but he spoils all he does by making the ontological or necessary el-

ements of the judgment necessary forms of the subject, instead of intuitions of real and necessary being under the only forms in which it is intelligible to the human intellect and enters into every human thought. How can the necessary, the universal, the eternal, the perfect, be forms of a contingent, limited, imperfect subject? Every difficulty is avoided by understanding that correlatives do not imply, but connote, each other, and in the intuition of the one there is really intuition of both; therefore the psychological and the ontological are not inferred either from the other, but both are given together simultaneously in one and the same intuition.

But a careful analysis of thought goes perhaps further, and discloses the fact that not only are the ontological and the psychological given simultaneously in one and the same intuition, but that they are given in their real relation, or real synthesis. *Ens*, or being, is intelligible *per se*, and can be thought or intuitively presented by itself, without relation to any thing distinguishable from itself; but *contingentia*, or contingent existences, are not intelligible *per se*, because they exist only in relation to being and not *per se* any more than they do in *se* or *a se*. They are given us in intu-

ition not as necessary being, but as contingent, dependent, insufficient for themselves, and having their being not in themselves, but in another. Hence the question, when we contemplate them, rises spontaneously, Whence come they? What is their cause? or what causes them? It is from this conception of the contingency of the world, the insufficiency of contingent things for themselves, their dependence on something which they are not, their relativity, that the inductive theologians, including, perhaps, St. Thomas himself, conclude the existence of God. But this conclusion would be without scientific validity, and even absurd, if in our intuition of contingent existences we had not intuition of them as contingent, or of their relation to being, on which they depend, and from which they are distinguished. There is no logical process by which contingency, or dependence, can be concluded from the intuition of ourselves, or of things around us, if they are given in our intuition of them as simply indeterminate ens, being, or substance, as the pantheists on the one hand, and the atheists on the other, have unanswerably proved. Besides, the indeterminate has no objective existence, and cannot be intuitively presented.

· But why is it that the mind, that reason, re-

volts at both atheism and pantheism, and invariably, when contemplating particular existences, feels that they are insufficient for themselves, and asks and seeks their cause? Why but because it intuitively perceives that they are not necessary, independent, self-existent being, but are contingent, dependent existences, that have not their being or their cause in themselves? If the mind had not intuition of them as causatae, it would not and could not seek their cause or conceive of them as caused; for conceptions, St. Thomas tells us, have their foundation in reality and can be formed only from intuitions, or objects really presented in intuition. The category of cause is necessary and indestructible, and, as it is not a necessary form either of the object or of the subject, it must be intuitively given in the intuition as the act of ens, producing, or creating and sustaining contingentia, or dependent existences. Hence the ontological and the psychological in their synthesis, or real relation, according to which the ontological causes, or creates, existences, are given in one and the same intuition.

That ideal intuition, or, rather, the intuition of the ideal, embraces both in their real synthesis, or being and existences connected by the creative act of being, I am well aware, will not

be universally accepted; perhaps chiefly from my inability to make my meaning intelligible. Gentile philosophers had no conception of creation, and hence they regarded the universe as an emanation of being, as generated by being, or as formed by intelligent force operating on a passive and eternal matter as its stuff or material. Most modern philosophers fail to recognize that the fact of creation is given in intuition, and hence either remit it to theology as a fact of revelation, not of philosophy, or attempt to obtain it by first establishing the contingent character of particular existences. But this is because philosophers have usually been more intent on analyzing conception than intuition. Conceptions, in the language of moderns ideas, may be confused, inadequate, erroneous even, but they always presuppose intuition, which alone presents, or places in the mind, the object or concrete reality from which the mind forms its conceptions. A failure to effect a perfect analysis of the contents of the intuition, of course, will render inadequate or erroneous the conception. It is precisely in the analysis of intuition, or thought, that philosophers, in my judgment, have the most signally failed, and it is precisely their defective analysis that I have been endeavoring to indicate and rectify.



All the principles of thought must be given intuitively, and principles of thought must include the real, be identically the principles of the real order, or the thought will be inadequate, unreal, and science a failure; for all science is by thought, and can contain no principle not presented in thought or intuition. If, then, the creative act is not presented in the intuition it cannot be included in philosophy. We may have, as Cousin has well said, less in our philosophy than is given in intuition, but we cannot have more; and I may remark by the way, that it is because it has less that philosophy is so often found at logger-heads with common sense. Yet St. Thomas and all our philosophers attempt to prove the fact of creation by our natural reason, or that contingent existences, all things distinguishable from being, are produced and sustained by the creative act of being from nothing, evincing thereby that they have the conception of creation; but how can they have the conception if the fact is not presented in intuition?

The general impression that creatures are apprehensible without intuition of their relation to being, is due in part to mistaking conception for intuition. We certainly can conceive of them as abstracted from that relation,



as we can roundness abstracted from the round; but this conception is not intuition, it is formed by the mind from the intuition. The impression is also partly due to a faulty definition of substance as that which exists in se non in alio, in itself, not in another as mode or attribute. Existences do certainly not exist in another as modes or attributes, neither do they exist in se. It is only being that exists in se, and hence Spinoza and Cousin, who adopt this definition, maintain that being, that is, God, is the only substance, and that all else is attribute, mode, or phenomenon. Taking substance in the sense of the positive part of this definition, there is no reason why all substances, all contingent existences, should not be presented in intuition by themselves, for what exists by itself may undoubtedly be intuitively presented by itself. But this would suppose that existences, which have not their being in themselves, and are nothing out of their relation to being, are presented in intuition as absolute, necessary, independent, and self-existent beings. Intuition presents things as they are, not as they are not. When intuitively presented we may by abstraction conceive of them without taking note of their relation to being, but they can be presented by intuition only in the relation in which they

actually exist, and therefore not as independent or indeterminate substances.

The impression is furthermore caused by the failure of philosophers to distinguish between substans and substantia. Substans, as the word implies, is that which stands under, upholds, or supports. Substances stand under, uphold, or support their accidents, and so far substans and substantia are identical. But contingent substances must themselves be stood under, upheld, or supported, and that which stands under, upholds, or supports them is again substans and distinct from substances. Pantheists identify substans with ens, or being, and thus make existences attributes, modes, or phenomena of being, as do Mr. Emerson and his followers. Deists and scientists identify substans and substantia, and assume that existences have their own support in themselves, and that when once created and set agoing the universe goes of itself by virtue of its own inherent laws and forces. Hence they very logically conclude that existences are apprehensible by themselves without intuition of their relation to being, and also that any miraculous or supernatural intervention on the part of the Creator in mundane affairs would show great want of skill or power in the Creator himself, or else would be a gross

piece of impertinence. Hence their sturdy opposition to all miracles and to the supernatural order which Christians assert. Others, including Dr. Brownson, distinguish the *substans* from *ens* as the act from the actor, and from *substantia*, substance or existences, as the act from its effect, thus identifying it with the creative act of being producing and supporting existences from nothing. As it produces and sustains contingent existences, and they are nothing without it, it must be conceded, either that we have no intuition of contingent existences, or that intuition of them necessarily includes intuition of the creative act of being which produces them from nothing, and as a continuous act sustains them, for it is precisely in the creative act that their contingency consists, and therefore the contingent is unthinkable without it.

No doubt the view here presented with regard to abstractions differs somewhat from that generally taken by philosophers, but because I distinguish sharply intuition and conception, and because I am less concerned with the question, How or by what means we know, than with the question, What we know. I hold that to know is to know, and that when one knows he knows that he knows. I hold, too, that the

principles and the matter of all science are intuitively presented, and that all reflection, discussion, abstraction, comparing, analyzing, synthesizing, or other operations of the mind, if other operations there are, have for their sole object to draw out and put the mind in possession of what is given or presented in intuition. Descartes either fails to recognize intuition, or confounds it with conception. Conception is an act of the mind, and hence the great question with Descartes, and with philosophers since his time, is the question of the truth, or objective validity of our conceptions, ideas, in modern language, that is, as Balmes says, of certitude, which is hardly a question at all with the scholastics, and just as little with me. The question of certitude with me touches not the intuition, but the conceptions; and, as to these, is settled by reference to what is intuitively given or presented in thought, which, as Cousin has said truly, embraces simultaneously the subject and object and their relation, just what I have been laboring all along to prove. I know and ask no higher certitude than intuition. Descartes lost all certitude when he placed it in conception and held that it consisted in the clearness of the mental conception, or as he said, idea.

Aristotle would seem to teach that abstrac-

tions are apprehensible by the mind without their concretes, but not that they can be intuitively presented. According to him the categories are formal, forms of the logical world, not, as I have said, of the *mundus physicus*, and all knowledge of the intelligible is *per speciem*, by the intelligible species or ideas; but the intelligible species or ideas, though not ideas in our sense, nor in the Platonic sense, are not mental conceptions, or ideas in the Cartesian sense. They were, as St. Thomas explains, presented to the mind in the *phantasmata*, and abstracted from them by the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, and became the medium by which the intelligible is apprehended. What the peripatetics meant by them, or what led them to assert them, I know not; but this much St. Thomas does not allow, that the intellect terminates in them, and that it obtains the intelligible only by a logical inference from them. He maintains expressly (*Sum. Theol. P. 1. Q. LXXXV. A. 2.*) that they are that by which the mind attains to the intelligible, not that in which it terminates; for it attains to the intelligible itself, and he gives in the article referred to most excellent reasons for the doctrine he teaches.

Yet I have no doubt that the peripatetic doctrine with regard to ideas or species, as the

means of knowing, has influenced modern philosophers and led them to suppose that abstractions, if nothing in re, are yet the condition and basis of the science of reason. All science is constructed, they tell us, with ideas, and all ideas are abstractions. Locke defines idea to be that with which the understanding is immediately conversant; Balmes and most of our philosophers who profess to follow St. Thomas make ideas representative, and therefore abstractions, in which we may detect a trace of the phantasms and intelligible species of the peripatetics, so fiercely and, in my judgment, so successfully assailed by Dr. Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, the most respectable school ever founded among the heterodox. Dr. Reid erred in making the principles of science primitive or necessary beliefs, as Kant did in making them forms of the subject, instead of regarding them, as they are, as intuitions presenting to the mind the principles of all the knowable and all the real; but he did good service to philosophy in maintaining most vigorously in his "Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense," that it is things themselves we apprehend in intuition, not their images or representations, the doctrine I also maintain.

In point of fact, the doctrine I maintain has very little to do with the abstractions or abstract ideas of the peripatetics, for I do not mean the same thing by them that they do. I distinguish between conceptions and ideas. The conceptions are formed by the mind operating on the concrete object presented by intuition, and abstraction is formed by the mind conceiving that object under a particular aspect, or abstracting and generalizing some special quality detected in it and common to all objects of its class, as roundness, whiteness, roughness, sweetness, gentleness, which have indeed a foundation in reality, but as abstractions exist only in mente. I do not class genera and species, the real universals of the schoolmen, with abstractions, for I hold that they really exist *a parte rei*, though never separate from their individuals. The species is as real as the individual, and the individual is nothing without it. Though distinguishable, neither does or can exist without the other; were it not so, it would be impossible to explain the fact of generation, or to make philosophy and theology accord. If the generic or specific were, as the old nominalists maintained, simply a quality of the individual, we should find it difficult, if not impossible, to



explain the incarnation and the redemption of the race by our Lord.

I do not, again, admit that the necessary and immutable ideas, which I call the ideal or necessary element of every thought, are abstractions; for there are no concretes, as I have already said, presented in intuition from which the mind can abstract them, and because, being necessary to thought, the mind could not operate without them. They must therefore be, not mental conceptions, nor abstractions, but ontological, or real and necessary being itself, not its species, its image, or representation. Descartes called them innate, but, as that supposed them to be merely necessary forms of the subject, he explained his meaning to be, not that the idea of God, for instance, is innate, but the faculty of thinking or conceiving of God is, which is liable to the rather grave objection that the God I think is simply my conception, an abstract and no real God at all, as is the God of all the psychologists. St. Augustine, as we have seen, holds the necessary ideal to be real, and St. Thomas maintains as much, and I think I have proved that it is identical with real and necessary ens, or being, as the intelligible.

Assuming now as established that the necessary or absolute ideas are ontological, identified



in real being intuitively presented, and that it is never presented in thought without intuition of the psychological in its real relation to being, the principle of all philosophy, of all science, or the intuitive element of thought, is not *ens alone*, nor *contingens alone*, but the two in their synthesis, or real and necessary being and contingent existences, the latter proceeding from the former, and united to it by the creative act of being producing and sustaining them from nothing. This asserts alike the principle of the ontologists and the principle of the psychologists, and connects them by the creative act of being, and lays the basis of a real and scientific, not a violent or empirical reconciliation of the two schools. It sacrifices neither to the other, leaves each in full possession of its principle, and makes philosophy a real science, founded on principles really given in intuition as the necessary and indestructible element of thought, and relieves it of the reproach of being either an abstract science or a science of abstractions, as is either ontologism or psychologism. Philosophy is no more an abstract science than is mathematics or physics. With us philosophy is real, and more easily understood than any of the so-called "exact sciences." It comprehends the distinctive principle of every

school, but is not eclectic or syncretic, but really and scientifically synthetic, as is all thought, and is free alike from all pantheistic and all egoistic tendencies, both which end alike in nescience and nihilism.

We take our principles, not from conceptions which are formed by the mind operating on concretes intuitively presented, but from intuition itself, which presents always the real, and therefore our principles are given to, and, indeed, constitutive of, the mind, not formed by it or obtained as elements of thought by its own activity. Yet are they presented in thought, and it is by the analysis of thought the mind finds or ascertains them or becomes aware that it has them. Being logically and really precedes and creates existences, but in constructing philosophy or science we cannot begin with being, as the ontologists require, for that would compel us to construct our ontology with abstract conceptions. We must, as to our method, begin with the analysis of thought, for it is in thought only that the principles intuitively presented are found, and though the principles are all presented in their synthesis, it strikes me, as we must begin by analyzing thought,—what Cousin calls the fact of consciousness, though improperly, because consciousness is simply the recog-

nition of myself, in the act of thinking, as the subject,—the most simple method is to treat the psychological part of philosophy before proceeding to the ontological part.

Then it is necessary to remark that intuition presents *ens*, or being, as the necessary ideal or intelligible, and it is not by intuition, but by reflection, involving more or less of a logical process, that we ascertain that the ideal or the intelligible, as intuitively presented, is real and necessary being, or that real and necessary being is God. The reader will have observed that I have studiously avoided saying that we have intuition of God, or that we know by intuition either that God is or what he is. The intuition presents us the ideal, the intelligible, necessary, universal, and immutable ideas, but it does not identify them with real and necessary being, nor does it identify real and necessary being with God. It is not true, then, if I am right, that we have intuition of God. Intuition presents us that which is being, which is God, but only under the form of the ideal or necessary ideas. This harmonizes with St. Augustine, who says we have intuition of God in the intuition of the perfect, only we do not advert to it or take note of it, and with St. Thomas, who says God is not known *per se*, or is not self-evident to us, but

who, in the same article, admits that first principles, or necessary truths, what he calls necessary ideas, are self-evident, that is to say, intuitive. But in point of fact, the question with St. Thomas is not *An sit Deus*, but *Quid est Deus*, for he says we cannot know formally that God is without knowing what he is, and this is not presented in intuition. Yet what God is is known, for, as St. Paul says, the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood (known, intellecta) by the things that are made. (Sum. Theol., P. 1, Q. 1, A. 2).

The philosophical reader cannot fail to perceive from what I here say, that no new philosophy is here proposed, nor any breaking with the philosophical tradition of the Catholic schools. In philosophy and theology I follow St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as in morals St. Gregory the Great, whom, after St. Paul, as a man aside from the apostle, I hold to be the three greatest men the world has ever known, and I interpret their writings in the light thrown on them by the studies of Dr. Brownson. The principles he endeavored to set forth will much simplify philosophy, will render unnecessary many questions which philosophers have unsuccessfully wearied themselves in at-

tempts to solve, and furnish the key to the reconciliation of philosophy and theology and of faith and science.

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### CHAPTER III.

#### THE THOMIST AND THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY.

It was intimated some years ago by a prolific, if not profoundly philosophical, writer in the "Catholic World," that the fact that what is called the Thomist philosophy has been allowed to be taught in Catholic schools, uncensured by the church, approved by heads of religious orders, held by the profoundest and most learned professors and doctors, gives it an authority which it is not lawful to question.

The geocentric theory, I believe, was taught in all Catholic schools down to the sixteenth century, and a Roman congregation pronounced the heliocentric theory, in the case of Galileo who defended it, false in science and heretical in faith; and yet this theory is now taught in Catholic schools and without censure. The Cartesian philosophy, as embodied in the Lugdunensis, was taught for years in Catholic schools, and

that is almost the direct contradictory of St. Thomas. The Wolff-Leibnitzian philosophy, as condensed by Storchenau, was for a long time used as a text book in Catholic schools in Italy under the very eyes of the Holy Father, also in other countries, and in religious orders, and I need not say that this philosophy differs widely from that of St. Thomas as I understand it. This is enough to show that the fact alleged by the "Catholic World" does not warrant the conclusion he draws from it.

In some of Dr. Brownson's earlier essays his thought is not always clearly and accurately expressed and tends to ontologism, if strictly taken, though that was far from his real meaning; but in his later writings he deviates in no respect from St. Thomas as he understood him, and he had studied St. Thomas perhaps with as much care and diligence as Father Kleutgen or Mein Herr Stoeckl. There is no decision of the church that I know of that binds one to take the "Catholic World," any German philosopher, or even the illustrious Society of Jesus, in general anti-Thomists, as infallible authority for determining the meaning of St. Thomas, and from which there lies no appeal.

Dr. Brownson deviates neither from the substance of his doctrine nor the spirit of his teach-

ing, but utters in the language of the nineteenth century what the Angelic Doctor wrote in a style adapted to the form of thought in the thirteenth, and undertakes to solve a problem which St. Thomas does not distinctly raise. St. Thomas holds that God is not *per se notus*, that is, the existence of God is not a self-evident or intuitive truth, but is demonstrable. So far both agree; God is not self-evident, or known by direct intuition, but may be proved to exist with certainty by reasoning. The principle of this reasoning or demonstration, according to St. Thomas, as of all reasoning, is the relation of cause and effect. The existence of God cannot, indeed, he says, be demonstrated by reasoning from cause to effect, but is proved by reasoning from effect to cause.

But cause and effect are correlatives and connote each the other. When we know something is an effect, we know it must have and actually has a cause. Then how do we know or prove anything is an effect, or form the judgment of the relation of cause and effect? This is Hume's problem. That is, how do we get the principle itself of the demonstration on which St. Thomas relies? As far as I know, this question St. Thomas nowhere distinctly answers, nor even raises. This question, raised by Hume, presents



a like question with regard to the first or necessary principles of all science. How do we come by them? Where in St. Thomas and the whole range of Thomist philosophy, or any other philosophy taught in Catholic schools, are we to look for an answer? Given the relation of cause and effect, and given the apprehension of effect as effect, any one of the five demonstrations of the existence of God presented by St. Thomas is conclusive, but all his demonstrations leave his postulate unproved.

Dr. Brownson reduced the postulate to actual science and established the principles of all science and all reality by showing by a severe analysis of thought and of the object in thought, that they are objective and presented intuitively to the mind, neither created nor supplied from itself to the human intellect, and that they are as certain as the fact that we think or exist. In doing this, he in no sense contradicted St. Thomas or questioned his philosophy. He only supplied a defect in that philosophy, which indeed in St. Thomas's time was not felt to be a defect, but which has become manifestly so, as he shows in the essay on "The Principle of Causality." Those who think it presumption on his part to suppose that he could either supply or detect a defect in the Thomist philosophy may



need to be reminded that a cobbler was able to point out a defect in the slipper of a statue by the sculptor Phidias.

Yielding to no one in his respect for the authority of the Holy See, or in prompt and unreserved submission to its definitions, decisions, or improbations, Dr. Brownson did not always conclude with Fathers Ramiere and Kleutgen, because the Holy See improbates a doctrine which he rejected, that she as a matter of course approves his, which is by no means its exact contradictory. Between it and the doctrine he defended there might be a *tertium quid*. He went as far as those excellent fathers and the writer in the "Catholic World," in holding that the Holy See has improbated ontologism, which he had always rejected, even before the Holy See had declared that it could not be safely taught, but he did not therefore conclude that the church gives her sanction to psychologism. These may be opposite errors, and the condemnation of the one does not necessarily imply the approbation of the other.

He generally avoided using the expression, intuition of being, although in his sense of the word, intuition, the expression does not fall under any improbation of the Holy See yet pronounced, for he did not hold that we have in-

tuition of being as being. The intuition is of the ideal, or what are called necessary truths but we know that these truths are all integrated in real and necessary being only by reflection and reasoning, by no means intuitively. Far less did he maintain that we have in this life intuition of God. Without intuition of these necessary truths, ideas he called them, we could have no science, for they are the principles of all science. That we hold them by intuition, as presented to the mind in sensible phantasms and intelligible species, might possibly be shown to be the doctrine of St. Thomas, and was maintained by the late Dr. Ward, of the "Dublin Review," and is, if I mistake not, by most if not all philosophers of the Society of Jesus.

Well, what are these necessary ideas, or necessary truths? Are they abstractions, or are they real? If abstractions, they are creatures of the mind and of no account; if they are real, they are either real existences or real being. But they are not existences as distinguished from being, for then they are creatures, and no creature can sustain the predicate necessary or universal. Then they must be and are real and necessary being, and consequently, intuition of them is in reality intuition of being, though we know it to be being, not by intuition, but by re-

flection. If in this, or in any question of philosophy, he dissents from St. Thomas, he had the right to do so if he showed good reasons for so doing, but I deny that he in any respect runs counter to the Angelic Doctor.

I maintain that there is no irreconcilable antagonism between Dr. Brownson and St. Thomas in regard to the ideal formula. For my part, I do not think it would be a hopeless task for a man who understood both to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, as mutually repellent as their respective systems are commonly considered. St. Thomas is in the main a follower of Aristotle, and Dr. Brownson follows more the principles and method of Plato, though he is less of a Platonist than St. Thomas is an Aristotelian or peripatetic. St. Thomas rarely deviates from "The Philosopher," except where his faith requires him to do so; Dr. Brownson frequently deserts Plato for philosophical as well as theological reasons. St. Thomas is oftener cited than read, and oftener read than understood, and few depart more widely from his real sense, as far as I can judge, than those who profess to be his disciples. I speak of him here only as a philosopher, not as a theological doctor. Dr. Brownson was never understood by his opponents, and I have never

seen any objection adduced by any of his critics that is an objection to any philosophical doctrine that I have ever found in his writings. I may not well understand either him or St. Thomas, but as I do understand them, though differing widely in their method and in the point of view from which they consider the same questions, they are on no essential point antagonistic one to the other.

St. Thomas asks, "*Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum*," whether that God is may be known per se, that is, immediately known, and answers, in se, yes; quoad nos, no. Therefore it is said that God is not affirmed to us, as Dr. Brownson maintains, in ideal intuition. This conclusion is not warranted, for the knowledge of which St. Thomas speaks is knowledge in the reflective order, and Dr. Brownson never pretends that any man from intuition can say, God is, and herein he differs from the ontologists, like Father Rothenflue, Father Fournier, and the school of Louvain; all he pretends is that the idea is intuitive, and by reflection on it as represented in language we discover that the idea is real being, and therefore God. Whatever is intuitive is that which is God, not that God is. Now this St. Thomas nowhere denies, but actually asserts, or at least, implies it in the very

article we have referred to, when replying to an objection based on the assertion of St. John Damascen, that the cognition of the existence of God is inserted naturally in all men, for he says that the cognition that God is, in a general and confused sense, in the respect that he is man's beatitude, is naturally inserted in us, for man naturally desires beatitude, and what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him. "Inserta est in nobis," inserted in us, is only another form of saying, is intuitively affirmed to us, or presented to us in ideal intuition, and whether he is affirmed as bonum or as ens makes no difference as to the fact of his being intuitively presented to the mind. But the holy doctor rightly adds that this is not to know that God is, as to know some one is coming is not to know Peter, although Peter is actually coming.

God is not, says St. Thomas, "per se notus," but that he is can be demonstrated by his effects. Effects manifest their causes, and hence we proceed from the effect to the cause. Thus God is, is demonstrable from his works, as says St. Paul, the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. This passage from St. Paul is the sole proof St.

Thomas adduces that the existence of God is demonstrable from his effects, or works, and yet St. Paul in this text asserts nothing of the sort. What he asserts is that the invisible things of God, his power and divinity, that is, character and attributes, are clearly seen from the foundation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, and this was all he had occasion to assert, for he was not arguing against those who deny that God is, but showing that those who know that he is are without excuse for failing to recognize his real character and attributes, and giving the glory that is his due to the corruptible creature, four-footed beasts, and creeping things (Sum. Theol., P. 1, Q. 1, A. 1, 2.)

The nature and character of the cause are manifested from the effect, as we say the workman is known by his work, or as our Lord says, ye shall know them by their fruits. So where the question is *Quid est Deus*, we answer it by referring to his works which reveal him, that is, partially answer it, for God does not exhaust himself in creation; so far from it that the Psalmist, pointing to his works, says they are but "the hiding of his power." But to the question, *An sit Deus*, the effects answer if we know them to be effects. The effect, unless appre-

hended as an effect, cannot answer, and if apprehended as an effect, it does not demonstrate the cause, but connotes it. Cause and effect are correlatives, as I have said before, and correlatives do not imply, they connote one another, and we cannot pronounce a thing an effect and proceed from it to the existence of a cause unless we know that it is caused, which we cannot know without knowing that it has a cause, though what cause we may not be able to say. St. Thomas was too profound a philosopher and too able a logician not to know that the mind must be in possession of the categories of cause and effect before it can pronounce this thing a cause and that thing an effect, and either deduce the effect from its knowledge of the cause, or induce the cause from its knowledge of the effect. Whence comes it then that he says the existence of God can be demonstrated by way of induction from the works of creation?

It is because he assumes that the mind is already in possession of the categories of cause and effect, as well as the other categories under which the mind must apprehend whatever it does apprehend, and the mind apprehending contingents under the category of effect is able at once to assert the category of the cause, and from the nature and character of the effect to



pronounce that the cause is God. Hence the appositeness of this quotation from St. Paul, which otherwise, as I have shown, could not have been at all to his purpose. This process is perfectly true and logical. But this shows that the question St. Thomas is discussing is not at all the question involved in the ideal intuition asserted by Dr. Brownson, as they who deny that the ideal formula is intuitive suppose. This question lies further back, and is a question as to the categories themselves, a question which, as far as I recollect, St. Thomas nowhere discusses. He takes them from Aristotle as the necessary forms of logic, without which there is no cognition, and no reason or reasoning. As far as I have read the works of St. Thomas, he leaves the question of the categories, or predicaments, just where they were left by Aristotle, as the necessary forms of logic, without determining the question how the mind obtains them, or whether they are real or only formal. He of course held that they are in the mind, or present to the mind, prior to experience, and are the necessary conditions, the a-priori element, of every fact of experience. But I do not find that he ever enters into any discussion of the question of their origin, though he evidently does not hold that they are obtained by the mind, or



imposed by it on the object, as Kant pretends. He considered them, no doubt, logical forms, giving the law to all knowledge, as they unquestionably are. Yet had the question come up as to the identity of the logical order with the real, he would have answered, as in the kindred case of universals, logic exists in the mind with a foundation in reality, which answer may be accepted, for logic is both formal and real. The ideal formula is only the reduction of the categories of the peripatetics to two, being and existences, and their relation—I say two, not three, for the relation is in the related, and the creative act of God is asserted in asserting, not God, which would be pantheism, but existences, identifying them with the real, and asserting that they are given, or immediately affirmed, by the real itself to the mind, which is what we call intuition, which as I have said, is not an act of the subject, but of the object, or God creating the mind and giving it the principles necessary to its activity as intelligent subject.

The formula is called ideal in a sense analogous to that of Plato, who calls the intelligible object idea, and because it is presented to the understanding as idea, or as the ideal part of our knowledge as distinguished from the experimental or empirical.

Plato had asserted ideas and their reality. The idea was the real thing which must be known in order to have real science. The sensible, the individual, the changeable, was in his language mimesis, and of no value in science save as directing us to the methexis, as the copy or imitation directs us to the original. The methexis is the participation of things of the divine ideas, in which is the real object of all science. Thus far Plato may be followed safely if we add that the mimesis is no less real than the methexis, and imitates the methexis as the methexis imitates being, or God, the place, as Leibnitz says, of ideas. But instead of making the methexis the participation of the divine ideas through the creative act of God, Plato made it the impression given by those ideas to pre-existing matter, as the impression of the seal on wax. This impression is the exact imitation of the divine idea, and from it we know the divine idea itself, and thus by rising through the mimesis to the methexis we rise to the divine ideal, to Being, which is being in itself. The really wise man stops at none of these degrees, not at the matter, not at the impression, but rising on the wings of intelligence and love, soars to Being in itself, the first good and the first fair, in which the soul will find her home

and regain the freedom, grandeur, and glory she had before she was imprisoned in matter, or united to body. The trouble here is that nothing is real save eternal being and eternal matter.

The term ideal is taken in the formula as objective, not as subjective, and as the ideal which precedes experience and renders experience possible, and what in every act of knowledge really enters as the necessary and apodictic element of human knowledge, and constitutes the basis of all demonstration, whether in metaphysics, mathematics, ethics, and aesthetics, or in the physical sciences, as cosmology, geology, chemistry, electricity, mechanics, physiology, philology, zoology, biology, sociology, etc. The formula is a priori, not empirical, and enters into all empirical science as its non-empirical element.

Now if you take any fact of understanding, or as the moderns say, a fact of consciousness, and analyze it, as Kant has done in his *Criticism of Pure Reason*, you will find in it a necessary element which enters into every intellectual fact, or thought, and a contingent or empirical element, and the necessary element is precisely the ideal formula, that is to say, whatever is thought is thought as necessary or as contin-

gent, and what is thought as contingent is thought as the product of the necessary or non-contingent, or in language perhaps more familiar to modern ears, to every fact of consciousness there is necessary as the condition of its production the a-priori ideas of the necessary, the contingent, and of the creative act which places the contingent.

Now bear in mind that abstractions are nullities, have no objective existence, are formed by the mind operating on the concrete objects presented intuitively or otherwise, and are apprehended only in the concrete, and that only concrete being or reality can be presented in intuition, and you at once perceive that the intuition of the ideal or of these a-priori ideas is the intuition of concrete reality. Thus you have the ideal formula, *ens creat existentias*, or real being creates existences.

In the first place, this formula contains the principle of all the real and all the knowable, for all the real must come under the head of being, existences, and the relation of existences to being. What is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God, and creatures can be distinguished from God and yet exist only by the creative act of God, the nexus that at once distinguishes and connects them. It gives

the principle of all the knowable, *omne scibile*, because what is not, or what is destitute of reality, is unintelligible. We can only know being and that which exists by the act of being. The formula is then complete, both in the order of being and in the order of science.

But all facts of knowledge, what we call science, include both the idea and the fact, and every fact includes the ideal or necessary and the contingent, and facts are not given intuitively save as contained in their most general or universal principle, and are obtainable only empirically, by observation and experience, as all philosophers except Platonists and neo-Platonists have always asserted, and as the common sense of mankind agrees. The ideal formula includes all that is given intuitively and this gives us only the ideal element of knowledge, that which is the *a-priori* element of experience, and which is the necessary, persisting, and invariable part of every fact of knowledge. It gives all knowledge in universo, as say the schoolmen, but never the knowledge of things in particular. Gioberti, in establishing his formula, departed not so widely from the scholastics as his admirers have thought or pretended, nor made any new discovery in philosophical science. What he has done is to collect and set forth in a distinct and

strictly scientific formula what is everywhere assumed by St. Thomas and underlies all his philosophical reasoning, and is given as the principle of all the philosophical solutions he offers.

I said the ideal formula expresses the principles of all the real and all the knowable, and all the knowable because all the real. Whatever is or exists is either God or creature; there is no middle term conceivable or possible; and hence the objective reason, in which Cousin integrates absolute or necessary ideas, and which he allows to be neither God nor man, but represents as something intermediary between God and creature, is an impossible reason. So the ens in genere, being in general, of Rosmini, one of the profoundest psychologists of modern times, and which he says is neither God nor creature, is a nullity. What is not in the one category either is nothing or it is in the other. Cousin, when he reduced the categories of Kant and Aristotle to substance and cause, taking cause for the caused, did much to simplify philosophy and to advance it; but when he resolved the whole ideal into the idea of the true, the beautiful, and the good, he omitted the whole second class of ideas, for the true, the beautiful, and the good are being under different phases. The *summum verum*, *summum pulchrum*, and *summum bo-*

num, are identically *summum ens*. Hence the charge of pantheism justly brought against his philosophy. To escape this charge he says God is substance, but substance only in that he is cause, as he is cause only in that he is substance, which makes God necessarily a cause and creation an evolution or emanation of himself, and no creation at all, but simply a subtler form of pantheism. This is the case with all the exclusive ontologists. If the ideal is being only we can in our science assert only being. The ontologists mutilate the ideal by cutting off the contingent, the creature, and the psychologists mutilate it by cutting off being and giving us for God, not being, but a generalization, an abstraction, a nullity. It, the ideal formula, must embrace both being and contingent existences, or science is impossible. But God and creature, or being, existence, and their real relation embrace all the real, and hence in the formula is intuitively given the principle of all the real and all the knowable. The contingent cannot be presented as being because it is not being, and therefore must be presented, if at all, as contingent; that is, in its real relation to being or God. It is the intuition of existences in their relation to God that forms the principle or basis of the whole inductive philosophy, and especial-



ly of the a-posteriori argument to prove the existence of God. This argument would have no force or validity, if the contingent were not held intuitively as contingent, and therefore in its real relation to being, real and necessary being. This relation is that of the effect to the cause, because it can be no other. The contingent can proceed from the non-contingent, existence from being, only by way of the creative act of being. Hence the ideal, that which precedes experience, and without which there could be no fact of knowledge, and which is creative and constitutive of the intellect, and enters as an essential element into every thought, fact of consciousness, or cognition, has been expressed in the formula, Real and necessary being creates existences, or God creates the heaven and the earth and all things visible and invisible.

That this formula is true no Christian theologian doubts or is permitted to doubt, for it is simply the first verse of Genesis, and the first article of the Nicene Creed; but that it is given intuitively has been very earnestly disputed, because they who oppose it mean one thing by intuition and they who assert its intuitive affirmation mean another. The ideal asserted in the formula is certainly a-priori, and therefore intuitive, and all arguments against either athe-

ism or pantheism, or to the existence of God or the fact of creation assume it, or depend on it as their principle, and the considerations presented show that it is not and cannot be the creation of the mind itself, nor mere forms of the understanding, unless you assume that Man is God, and as God, is his own subject and object, therefore self-existent and self-sufficing. But nobody pretends that the mind knows intuitively that the ideal is God and his creative act. Though God affirms himself in immediate intuition we do not know intuitively that what is affirmed is God, and therefore the formula as a formula is not intuitive, but that which is expressed by the formula is intuitive, because it is prior to experience, to every intellectual act, and without it there would and could be no human intellect capable of acting or experiencing. Therefore it must have been presented intuitively, since the mind could not exist and operate to find or invent it without it as its principle of existence and operation. The mind could no more find, invent, or obtain it than a man or any other creature could create himself or itself. Its affirmation, not by, but to, the understanding is necessary to create and constitute the intellect, and prior to it the man as an intelligent soul does not exist. It is impossible, then, that what

is expressed by the formula could have been obtained by discursion, by inference, by deduction or induction, and therefore could be obtained only as directly and immediately affirmed by the Creator himself. So much for the contents of the formula, if I may so speak, the ideas of being, existence, and of the creative act or causation.

But that these ideas are identically being creating existences, or the ideal being is God, Dr. Brownson does not pretend any more than do his peripatetic opponents. This is ascertained by the human mind reflecting through the aid of language which re-presents it, on the divine affirmations intuitively presented, which are the basis of all the demonstrations of the existence of God and of the fact of creation given us by St. Anselm, St. Thomas, Suarez, Fenelon, and philosophers and theologians universally. The ideal goes before knowledge, as that which renders understanding possible, and is presented immediately and directly as the immediate object and light of the intellect; the formula or scientific statement of what the divine judgment expresses is obtained by reflection, study, careful analysis of the facts of consciousness; in a word, experience; but it never could even in this way be arrived at had it not been re-presented

to the mind by revelation through the medium of language, the indispensable instrument of all reflective thought. The child, the savage, the unlettered rustic has present to his mind what the formula states, but only those who have the Holy Scriptures and have learned the Creed and the Catechism have the formula and can say *ens creat existentias*.

The formula has been objected to on the ground that it assumes that *ens*, the subject of the judgment, is real and necessary being, that is, God himself, for it is contended that though *ens*, or being, is the first object of the intellect, yet it may be possible being as well as real being; but this objection has been already answered in showing that only the real can affirm itself. The objection grows out of the supposition that the intuition is subjective, whereas it is here taken as an objective fact, and is the act not of the intellect, but of the object creating and constituting the intellect, and consequently only the real can be the object intuitively affirmed, because only the real is active, capable of acting. The possible is that which may exist, but does not, and is apprehensible only in the reality that can give it existence, or has the ability to realize it.

The formula is still further objected to in that

it supposes the creative act to be intuitively present to the mind. It may be concluded discursively, but not affirmed by us intuitively. If intuition be taken as our act, not as the act of the object showing itself to us, certainly not, but it must be recollected that the principle of all logical conclusions, of all the demonstrations of science, is the ideal intuitively presented, and if the creative act were not so presented it could not be concluded, demonstrated, or proved. Creatures are contingent, not necessary existences; they cannot stand alone, and cannot be asserted without asserting that which is not creature, which is not contingent, but necessary, and then only by asserting their relation to the necessary, and as only the real can affirm itself intuitively, only the real relation can be asserted, and the contingent can bear no other relation to the necessary but that of creature to creator. That relation is the creative act, and therefore the creative act is intuitively affirmed in affirming the relation of the contingent to the necessary, existences to being. This is no novelty, but is the assumption of all who undertake to prove the real existence of a created universe.

That the ideal basis, or the principles of all human science, is intuitive is held by all great philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, St. Au-

gustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Fenelon, Gerdil, and Gioberti. It is from the intuitive idea of the most perfect being intuitively present to the mind that St. Anselm draws the argument for the existence of God alike in his *Monologium* and in his *Proslogium*. Rosmini, in this respect, agrees with the others and professes to derive all our science from the intuition of being, although he and some others very inconsistently make the intuitive idea the idea of being in general, or *ens in genere*, which is an abstraction formed by the mind and in no sense an intuition. The mind cannot create, invent, or find its own principles of science, because it cannot operate or exist without principles, and first principles must therefore be given intuitively. This is evident of itself.

St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, Gerdil, and Gioberti, especially the last, are very generally understood to maintain that we know God intuitively, and not a few read the ideal formula as if it were, *Deus creat existentias*, God creates existences, but none of these philosophers, so far as I can understand them, maintains anything of the sort. What they assert is that the idea is intuitive, but that the idea is God none of them pretend to know by intuition. This is

known only by reflection, by the operations of the understanding itself. The ideal formula as given by Gioberti is not *Deus*, but *ens creat existens*, *l'ente crea l'esistente*. The identity of *l'ente*, or *ens*, with God is not given intuitively, but is obtained by reasoning, and is what we really do in demonstrating the existence of God, or that God is. Dr. Brownson, on this point, as to what is intuitively given, asserts nothing. St. Thomas denies when he denies that *Deum esse sit per se notum*. Things, says St. Thomas, are said to be known *per se*, or, as we say in English, self-evident, in a twofold sense, the one *secundum se*, or as to themselves, and *non quoad nos*, or as to us, or both as to themselves and as to us. Any proposition is known *per se* when the predicate is included in the subject, as *Man is an animal*, for *animal* is included in *man*. If therefore what is the predicate and what is the subject be known to all the proposition will be known to all (or self-evident), as appears from the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are certain common conceptions of which no one is ignorant, such as being and not being (*ens et non-ens*), the whole and the part, and the like. But if there are persons who are ignorant of what is the predicate and what the subject, the proposition will still be known *per*



se, or self-evident, yet not to them. Hence Boetius says there are certain general conceptions of the soul, as that incorporeals are not in place, which are known per se, or self-evident, only to the learned. I say therefore that the proposition God is, *Deus est*, is known per se as to itself, quantum in se est, since God is his own being or *esse*; but inasmuch as we know not what God is, it is not known per se to us, or to us as a self-evident proposition, but needs to be demonstrated by means of things more evident to us, though less evident in themselves, namely, effects.

I have cited this passage from the second question of the First Part of the *Summa Theologica* because it is supposed to be contradicted by the ideal intuition asserted by Dr. Brownson, but he does not maintain anything contrary to it, for he never pretends that the proposition, God is, is a self-evident proposition to us, and is known of itself as soon as it is announced, and in no need of being proved or demonstrated. He may not agree with St. Thomas as to the process of demonstration, but he agrees entirely with him that it needs to be demonstrated. But St. Thomas asserts in this passage that the first principles of demonstration are intuitive and includes among them being and not-being, the

whole and the part, and the like. All that Gioberti has done is to compress within a formula comprehensive and exact this ideal intuition on which all theologians, philosophers, and logicians base their demonstrations, and to show that the demonstrations are solid and conclusive by showing that the ideal on which they are based is objective and real, which is, after all only what Plato and St. Augustine had done, or, at least, asserted, before him.

St. Thomas agrees with Dr. Brownson in asserting the reality of the ideal, or the intelligible, for he says (*Ubi Supra*, Q. 87) that the object known is the real or the actual, not the possible, just as in sensible perception the eye does not see that which may be colored, but that which is colored. He teaches, further, that the human mind in the order of intelligibles is only in *potentia*, or possible, and becomes an actual or real mind by the act of the intelligible object; that the intelligible is superior to the intellect, and brings it from possibility to actuality, that is, actualizes it, or creates it, precisely what Dr. Brownson maintains, and from which we learn that the soul is created, and not, as Dr. Frochammer was condemned at Rome for asserting, generated.

With these explanatory remarks on the phil-

osophical principle and method followed in the present work, we may now proceed to the problem we have proposed for solution.

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## CHAPTER IV.

### RATIONALISM.

Rationalism is so called from ratio, reason. It is divided into pure and impure. Pure rationalism is the doctrine that man's natural reason suffices for itself, and solves all the problems of life that are solvable without aid received or needed from supernatural revelation. Impure rationalism does not deny, it indeed professes to assert supernatural revelation, but contends that nothing is revealed that is above reason, or that when revealed reason cannot by her own light freely comprehend or judge of both as to its intrinsic truth and meaning.

Pure rationalists differ much among themselves, but all agree in maintaining that reason is self-sufficing, in rejecting with disdain or contempt all pretensions to a divine revelation, and deny as unreal everything that professes to transcend the natural world. Nature is all that

is or exists, and beside it there is and can be nothing. All that is knowable in nature can be known by the right use of reason and the senses. The impure rationalists admit a supernatural God and creator of the universe, who reveals to us not mysteries, but the simple law of nature, which lies wholly within the sphere of reason. St. Thomas maintains in his "Contra Gentiles," that the choice minds of the race, the learned and the highly cultivated might find out and know the natural law by reason alone, but the mass of mankind could not, and that for them its divine revelation is necessary. The impure rationalists agree so far with St. Thomas, but reject his teaching when he asserts not only supernatural revelation of the law of nature or the intelligible, but the supernatural revelation of the superintelligible, or mysteries which remain mysteries after revelation. They deny all revelation of anything which when revealed is above reason, and consequently the whole supernatural order. Revelation serves them as grace serves the Pelagians; they can do with it nothing which they could not, strictly speaking, do without it, but more easily with than without it. Moreover, with them revelation is needed at all only in the infancy of the race, and in proportion as the race advance and come to the mature exercise

of their reason, there is no longer any necessity of revelation, and religion itself is transformed into philosophy. So that they in reality, the pure and impure rationalists, differ only temporarily as to the means of knowing and not at all as to the objects known or believed.

Reason is certainly common to all men, and is the natural light of the human understanding, without which no man could have any intelligence, or any intellectual or moral life. Some psychologists make reason and understanding identical, and regard them as our intellectual faculty, or power of knowing. Others distinguish them, and make reason and understanding, the *Vernunft* and the *Verstand* of the Germans, two distinct faculties of the soul without mental dependence the one on the other. Kant and most Germans since Kant distinguish them. Cousin and the French eclectics identify them, and hold that reason is our only faculty of intelligence, that by which we know all that we do know, whatever its sphere, its object, or degree. The psychological question is of no great importance to our present purpose, but is not without its bearing on the capacities of creatures like the dog, the horse, the rat, and various other animals to which it is hardly possible to deny every degree of intelligence, and to whom

it is still harder to concede any degree of reason. Reason and understanding may be the same, or, rather, understanding may be reason in man, but yet, in some sense, in their nature distinguishable. Be this as it may, reason is at least the light of the soul and the characteristic, or differentia, as say the schoolmen, of man, who is usually defined a rational animal, whether it is so because what is simple intelligence in animals is transformed into reason in him, or because reason is really distinct from understanding, it may be difficult to decide. Perhaps understanding should be taken as the subjective faculty, and reason not as a subjective faculty, but as the objective light which informs the subjective faculty and makes it understanding. This whole question of reason is important and interesting, but it suffices to say here, what nobody will seriously question, that all men have reason, or the light of reason, in some degree, and without it there is no understanding, no intellectual life, no proper human acts, or acts done by the man himself and for which he is morally responsible.

We know only by reason, and consequently can know nothing above reason and believe nothing that is unreasonable. Whatever lies above the plane of reason and is unillumined by

the light of reason is to us superintelligible, and whatever contradicts that which is so illumined or is known by reason is to us absolutely incredible. To say of any proposition that it is unreasonable is the same as to say it is unintelligible; and to say that it is unintelligible is the same as to say that it is unreal, untrue, false, nothing at all. It can neither be known nor believed. No man does or can know what is unreal or false, for it is nothing, and nothing can be no object of knowledge; so also no man believes or can believe what appears to his understanding to be unreasonable, or to contradict his reason. The word of God is ample and conclusive authority for any and every proposition for which we really have it, for it is impossible for God to lie; but the fact that a given proposition is unreasonable or against reason is conclusive evidence that for that proposition we have not the word of God. The proof of its falsity is stronger than any possible proof that God has revealed or asserted it.

Hence we gain this important result, that there never is and never can be any real antagonism between faith and reason, for no man ever does or can believe what conflicts, really conflicts we mean, with his reason. No man does or can believe the Christian mysteries so long as



to his understanding they appear to be unreasonable, and before he does or can explicitly believe them he must be enabled to see that, though above reason and incomprehensible by reason, they are yet not unreasonable or contradictory to reason. So far the rationalists are right in principle, and no depreciation of reason as a false and deceptive light, no exaltation of revelation at the expense of reason, can make them wrong. We may mistake other lights for that of reason, but reason herself is a true light, and never misleads or deceives. The intellect, St. Thomas maintains, is never false, and error proceeds from ignorance, not intelligence. Faith is distinguishable from knowledge, is an intellectual act, is in the intellect, as St. Thomas asserts, as its subject, *tanquam in subjecto*, and can be no more false or deceptive than reason herself.

But the rationalists forget that a thing may be above reason without being contrary to reason, and that what is above reason may be essential to the existence and operation of reason, even in relation to matters which are not above it. By rejecting as unreal all beyond and above natural reason, or at least by denying the revelation to faith of anything above the plane of reason or the intelligible, the rationalists are far

from escaping from all difficulties and contradictions. Reason, all men feel, has her limits and is unable to enlighten all reality. Logicians say *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*, but the human mind is far from believing that beyond what appears to us there is no existence, nothing real. No man confounds the unknown which everywhere confronts us, with the unreal or unexisting; and every active mind is ever driven on by the unquenchable thirst of knowledge to assail the unknown. Mr. Herbert Spencer, the ablest writer of the rationalistic school in Great Britain, if not in all Europe, does not venture to deny that the division of the universe which he calls the unknowable—he should have written superintelligible—is real, and in the unknowable he places the root, the origin and causes of things, which for ought we know or can know may be very real. The philosopher, he contends, cannot deny that they are, but as they are unknowable he can make no account of them and must proceed to construct his science precisely as if they were not, because to him being unknowable they are not and can have no place in human science. Human science can be true only relatively to man, and he should learn to give up all aspiration to absolute science. When we have drawn clearly and dis-

tinctly the line that defines the knowable, we must leave all beyond it, as beyond the bounds of science.

All this may seem facile and wise to the rationalist or positivist, but the human mind refuses to be restricted to the intelligible, and in spite of everything it will regard Mr. Herbert Spencer's unknowable as superintelligible. The philosophers who would confine the soul in her aspirations and beliefs to the world which is knowable to us have never been able to succeed. She does not doubt and cannot doubt if she would that there is more than she is able to know, and that she has in herself capacities not yet realized or realizable in the order of nature. Man has wants that the intelligible does not and cannot satisfy; in the language of the eloquent Channing, "he thirsts for an unbounded good," and with more or less energy, with more or less wisdom, he unceasingly strives for it. Sir William Hamilton maintains with the sturdiness of his character that man has no power to think the infinite, but certain it is that the soul craves that which only the infinite can satisfy, never can she be filled with the finite. The eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing. The more a man knows, the more he hungers and thirsts to know; the more the eye

sees, the more he sees there is to be seen which is as yet unseen and invisible. Give a man all the good things of this world and they soon pall upon his senses, and he turns from them in disgust or clings to them without deriving any satisfaction or pleasure from them. Even human love, pure and holy as it may be preserved, never suffices for human love.

Love may be exhausted, it may lose its fullness, it may die, and the soul deplore the loss of that which when present gave her no pleasure. The soul is never satisfied with what it has, and is always seeking after that which it has not.

Always it asketh, asketh,  
And each answer is a lie,  
So take thy quest through nature,  
It through thousand natures ply;  
Ask on, thou clothed eternity;  
Time is the false reply.

There is no true good, no real satisfaction for the soul of man, or for man himself, that is finite and restricted to the world of time and space, and no man ever felt it more keenly than the pantheistic or naturalistic author of that New England poem, the Sphinx. "Time is the false reply." You deceive yourself, O man, if you think the world and its phenomena, man and his theories, woman and her love, can answer

your ceaseless questioning, or fill up the void within your heart. The lesson is as old as the ages, and the fact on which it is founded is indisputable and indestructible.

Philosophers, sages, theologians, moralists, preachers in all nations, and in all ages, have taken notice of the fact that man is not and cannot either in his desire for knowledge, in his craving for love, or his hunger and thirst for good, be satisfied with what the rationalist calls the knowable and which is naturally attainable, and Solomon after having plucked the choicest flowers and gathered the richest fruits that nature bears, exclaimed in terms which all experience echoes, *Vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas*, vanity of vanities, all is vanity. The origin and cause of this fact which inspires much of the poetry and underlies all the tragedy of life, this is not the place to explain; but it certainly indicates in the soul a sense, a feeling, a belief, that there is a superintelligible world as real and as necessary to us as the intelligible world. We know not by natural reason what it is, nor how it may be attained to or possessed, but that it is, and that our beatitude, the fulfilment of our existence is in it, the soul is firmly persuaded, and fire and water will not beat her out of her persuasion. Hence in all ages and nations we

find mankind asserting the reality of the unseen and the invisible, and holding it to be the chief aim of life to maintain proper relations with it.

Rationalists do not pretend to deny the fact noted, but seek to escape its force by attributing it to superstition, or priestcraft which has perverted human nature, or clothed it with false habits. This were very well, only priestcraft, as every other craft, must have some real principle on which it operates, and which it perverts to base and selfish purposes, or it would be powerless; superstition is only the misapplication of a principle it neither invents nor creates, and so far from originating the fact noted, it is itself only an abuse of that fact. If there were not in the soul the belief that there is a reality that transcends the intelligible there could be no more superstition than religion, for superstition is simply a sin against religion by way of excess. Has education originated it? Education can only draw forth what is in the soul, or infuse into it what it has the capacity and aptitude to receive. You could hardly by any possible training generate a similar fact in your dog or your horse. Then whence could the educators themselves get their first notion of it, or their ability to teach it? The educators could get it only from educators, and who gave it to the first edu-

cators? If the human soul had not in it some intimation of the supernatural, some belief in its reality, though ignorant of what it is, there could be in men nothing from which superstition could be developed or evolved normally or abnormally. All religion supposes a superintelligible reality, and that man has in some way, naturally or supernaturally, a relation more or less intimate with the unseen and invisible. Scholars and thinkers highly esteemed by the age, and who would scorn to be taken as believers in the divine inspiration of the Old and New Testaments, have in our own day written elaborate and really erudite works to prove that the religious sentiment is natural to man, and is as universal and as indestructible as human nature itself; and as they identify the religious sentiment with the mysterious fact noted, their testimony goes for whatever it is worth to prove the fact itself a natural psychical fact, as it in some sense really is.

I draw here no argument to prove the existence of this fact or faculty of the soul in favor of the truth of religion of any sort, or to prove that there is beyond the intelligible a superintelligible reality. It may or may not create a presumption that there is, but all that I pretend to prove by it is that the human mind does not be-



lieve and cannot be made to believe, or be satisfied to believe reason is unlimited, or that her intellectual powers are adequate to the cognition of all reality. Here in the outset is a grave difficulty for pure rationalism for which its own principles can furnish no solution, and which places it, without other light than its own, in contradiction with itself, and proves that rationalism does not suffice for rationalism.

Moreover, that staunch rationalist, Mr. Herbert Spencer, who would not willingly either deceive himself or mislead his readers, banishes to the category of the unknowable, or unintelligible, all questions relating to the origin, principle, and causes of things, and restricts the knowable to sensible or material facts and phenomena. We know not things in their principle and cause, have no knowledge of the relation of cause and effect, and know things only under the relations of coexistence and succession. Hence science is only the statement, description, and classification of facts or phenomena, and his biology, or science of life, recognizes no principle of life, but attempts to show how the vital phenomena are evolved from the mechanical, chemical, and electric changes or arrangements and combinations of material atoms, the old atomic theory of Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus,

so charmingly chanted by the poet Lucretius.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, no doubt, in this mutilates the intelligible world, and excludes from the category of the knowable much that is within the province of reason, which the impure rationalists assert, and rightfully assert, for they admit supernatural revelation as a means of knowing, though not as a ground of faith in anything suprarational. But the pure rationalist, as will be explained further on, can go no further than Mr. Herbert Spencer, since we do and can know only what is sensibly represented to the understanding, and therefore by the natural understanding alone only sensible facts or phenomena, or what falls under the observation of the senses. And this is precisely the difficulty with pure rationalism. In relegating principles and causes to the category of the unknowable, it renders impossible all science even of the intelligible, and thus mutilates reason itself. The statement, description, and classification of atomic changes and combinations of matter, whether mechanical, chemical, or electric, is a very necessary preparation for the construction of the physical sciences, but is not itself science, and with it, unless you know something more, you are no wiser than without, for you know the reason of nothing, explain nothing, any more

than you do when you say two and two, and do not add two and two are four. To restrict human intelligence to sensible phenomena alone is to reduce human intellect below that of the lower orders of creatures whose senses are often acuter and further reaching than man's. The hound and the horse are not usually regarded as capable of science, but they have ordinarily as good eyes and ears as man. Science is not in observing and simply classifying facts, but in knowing principles and causes, and in referring the facts to their principles and causes, and arranging them under the law of their generation and production. Animals observe and to a certain extent classify phenomena as well as man. The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib, the dog confounds not his master with a stranger, a white man with a negro, a gentleman with a beggar. To deny that man can know principles or facts under any other relations than those of coexistence and succession is simply to deny reason itself and degrade human science to the level of brute intelligence.

There are, in fact, men standing high in the scientific world, if not at its head, to whom this would be no *reductio ad absurdum*, or anything more than they are disposed to believe and are collecting and classifying facts to prove. They

have placed man in the order of mammalia at the head, but in the order of the animals amongst which the mother suckles her young, and they are laboring to find proofs that there is a regular progression from the mineral to the plant, from the plant to the animal, and from the lowest forms of animality up to man. They entertain seriously, perhaps hope to establish the hypothesis that man is simply the chimpanzee or gorilla developed or completed, and they are already nearly convinced that the best developed of the simian touch the lowest of the human family. It is singular how little anything but anatomical structure or some incidental peculiarity which gives no hint of the quality or property of the plant or animal is considered by naturalists in their classifications. One may master the whole Linnean science of botany and know nothing more of the qualities or properties of a single plant than before, and in the classification of man his soul, his reason, his moral and intellectual qualities or capacities count for nothing. Indeed, men endowed with rare intellectual powers, with rare genius even, are hard at work to prove that man is merely an animal, not only figuratively, but literally a brute, not apparently reflecting that till they can find brutes engaged in establishing the same

thesis they have very little chance of success. It is very doubtful, to say the least, if even the latter class of animals take any interest in the problems and laborious investigations so attractive to the Comtes, the Littres, the Owens, the Huxleys, the Liebiges, the Darwins, the Herbert Spencers, or could comprehend as much of their theories as they do themselves.

But be this as it may, and though our men of science both by precept and example have done their best to prove science impossible and to efface all radical distinction between man and the brute, and really have proved that rationalism left to itself soon ceases to be rational, their labors have not been in vain, and by their unwearied industry they have amassed abundant and invaluable materials for the construction of the sciences which the philosopher has hitherto lacked. Their inductions, though invalid on their own theories, are often just and have led to the most useful applications in the mechanical and industrial arts, because the human mind has a more truly dialectic constitution than they recognize. They have explored every corner of the globe, they have thrown great light on physical geography, enumerated, described, and classified, very unscientifically often, an immense variety of four-footed beasts, reptiles, birds and

fishes, enlarged our menageries, and enriched our jardins de plantes, and given us a cosmos far more extensive and comprehensive than that of Aristotle or Pliny the Elder. Enough will remain when their absurd theories and hypotheses are exploded and forgotten, and science placed in accord with common sense, though man be no longer regarded as a developed monkey, to command the gratitude of mankind.

The positivists, who and from their absurd religious pretensions, are the best representatives of pure rationalism just now to be found, though they may have disappeared before these pages are read, tell us plainly that we can know only sensible facts and phenomena under the relations of coexistence and succession, that principles and causes are for us pure entia rationis, mere metaphysical abstractions, and therefore sheer nullities, that for us at least there are no principles or causes, first or final causes, that all things are to us simply phenomenal, and that truth and science are only phenomenal, relative, varying with time and place. Suppose that it is so, that they are right, you can never bring mankind to believe it. Men do and will continue to believe that there is eternal and unchanging truth, that there are eternal, universal, and immutable principles, that all things that change



are contingent and have a cause independent of themselves, and that facts and phenomena, till known in their principles and causes, are not really known at all. People do not believe and will not believe that facts exist without being made, or that they can be made without a maker; they do not believe nor can be made to believe that phenomena can subsist by themselves without anything under them to sustain them, or of which they are phenomena; and till they do so believe they will not be contented to seek no further. Topsy's answer, I didn't come, I growed, is not generally satisfactory. Do you say Topsy was right, and her answer, instead of being taken as a proof of the stupidity of an un-instructed negro girl, should be taken as an evidence of the most advanced philosophy of the age? Do you say that men ought not to look beyond the phenomenal, that they should confine their thoughts and desires to the relative, the sensible, the phenomenal world, that is to the symbol without seeking its meaning, what do you but fall into the precise fault which the rationalists are perpetually bringing against the exclusive supernaturalists, that they forbid men the free and full exercise of reason? It is as necessary to suppress reason to keep people within the narrow limits of pure rationalism as



within the limits of pure supernaturalism. What scope is there for reason in a system that includes in the category of the knowable only sensible facts, or phenomena without their noumena?

The human mind cannot be made to stop with the relative, for the relative not existing alone or having the principle and cause of its existence in itself, is not by itself alone in the category of the knowable. The relative is conceivable only in relation, and the relation is conceivable only in the related, or the correlatives. The conception of a thing as relative connotes the conception of that which is not relative, but absolute. Sir William Hamilton has gained much credit by maintaining that the human mind cannot think the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, and his philosophy on this point is generally accepted by the English-speaking world, but if he is right, man cannot think at all, for he cannot think the finite, the particular, the relative, the conditioned without thinking simultaneously and in one and the same thought that which bounds, conditions, and makes the relative, as I have abundantly shown. Thus pure rationalism leads inevitably, as its ablest expounders present it, to nihilism. The mind cannot think the unconditioned, says Sir Wi-

liam, for the very thought that thinks it conditions it; but it cannot think the conditioned without the unconditioned, for without it the conditioned is nothing, is not thinkable.

But without pushing rationalism so far, and conceding that we can and do perceive in sensible things, not merely the phenomena or phantasms, but directly the things themselves, still it is only the sensible properties of things, not the substance or suppositum in which the properties inhere, or of which they are properties, that we perceive, for substances are in all cases supersensible, and are grasped not by the senses, but by the intellect or noetic faculty of the soul. They pertain to the intelligible order, not to the sensible, as theologians have abundantly proved by the ontological and psychological investigations which have been provoked by the controversies respecting Transubstantiation, and Sir William Hamilton himself, the great champion of the direct perception of things against the peripatetics, who maintain that we perceive directly and immediately only their phantasms or, as the moderns say, their phenomena, does not pretend the contrary. All he pretends is that he has exploded the theory of representative ideas and proved that we perceive directly the external objects themselves.

Whether Sir William holds that we grasp the substances or not, is not very clear, and if he does he holds that it is discursively, as a logical induction from the sensible properties, or by a principle of the mental constitution, as did Dr. Reid, which creates an invincible belief that there is a supersensible substance in which the sensible properties inhere. That man has a real noetic faculty and does through the medium of the sensible, or sensible representation, really perceive the intelligible or supersensible, is a fact that I shall prove further on. If the rationalists claim that the reason intuitively or discursively attains to the supersensible substance in the sense of supporter of the sensible properties, their claim will be conceded, for I also hold the sensible, while in its order as real as the intelligible, to be mimetic or symbolical of the supersensible. But even conceding all this, which is more than most rationalists will accept, still as the substances are intelligible and above the senses, so are the essences of things above substances, superintelligible and not cognizable by reason at all. The sensible properties depend on the intelligible substance, and the intelligible substance on the superintelligible essence. Hence both the sensible and the intelligible, the properties and their substance,

have their origin, their principle, their cause, or ground in the superintelligible essence, or in what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the unknowable, and consequently can be scientifically known only in knowing the superintelligible. Hence rationalism, even if it rise above the sensible to the intelligible, can never be really science, because it must always remain ignorant of the essence of the intelligible.

The essence is not unfrequently confounded with substance, and by the scholastics is taken to mean the whole thing, its substance, nature, and properties; but this is not its theological nor its popular sense. All the theologians agree that the essence of God, or God in his essence, is in no sense cognizable by the natural powers of any creature, and yet St. Paul assumes that the Romans knew God, and he blames them when they knew him for not worshipping him as God. They, he says, are without excuse, "because from the creation of the world, the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." It is clear then that the theologians must distinguish between knowing that God is and is God, and knowing him in his essence, or as he is in himself, that is, in his essence. This essence is what he is in his being or in himself.

Hence St. John says, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know we shall be like him because we shall see him as he is," plainly implying that though we now know his being and attributes we do not know, do not see him as he is in himself, that is, in his essence. At least, this is the interpretation the theologians give. The essence of a thing according to the theologians then is, that which is intrinsically, in itself, that which makes it what it is, the *causa essentialis*, or that, as Webster defines it, which constitutes the peculiar nature, or being, or substance, and distinguishes it from every other. And this is the popular sense of the word, at least in English. It is that which it is necessary to know in order to have real science, but is that which reason cannot in anything attain to. The essence of God is suprarational, and can be known only through what theologians call the *ens supernaturale*, or glorification; and as the essences of things are intelligible only in the essence of God, they too are in all cases superintelligible.

Now as we do not know and cannot know by natural reason the essences of things, and as all in the thing depends on the essence, we come back to the previous conclusion that rationalism under none of its forms can attain to absolute

science, and agree with Sir William Hamilton, Herbert Spencer, and the positivists, that with reason alone all our knowledge is relative. Sir William Hamilton, as we have seen, denies that man can attain to the knowledge of the absolute, the non-relative, the unconditioned, and therefore he excludes ontology, or the science of being, from the domain of human science, and restricts philosophy to psychology and logic. But since without being there is and can be neither logic nor psychology, the real result at which he arrives is that philosophy is an illusion, a phantasmagoria, and that for man there is no real science, no knowledge, but universal nescience.

But here again we encounter a difficulty. Pyrrhonism is an impossibility. If it is certain that there is no absolute knowledge, or knowledge of that which is absolute, equally certain is it that there can be no absolute or universal nescience. No man ever does or can arrive at the pleasant state described by Byron, in which one not only doubts of all things, but even doubts if doubt be doubting. To doubt is an intellectual act, no less than to believe. He who doubts knows that he doubts, and therefore knows something. He who doubts, by the very act of doubting, asserts the truthfulness of the reason by which he doubts, and therefore that



she is a true, not a false or deceptive light, and therefore is as true when and where she affirms as when and where she doubts. Men neither do nor can distrust either their reason or their senses, and consequently men are never practically sceptics, and, however they in their speculations tend to universal scepticism, they are still firm believers in the real existence of themselves, of the universe, and of other men.

In showing that reason cannot recognize her own limitations except in the intuition of the suprarational which limits it, which intuition is impossible to reason—because she can take cognizance only of that which is positive, which really exists, in fact only of being, and limitation is negative, is neither existence nor being, but their absence, no being, and can be cognizable by reason only in the intuition of existence or being which is unlimited and imposes on reason her limits,—the principle is established that negatives are in themselves unintelligible, or inconceivable, and are intelligible only in the being affirmed. It is impossible to frame a form of words that expresses universal negation. In the assertion, there is nothing, or nothing is, the assertion is made by the assertion of being, expressed by is, the verb to be. I cannot deny my own existence, because in denying I affirm the



denier. While then rationalism tends to nihilism or nescience, it is impossible to carry mankind with it, as they are constantly brought back instinctively and logically to the assertion of being and science. This is the objection to it, that it is either too much or too little for itself. No man can follow it in its tendency either to science or to nescience, without falling into gross sophisms; or, in other words, rationalism is illogical, cannot answer the dialectic demands of the understanding, and therefore is not a complete and harmonious whole capable of sufficing for itself.

The reason of this is plain enough. Rationalism is far less than nature, and nature herself does not and cannot suffice for herself, because she has not in herself, or is not herself, her own origin and end, has not in herself her own being, which is necessarily in her creator, for, as says St. Paul, "in him we live, and move, and have our being," which is as true of the whole of nature as of any part of nature. Rationalism starts with the assumption that nature suffices for herself and is explicable without reference to the Creator, who is supernatural, and it arrives at nothing, simply because nature without the Creator is nothing. Hence necessarily nihilism. But notwithstanding nature is not noth-

ing, but a real existence, cognizable by reason, and hence the possibility and reality of rational science, but only in the conditions on which nature herself exists.

The difficulty grows out of the insane attempt to found purely rationalist science, or a science based on pure reason, which Reid, Kant, Sir William Hamilton, and the experience of philosophers for over two centuries have demonstrated to be impracticable. It is not necessary, nor proper to make philosophy the ancilla or the handmaid of theology, as did the scholastics, which was to mistake both the nature and the office of reason; nor will it do to attempt to found science on faith, or principles which are certain only by supernatural revelation, as do the so-called traditionalists, which were to deny both reason and revelation: but philosophy should never be detached from theology, though distinguished from it, and erected into a separate and independent science. An independent science, complete in itself, we have seen it is not and cannot be. It was not detached from theology with either the ancient Jews or the ancient gentiles, except by the atomists or hylozoists. It constituted the rational element of theology, as it did in fact with the fathers and the mediaeval doctors, as Cousin, than who, on such a

point, no better authority can be desired, maintains, though he thinks it a great wrong to philosophy.

There is an apparent exception to this remark with Christian fathers, but no real exception; because what they distinguish under the name of philosophy from theology founded on faith is not reason or the rational element of theological science, but the Greek, or gentile, wisdom, or science. There was a distinction always recognized between science and revelation, reason and faith; but no separation was recognized till after the revival of Greek letters in the fifteenth century, or fully effected before the seventeenth century, which may be regarded as the point where reason became detached from faith, to the great detriment of both. The man who completed the separation and attempted the impossible task of erecting philosophy into a complete and independent science was the Bas-Breton Rene Descartes. Scotus Erigena dreamt of it in the ninth century, Abelard, also a Celt, attempted it in the twelfth century, Pomponazzi and others timidly asserted it in the fifteenth, and Telesio and Campanella in the sixteenth, but it was completed by Descartes in the seventeenth century.

Descartes starts with the assumption that

philosophy as purely rational science is possible and practicable. He erases from his mind all previous instructions, beliefs, or convictions, cuts himself, or attempts to cut himself, loose from antiquity and tradition, and places himself in the position of a man who doubts of every thing, and will believe nothing, not even his own existence, till it is proved to him after the manner of the geometricians. It matters not to us whether his methodical doubt was real or feigned, or provisorily assumed; for if he had ever really doubted he could never have got over his doubt by the sad dialectics of his system. He gets, or professes to get out of his doubt by his famous enthymem, *Cogito, ergo sum*; I think, therefore, I exist. He concludes his own existence from the fact that he thinks, the existence of God from his own, and the universe from God. This is the process prescribed by his method, and every step in it is illogical, and indefensible. The existence of the universe can be concluded by way of logical deduction from the existence of God only on condition that creation is a necessary, not a free act, and therefore that the universe is a mode, manifestation, emanation, or evolution of God, which is pure pantheism, the greatest of all sophisms. Benedict Spinoza, the apostate Jew of Amsterdam,

was the most faithful and the greatest disciple Descartes has yet had.

The existence of God, again, cannot be logically deduced from our own personal existence. Deduction is simply analysis, and can give only the contents of the subject analyzed. To be able to say, I exist, therefore God is, would require me to be God, or to contain God as one of my essential attributes, or properties. Finally, the enthymem, I think, therefore I exist, is a manifest paralogism, as more than one of his contemporaries pointed out to him, for "I exist" is already asserted in "I think."

Hard pressed by his contemporaries, Descartes, in one of his letters, abandons his Cogito, ergo sum, and says that he never meant it as an argument, but as a simple statement of a fact in which he finds, or becomes conscious of, his existence. Undeniably, an afterthought; but let that pass. He then takes the fact of his existence from his consciousness, which is only an interior or subjective sentiment or affection, from which nothing is logically deducible, no substantive existence or persisting subject, far less God or the exterior universe. Hence he gave birth to pure subjectivism, or, as it has been called, by a strange misuse of terms, idealism, first in the denial of the externity of the uni-

verse with Berkeley and Collier, and also to the pure sensism of the Abbe Condillac, and Jefferson's friend, Destutt de Tracy, who held that the soul, the sentient subject itself, what we call me, myself, is only sensation transformed, whatever that may mean—a conclusion not a little favored by the fact that Descartes regarded the soul, not as thinking subject, but as thought, *la pensee*, and Leroux, when in his "*L'humanite*" he denies to the individual man all substantive existence as an individual and defines him to be sensation—sentiment—*connaissance*, only preserves and follows the teaching of Descartes, who evidently supposed thought without a thinker. There is scarcely an error or an absurdity in all modern philosophy, not one, so far as my reading goes, the germ of which is not contained in the teaching of Descartes, who never had the first spark of the *ingegno filosofico*, and scarcely the first rudiments of philosophical erudition. The Abbe Condillac developed Descartes faithfully in one direction, as Spinoza did in another. Malebranche, Bossuet and Fenelon, commonly counted Cartesians, may have borrowed from him a few phrases, or a few forms, but they are theologians, and never accepted his systematic views; they belonged to a better school, followed purer traditions, and



were, any one of them, incomparably his superior as philosophers.

Descartes himself became aware that God cannot be concluded by way of deduction from our own personal existence, and then maintained that God is known to be from the idea of God innate in the soul; but by idea he does not mean God himself who affirms himself as ens, or being, to the mind, but he takes idea in a representative sense, as the image or species stamped on the soul as the impression of a seal on wax, in which sense, notwithstanding Plato's doctrine of ideas, there is no evidence for supposing that there are any such things as innate ideas, and if the idea of God were so impressed or engraven on the soul, it would not at all help us to the knowledge of the fact, for it would leave us without any means of ascertaining whether there is anything really existing to correspond to the idea in the mind or soul. To this grave difficulty, the *pons asinorum* of all philosophers who assert representative ideas, Descartes has no other answer than to allege the veracity of God, when the question is whether there be a God or not! He forgot his method is to doubt of everything till proved by rational deduction, and therefore must prove by his method that God is before he



can adduce his veracity. To say that we know God by an innate idea representative of him, and then allege his veracity to prove that the idea does represent him, is not a very conclusive, if sometimes a very convenient, way of reasoning. There is no question that Descartes believed much, or that he embodied in his various works much truth, because he was a man and received Christian instruction, and had not, as much as he may have labored to do it, cut himself loose from tradition; but what of truth he held he arrived at by another process than the method he prescribes, and to which he could never have attained if he had been left to his own method.

If Descartes corrupted philosophy by seeking to erect it into a separate and independent science, complete in the natural order, Hume, in the first half of the eighteenth century, went far towards proving that the empirical philosophy attempted in England by Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, is without the slightest scientific value, and what he failed to do, Kant has since completed. Hume proves as clearly as anything of the sort can be proved that we have and can have no experience of the relation of cause and effect—no experience of cause, particular or general, contingent or necessary, or that things

are connected by any other relation than that of time and place; but, he adds, that though no other relation is provable from experience, yet no man does or can believe that there is no other relation between them. Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, who has rendered an important service by exploding the old doctrine of representative ideas and asserting the direct perception of things themselves, or, at least, their sensible properties, made a great show of refuting Hume, but really does not differ from him. He merely insists more earnestly on the inability to disbelieve in the reality of power, cause, causation, and asserts that it proceeds from a principle of common sense, or a constituent principle of human nature, and is one of the first principles of reasoning which must be taken without proof, assumed, as self-evident. That is, he simply generalized the fact conceded by Hume, and erected it into a principle, but never gave it any scientific explanation or demonstrated its scientific validity.

But Immanuel Kant, a man by nature kindred to the Greek Aristotle, and the greatest philosopher Germany has given birth to, with the exception of Leibnitz, if, indeed, Leibnitz be an exception, has settled the question, as a question of pure reason, in favor of Hume, although

it has been pretended by some able men, who more admired the transcendental philosophy than they understood it, that Kant's purpose was to refute Hume's scepticism, and that he succeeded in doing it. But such is in neither respect the fact. He simply took occasion from the publication of the "Treatise on Human Nature," or, as finally modified, "Essays on the Human Understanding," to examine anew, thoroughly and impartially, the whole question, and, as far as possible, determine what we can and cannot do by reason, whether empirical or a priori. The result he gives in his "Kritik der Reinen Vernunft," and which, as he himself sums it in his Preface, is "to demolish reason to make way for faith," the very result that Descartes had before him arrived at, without perceiving it, when he based all his proofs on the veracity of God, without having as yet proved in any manner that God is, and also the very result at which his greatest disciple, Sir William Hamilton, arrives, which is ably set forth in the "Limits of Religious Thought," by Sir William's disciple, Henry Longueville Mansel, which should have been entitled "Limits of Reason." It is, in fine, the result, so far as reason detached from revelation goes, at which arrived the distinguished Cardinal Newman, as is evident from his "Apol-

ogia pro Vita Sua," and at which had prior to him arrived Pascal, Huet, Bishop d'Avranches, and Viscount de Bonald, founder of the French school of traditionalists.

None of these great men are to be classed as practical sceptics, or to be regarded as holding that the human race can attain to nothing affirmative. Pascal, Huet, De Bonald, and Newman fall back on revelation and bring in faith to supply the defect of reason; Reid fell back on what he calls the principles of common sense, or constituent principles of the human understanding; Kant fell back on what he calls the practical reason, very nearly the common sense of Reid; and Father Buffier, that is, as we explain it, on reason, taken not as pure speculative reason, but taken in sensu composito, as actually formed by revelation or tradition and cultivation. Newman evidently gets over the difficulty, not by reason alone, nor by revelation alone, but by their combined or blended light, as the Holy See has somewhere defined, mutually assisting each other. Hamilton and Mansel, as far as they affirm at all, appear to do it on faith, which has with them no rational motive.

Whether any of these ways is to be accepted, or whether there is any possible way of solving the difficulty, or not, this much is certain, name-

ly, pure rationalism is impracticable and self-contradictory. It proceeds on the assumption that nature is complete in herself, and is explicable without referring to anything above or beyond herself, which, not being the fact, the science founded on it must be incomplete and baseless. Nature is not a complete, independent and self-sufficing order. It is not a self-existent order, as is evident from its very dependence and incompleteness, and has and must have its principle and cause, its origin and end, in that which transcends it and is strictly supernatural. The natural begins and ends in the supernatural, without which it does not and cannot exist. Sever it from the supernatural and it would be simply nothing, a pure nullity. Reason, then, even if commensurate with nature, could not alone give us a science of nature, because nature alone is inexplicable, as has been amply proved by the sad failures of your natural philosophers who undertake to explain it, or the least of its phenomena, without a First and a Final Cause. A complete, self-consistent and self-coherent rationalist science, founded on natural reason alone, is simply impossible.

This conclusion is confirmed by the experience of all ages and nations. The rationalist has always had all of reason, and all of nature, and if

he is right in rejecting the supernatural, he has had no obstacles to overcome but such as are inherent in reason and nature themselves, and when and where has he been able to construct a rationalistic system that would hang together, or with which reason herself is or can be satisfied? All exclusive rationalism in all ages and nations has proved an intellectual failure, and no people are more thoroughly persuaded of it than rationalists themselves, who are noted for their ridicule of one another, and for the ease with which they explode one another's systems. The greatest philosophical geniuses that have ever lived have failed equally with the smallest, and there is something sad in the tone with which Theodore Jouffroy says the poor plough-boy who has learned his Christian Catechism has solved for him the problems which the philosophers seek in vain to solve. The common sense of mankind is far more scientific and contains far more truth than the theories of the greatest philosophers, and Cousin very justly maintains that all that philosophy can do is to explain and verify common sense, or the common beliefs of mankind, always, and everywhere, and by all. Mankind do not believe, and have never believed, in purely rationalistic science; but they believe, and always and every-



where have believed, that true philosophy, true science, real knowledge, what the Greeks called *sophia*, is the joint product of reason and revelation.

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## CHAPTER V.

### REVELATION.

Every author, somebody has said, whatever else he may write, always writes himself. Every man enters into his thought and act as one of its elements, and enters in spite of himself as he is. No one, however skilful an actor he may be, can wholly divest himself of himself, and think and act as another. Even in his imitations of others something of himself appears, and every one will have his own manner of imitation. It is impossible for the human mind to make a complete abstraction from what it has assimilated from tradition, and throw itself back into the state in which it might have been if we could suppose it without any tradition at all; that is, in a state of pure reason, inheriting nothing from the ages, and receiving no instruction from without. The human race has never ex-



isted in that state. It has always had, or believed that it had, a revelation of some sort, and been always engaged with ideas, principles, beliefs, which all the philosophers say are not obtainable from pure reason; and these ideas, principles, beliefs, are the constituent elements of what is called common sense, the common sense of mankind.

Of course, there always has been, and always must be, the part of reason in all philosophy, as in all theology, and in that part reason is in no sense a false or illusory light; but with the rational part or element there has always been another element, without which the rational element would be inoperative, and there would and could be no theology and no philosophy, no science of any kind, properly so called. Certain is it that the understanding has been developed and won its most brilliant victories even within the domain of reason herself in view of ideas, principles, and beliefs not obtained from reason; either in efforts to disprove, or to explain and verify them. The great philosophers in all ages have been theologians, and the rationalistic philosophy of the day would be a far more meagre thing than it is, but for the light thrown on the real world and on the human understanding by the discussions and investiga-

tions provoked by the great mysteries of faith. Indeed philosophy owes its entire existence to men's belief in the unseen and the eternal and to their efforts to understand and adjust their relations with the supernatural. It lives and flourishes only with faith, and droops and dies as faith declines and disappears.

The great fact, however, on which I here insist, is that practical understanding is not and never has been formed by pure reason alone; or, in other words, reason never operates, never has operated, alone. It does not operate so even in pure rationalists themselves, and there are elements operative in their life, or in their minds, not derived from reason, and which are apparently in contradiction with it; certainly elements which they do not and cannot reconcile with it, as I have shown in the foregoing pages. The positivists, than who none have succeeded better in eliminating from their minds everything derived from revelation, nevertheless bear unmistakable traces of having been brought up in the bosom of Christian civilization, and many of the arguments they use against Christians are drawn from Christian sources. The Cartesian method excludes all revelation, all tradition, and doubts of everything, at least provisorily, but the Cartesian philosophy, as constructed by Des-

cartes, is composed of fragments of Christian theology, poorly explained, badly joined together, and worse proved. Kant's "Kritik" excludes all science and all tradition, retaining nothing but the subject and its forms, modes, or affections, but the moral and political doctrines which he founds on what he calls the practical reason borrow largely from Christian morality. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, never pretend to build with the individual reason alone, but use freely the materials supplied by tradition, and the defects of their philosophy are all owing to the fact that they had not tradition in its purity and integrity. They took never the abstract reason, but reason in the composite sense, as including tradition as well as rational intuitions. We find in Greece, Rome and several other nations, as we find in modern nations, men who rejected not only the fables of the gods, but sadly mistook the nature and attributes of the Divinity, and attempted to explain nature without transcending nature; yet these by their controversies and denials, bear witness to the fact that the great body of the people had a traditionary belief in divine revelation, that God, or the gods, had made known the divine will to men, and that they themselves had been reared in that belief. All the lettered nations of the ancient

world had their sacred books, and the unlettered had their traditions orally preserved by the heads of families, and transmitted from father to son, under the guardianship of the priests or great sacerdotal corporations. No nation or tribe has ever yet been found so ignorant, or so enlightened, as to have no religious conception, no belief in supernatural powers, and no form of worship or communion with the supernatural. This has been used as an argument to prove that religion is natural to man, and it does prove that mankind have always thought and acted under the belief that they had in some form a supernatural revelation.

In this respect there is no difference between Jews or Christians and the gentiles. All alike believe in the fact of divine revelation, that man has never been left to the light of nature alone, and that his reason has always acted in combination with divine revelation, or what was held to be such. Both Jews and Christians hold that God has made a revelation of his will supernaturally to our first parents in the garden, which has been handed down to us in a broken, mutilated, or travestied form through the gentiles or nations that apostatized, and an unbroken form, and in its purity and integrity through the patriarchs and the synagogue and, the Chris-

tian adds, through the church. The Christian fathers and doctors never teach that the human race was left without revelation till the advent of our Lord, or even till Abraham, but that revelation was made in the beginning. St. Augustine speaks for them all when he says, times vary, but faith does not vary: as believed the patriarchs (patres) so believe we; only they believed Christ was to come, and we, that he has come. St. Thomas, an authority not second to St. Augustine, maintains that there never has been but one revelation, and that was made, at least in substance, to Adam in the garden, to the progenitor of the race, whose duty it was to transmit it unimpaired to his posterity. The Holy Scriptures tell us, "there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding," and speaking of our first parents, representatives of the race, that God "filled them with the knowledge of understanding; he created in them the science of the spirit, he filled their hearts with wisdom, and showed them both good and evil. Moreover, he gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." All this implies a primitive revelation, divine instructions to our first parents as to what they must believe, and which they were to transmit as an inheritance to their posterity.

This is not adduced, I hasten to say, to prove the fact of divine revelation, or that any supernatural revelation has ever actually been made; but to prove the fact that the tradition, oral or written, of a divine revelation is universal and unbroken, and therefore that the human understanding has always existed and acted in combination with a real or supposed revelation, and it never has acted or can act otherwise. The Athenians erected an altar to the "Unknown God!" Cicero prayed to the Great Unknown, and the French atheist, Volney, in a storm on Lake Erie, and a storm on Lake Erie, before steamers were used on it, was no child's play, prayed to God as a Christian to save him. So the poor mother who had or supposed she had no faith, watching her dying boy, raised her hands, and with agony in her heart and eyes, exclaimed: "O, thou Unknown, save my child." These and thousands of similar instances prove that, be the revelation true or be it false, the human understanding has assimilated its great principles, and that to deny it we are obliged to do violence to ourselves, rend, as it were, our own heart and soul, as every one who has fallen into unbelief knows but too well from his own experience. Few bitterer things are ever felt than the loss of our childhood's faith, and we

almost curse in our anguish the intelligence that has destroyed it. It has taken from us the best part of ourselves, and if it has relieved us from the terrors of the Stygian waves and the gloomy Tartarus, it has dispeopled Heaven and made earth a desert, and placed us on a mere point in space, surrounded by a universal blank. Fill up the blank, be it with devils and goblins damned; they are something, and anything is better than nothing.

The Holy See, in its rescript against the French traditionalists, asserts that the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and human freedom can be proved with certainty prior to, or independently of, faith. This, in the sense intended by the Holy See, must be accepted by every Catholic. The traditionalists maintained, or were supposed to maintain, that faith precedes science, and that reason in its operations must support itself in all matters transcending the senses on revelation as its basis. That is, they founded science on faith, and faith on the veracity of God, without any rational certainty that God is, or that there is any God. Till we know that God is we cannot assert his veracity, and therefore must know that he is and that he is God and infinitely true, before we can believe in his word. The doctrine



of the traditionalists would therefore destroy both faith and reason, and leave us only the intelligence we have in common with many classes of animals. But the condemnation does not require us to maintain that man did not first learn the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and human freedom from revelation, or the instructions which God gave him for an inheritance when he placed him in the garden; but that these great truths, though not discoverable by uninstructed reason, can yet be proved with certainty by reason, without the principles or premises which are certain only by faith. St. Thomas, as we have seen, who holds that the law of nature is rationally certain, asserts that it has been revealed and that without its revelation the bulk of mankind could not become acquainted with its precepts. Yet St. Thomas holds the law of nature to be a dictamen of reason, and therefore could not have made it depend on faith or revelation for its scientific basis.

Science certainly does not depend in the order intelligible to us on revelation or faith as its ground or principle of certainty, which is what and all that the rescript of the Holy See censures in the traditionalists, and yet revelation, not faith, may be necessary as a means or con-

dition of science even of the intelligible. The intelligible as the ideal is undoubtedly presented to the mind in immediate intuition. This is the common doctrine of all those whom the world honors as its great philosophers, and were it not so, there could be no science, no reasoning, no demonstration, for all demonstration consists in showing that the proposition demonstrated has its ground, or is founded in the principles intuitively given. The human mind can neither operate nor exist without intelligible principles. It cannot therefore either find or make its principles, for nothing can act before it exists, or without the principles of its existence and activity. The intelligible principles must be given immediately by the Creator in creating the mind and rendering it capable of mental operations. The principles are intelligible, and therefore cannot, as the sensists dream, be obtained by the mind from sensation, for, till it has them, it does not exist, is no mind at all. But these principles constitute, I may say create, the mind, its very faculty of knowing, and we call knowledge only that which the mind knows by the exercise of its faculty of knowing. The intuition is not knowledge in this sense, but the principle of knowledge and basis of all rational certainty.

But St. Thomas holds that the existence of

God is not self-evident to us. To the question, *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum*, he answers, *non quoad nos*. The pretense that we have intuition of God, or know him intuitively, set up by some philosophers, is sustained by no great philosopher, ancient or modern. That that which is God is intuitively affirmed to us, is maintained by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Malebranche, Fenelon, Gerdil, Gioberti, and others; but none of them pretend that we know intuitively that what is so affirmed is God. What is intuitively affirmed is the ideal, which is God as the intelligible, or in face of our intelligence; but we know that the ideal is God not intuitively, but by reflection, by discursion, or reasoning. On this point there is no difference between St. Thomas and Gioberti, for they both hold that the intuitive ens is known to be God only by demonstration.

Conceding or maintaining that the intelligible as idea, or the ideal, or what some philosophers call absolute ideas or necessary ideas, and the peripatetics call the first principles of knowledge, are given intuitively, the difficulty with the pure rationalists lies in the fact that the reflective reason, the proper human reason, cannot take these principles, ideas, intuitively presented, immediately from intuition and convert

them into human science. We are not pure intelligences and are incapable of pure intellects, and can, as our own proper act, know the intelligible, idea, or supersensible, that is, the spiritual, only as sensibly represented. This is the meaning of the peripatetic maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, nothing can be in the intellect which was not previously in the senses. It does not mean with Aristotle and St. Thomas that we cannot know intelligibles or non-sensibles, but that we can know them only as sensibly represented. Man acts as he is, he is not pure spirit, but spirit united to body, and hence he cannot in this life act, think, or know either as pure spirit or pure body, or pure matter. This fact is forgotten by the pure sensists on the one hand and by the pure idealists on the other. We can perform purely intellectual or noetic acts, behold immediately the spiritual, and have intuitive vision of God only when our bodies are raised spiritual bodies and transformed into the likeness of our Lord's glorious body. Hence we can in our present state of existence see the spiritual only through a glass darkly, *per speculum in aenigmate*, as says St. Paul, which is as true in the intelligible as in the superintelligible order.

The Abbe Condillac seized upon the fact that

we can know only through the medium of sensible representation and came to the conclusion that we can know only sensibles, and then all thought or knowledge is a sensation, and then finally that the sentient subject is only sensation transformed, or something sensing itself. This extreme sensism has now few eminently distinguished advocates, but the greater part of those who have undertaken to refute it, have run to the opposite extreme and make the body count for nothing in the fact of cognition. The ablest, the most erudite, as well as the most brilliant of those who have made war on exclusive sensism, is Victor Cousin, and there is not a finer piece of philosophical criticism in any civilized language than his review of Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding." Yet it errs in the first place by taking Locke as a pure sensist, which he is not; for Locke understands the maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, not in the sense that only sensibles are knowable, but in its proper sense, that nothing can be known not sensibly represented. He errs in the next place by separating in action sensibility and intellect, and making them act syncretically instead of synthetically, or dialectically, or more simply, he fails to assert the unity of the cognitive subject, as also of the cognitive

act. In reading him we fail to see the part of sensibility in the cognition of intelligibles and the part of intellect in sensation or the perception of sensibles. Sense and reason are not blended so as to act as a single sentient-cognitive, and a single cognitive-sentient subject. Leroux, in his "Refutation de l'Eclectisme," escapes this error or defect, and shows very clearly, as he also does in his "L'Humanite," that in every act, no matter of what kind or sort, the two, or, as he contends, the three psychological elements, in his language sensation—sentiment—connaissance, enter as the single subject, but unhappily he gives these elements of thought no subsistence in the individual, no subject, but the general man, which is to make the individual merely phenomenal, unreal.

Viscount de Bonald, the profoundest thinker in France at the beginning of the present century, less brilliant than his friend, Count de Maistre, but endowed with a far superior philosophic genius, gave the principle of the solution in his doctrine that man does not and cannot think without language, and that language is not a human, but a divine creation. In developing this principle he founded the modern traditional school, which has incurred the censure of the Holy See, but which notwithstand-

ing has brought out and established a great truth. M. de Bonald erred in not distinguishing between intuitive thought and reflective thought. He does not take note of ideal intuition which serves as the rational basis or gives the principles of all science, and which is the creative act of God rather than a proper human act, and took thought only in the sense that it is our act, that is, reflection. Cousin was one of the first—as far as my reading goes, the very first, not indeed to distinguish between intuition and reflection, for that is as old as philosophy, but the impersonal character of intuition and the personal character of reflection; but he failed to derive from the distinction all it really implies, by making intuition the act of the impersonal or spontaneous reason which, save as to the mode of its action, he identifies with the personal reason, and thus destroys all the scientific value of the distinction. Cousin never got quite clear of the old doctrine of representative ideas, and never understood that the ideal is God, and not an abstract world, or sort of *tertium quid* interposed between God and man, and distinct from each, being neither God nor creature, and therefore nothing. The same is true equally of that profound psychologist, the learned and pious Rosmini, who divided the best



minds of young Italy with Gioberti. He makes the ideal ens, but ens in genere, therefore an abstraction, a mere possible being, but no real being, corresponding precisely with das reine Seyn of Hegel, which Hegel himself declares is identical with das Nichtseyn. The pure being of Hegel is simply possible being, and possible being is really no being at all. All abstractions, save in the concrete reality, are simply nullities, the truth philosophers are slow to recognize.

But distinguishing between intuitive thought and reflection, and understanding De Bonald to mean by thought reflection, what the Italians, in their language so well adapted to the use of the philosopher, call ripensare, to think over or to re-think, his doctrine that we cannot think without language is sound and undeniable. In purely sensibles language is not necessary to thought, because the object is sensibly present. I can think a tree when it is before me as well without the word tree as with it, but I cannot as well recall it or reflect on it when absent. In non-sensibles it is different, and I can think them only as sensibly represented by language. If I had not the word soul I could never grasp the ideal intuition, and it is only through the word God that I am able to find what the word signifies in what is intuitively presented to me.

Through the medium of language I am first instructed in spiritual truth, and then I find by reflection that what I am taught, so far as it is within the intelligible order, has already been affirmed to me in the ideal intuition.

Now, language, which may be defined a sensible sign or representation of the intelligible, is not a human invention, but a divine creation. Men out of society could not have invented it, and society is not possible without language. It could not have been the spontaneous growth of human nature, for there is more in it than in human nature, than in all nature. No doubt language adopts its symbolism from external nature, or the sensible order, and must do so or not be able to be a sensible representation of intuitive ideas. But this says nothing against its divine origin, for it was only a mind that comprehended the whole order of intelligible truth that could have constructed a language adequate to its representation.

Whoever studies language, not as a grammarian or philologist, as these terms are now understood, but as a philosopher, will find it a succession of surprises. There is more and deeper and truer philosophy embodied in language than the philosophers have ever mastered, and the study of language is the best method

possible of studying ideal science, for language corresponds to the ideal intuition, and bears in its very structure, its forms, its power of development, expansion, and expression that it proceeds from the same universal Mind that planned and created the universe. It accords with reality, with the truth of things, and lends itself with difficulty to the expression of error and falsehood, and never without violence. It proves to those who have understanding what many people, even revered as philosophers, need to be taught, that pure negation is unintelligible, and that in no language is it possible to express a negative without first making an affirmation. We say such or such a thing is—not. The thing is affirmed before it is denied. Hence affirmation precedes denial, faith goes before doubt, and truth before error and is older than falsehood. Hence error is intelligible only in the truth denied. The very construction of language symbolizes the ideal formula, *ens creat existentias*, being creates existences, since no sentence can be formed which does not consist of the subject, predicate, and copula, and therefore the essential formula of all reality, all logic, of all philosophy that is worthy of the name. It stubbornly resists both atheism and pantheism, and in every sentence it forms ex-

presses the truth that contradicts them. The moment a man opens his mouth to utter these great sophisms his speech betrays him, his language becomes confused, incoherent, self-contradictory, unintelligible, and language is the greatest protector of the people against them, for the people left in the simplicity of language and common sense are never atheists or pantheists. Hence the people are always truer in their beliefs than philosophers in their speculations.

Indeed, this is in accordance with the office of language, which is to represent to the reflective faculty what is affirmed in ideal intuition. It is in some sense a glass which reflects the intuitive affirmations and enables the understanding to contemplate them at its ease. But as the intuitive affirmations are not made by us, are not made by the reason, of which they are creative and constitutive, it follows necessarily that language which symbolizes or represents them in the process of thought cannot be of human origin, cannot be our invention or construction, for we could not invent or construct it without a reflective knowledge of the intuitive affirmations, and that knowledge is impossible without language, and therefore it must be supernaturally given, as are the intuitions themselves. What we call our reason is natural in the sense

that it pertains to that nature with which we are created, but it, as every thing created, is created by the supernatural. The rationalists have proved beyond all cavil that nature has no natural origin or cause, and therefore conclude, since they will admit nothing supernatural, that it has no origin, no cause, at all. The vague impression that many, who hold that the world was created, have that nature and its creator, that is, as its creator, stand in the same order, and therefore that the act creative of nature is a natural and not a supernatural act, is an erroneous impression. Supernatural is God and whatever he does directly and immediately by himself. Natural is the created order and what God does through the medium or agencies of its laws or forces as second causes. The cause of nature is supernatural, and as the rational nature we call man is formed only by reason, and reason is constituted only by the affirmations which I name ideal intuition, it follows that the affirmations are supernaturally made, that is, by the Creator himself, which is neither more nor less than saying that our reason is supernaturally created. The ideal affirmations or intuitions having then a supernatural cause, the language which is to symbolize them and to re-present them to the reflective faculty, must

also have a supernatural cause, or be like the intuitions the direct work of the Creator.

The essential point is that language was created directly by God himself as necessary to the creation and operation of the understanding in man. How God created language is not now the question. The theologians generally hold that God infused language into man along with the knowledge with which he created him, or rather, that he infused the knowledge in which he instructed the first man under its appropriate sensible signs or representations. Adam could not have been created and left with the naked faculty of understanding without instruction, for without instruction that faculty cannot act or, as the rationalists say, be developed; and there was no one to instruct him but his Maker. Hence the Holy Scriptures teach, in a passage from Ecclesiasticus already quoted, that God gave our first parents "instructions and the law of life for an inheritance." Adam must have had infused knowledge then, even of those things which his posterity possess by acquisition and inheritance, and this knowledge, though infused, could not be possessed by Adam, and be his, or be understood by him without its appropriate sensible representations any more than the intuitive affirmations themselves. It must

have been infused as embodied in language, and it may be assumed that the creation of language and the infusion of science were simultaneous in the one divine creative act that created man a living soul, or a living, thinking, speaking man, the father, in the order of generation, of the human race.

According to this view, which is that of the theologians, language was not created or formed, and given to man as empty signs, or signs signifying nothing, but the sign and its signification, the word and its meaning were given together. In exercising his faculties Adam found the word and its sense married to each other, just as we do now, only he was taught directly by God, and we only indirectly, through tradition preserved in language and transmitted by it from father to son, and teacher to pupil, down to us. These direct instructions infused into Adam were instructions to the race, because the race was in Adam. Adam learned language as he learned things, as we learn it as we learn things, and used it to express his thought to himself or to others, as we do. The necessity of language as the condition of thinking or the interior word will be shown in another volume when treating the mystery of the Trinity and the generation of the Word, or second person in the



Godhead, should the author live to complete it.

But there are languages innumerable, and all living languages are continually undergoing modifications, losing old locutions and adopting new ones, leaving behind old words and taking up new words, and using old words in new senses. The ordinary Englishman cannot read old Gower or Chaucer without a glossary, nor an ordinary Frenchman the chronicles of the Sire de Joinville, or even of Sir John Froissart. Dante is read with ease only by learned Italians, and not always by them without a special preparation, and the *Nibelungenlied* needs to be translated to be understood readily by a modern German. Are all these different languages, with all their variations and changes, given immediately by the Creator, and are philologists wholly wrong in supposing them produced by natural laws or causes, formed by derivation one from another, by being mixed one with another by migration, trade, colonization, conquest, and also by the influence of climate, of soil, of moral and social habits and conditions? If they are not, what was the original language? What language did Adam speak? What has become of that language? If the various languages and dialects now spoken are not divine creations, how maintain that language is supernaturally given?

Language may have been supernaturally given, that is, immediately by the Creator in the first instance, and yet be subject to natural laws in its transmission from father to son. The human race was created immediately by the Almighty, and therefore supernaturally, yet is developed, multiplied, more or less modified, and continued by the operation of natural laws or causes, and though all men have sprung by natural generation from the same original pair, they differ among themselves no less than do the languages they speak. The philologists are right in attempting to explain the developments, changes, variations, differences they note in language by natural causes, but they do not succeed in finding any language which they regard as primitive, and from which all the others have been naturally derived. All the languages they become acquainted with bear evidence in themselves that they are not primitive, but at best are only of secondary or tertiary formation. Subjected to the natural laws, languages are like all things in time and space liable to perpetual changes, and hence the necessity, in order to maintain the unity and integrity of the idea, of some supernatural provision, the divinely assisted church say the Catholics, a divinely inspired book say the Protestants, to preserve the

unity and integrity of language. It was the loss of this unity and integrity, or confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel, according to Jewish and Christian tradition, that led to the dispersion of mankind and the great gentile apostasy.

But after all it is necessary to distinguish in language, as in other things, between the substance and its accidental forms and variations. Language itself retains its substantial identity under all its changes and alterations, as does human nature itself, which is the same nature in the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the American Indian, and in the African negro; in the Jew, the gentile, the Christian and the pagan, the Mohammedan and the Buddhist, the believer and the unbeliever, the just and the unjust. The nature of a sheep is the same, whether the sheep be white or black, and the black sheep may be born of white parents. There may be deteriorations in language, as there are in the human race, but the elements of all languages are the same. All have the noun and the verb, that is subject, predicate, and copula, and there are philologists of great respectability that maintain that the radicals of all languages are the same. This is certainly the case with the Semitic and Japetic, and if the connecting link between

these and some of the African and the so-called Turanian languages is not yet ascertained, that is not saying that it never existed or does not yet exist. Nothing can be concluded from the inability of philologists to detect the traces of radical identity, for in the changes which have gone on during a long series of ages, what is called the radical letter may have been lost, as we find it frequently has been in words evidently derived from others which originally had it, and which is retained in the corresponding words in cognate dialects. Climate and other physical conditions, modes of life, social habits, may have so modified pronunciation or so affected the physical organs of speech, the muscles, that in languages which have no written monuments but must be learned from the ear, from the voice, no trace of the radical sounds may be discoverable even where they really exist. In the Semitic, especially in the Japetic or Aryan languages, the law which governs the changes which consonantal sounds undergo is to some extent known and determinable, but in the African and American languages it is unknown and can hardly be known, since they are not written languages. In writing our North American dialects great blunders are often made, and the lexicographers give in an assimilated form

as single words what are really phrases or sentences. If then philologists have not succeeded in proving that "the earth was of one tongue and of the same speech," as the Holy Scriptures assert, they have proved and can prove nothing against it, any more than naturalists have against the unity of the human race. The greatest scientific authorities agree that science, while it is not able from its own light to assert the unity of the human race, or the descent by natural generation from a single original pair, can assert nothing against it. In all such cases, the rule of judgment is to follow tradition. If we assume that all men sprung from a single pair, and therefore the unity of the race, which is undeniably the Christian doctrine, and which nothing disproves, the original unity of language follows as a matter of course, and then the common-sense conclusion is that languages have undergone changes and split into various dialects by like changes which the human race itself has undergone, and which have divided it into so many distinct varieties, families, nations, and races, now so far asunder that it seems hardly credible that they were originally all of one and the same race.

But be all this as it may, the elements of all languages, I repeat, are the same. Their logic,

and the essential principles of their grammar are the same, and so also is their representative or symbolic character. All the rest is accidental, and by whatever causes produced, affects not the assertion of the divine and supernatural origin already proved; for that assertion does not preclude, and is not intended to preclude, the accidental changes, variations, or even corruptions of language under the influence of natural causes, the strongest and most corrupting of which is and always has been that of the philosophers, or rather sophists, so abundant in every age and nation. The people never corrupt language; they are faithful to tradition, or at least the last to depart from it, and therefore are able to express themselves in the language of their ancestors; and one of the most encouraging signs of the times is in the fact that philologists are turning their attention to the simple and natural language of the people in simpler and less artificial ages than the present. Percy and those who have followed him have in reviving the old English ballad poetry rendered great service to the English philologist, and the French are doing still more for the French philologist in returning to the French poetical chronicles and romances of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The sophists having lost the

sense of tradition, or ceasing to respect it, are perpetually concocting new theories which have no foundation in reality, and which they can contrive to express only by wresting language from its plain natural sense, by the introduction of neologisms which are repugnant to its genius, and tend only to mar its simplicity and despoil it of its dialectic harmony, and hence the more speculative a people is, and the more generally educated it is, if not educated in accordance with tradition, the more does it corrupt its language and unfit it to be the symbol of ideal truth. The earliest stage of a language is that which best expresses the tradition of divine revelation, only we must not take it as we find it with savages as in its earliest stage, for the savage is not the primitive, but the degenerate man.

The primitive revelation necessary to the human understanding is made as embodied in language and is transmitted with more or less purity and integrity along with language in all nations, so that no people who has inherited language is wholly destitute of divine revelation supernaturally made. This revelation transmitted from father to son from Adam to us is what is called tradition and forms the traditional element of the human understanding itself, without which there would be intuition indeed,



but no practical understanding. Thus far De Bonald and the French traditionalists are evidently right, and so far the Holy See has not, as I understand its rescript, censured them.

Now as language is not words without meaning, though many people use it as if such were the fact, but signs which are significant, and as the understanding cannot seize and appropriate the ideal intuition, or intuitive affirmations, save as sensibly represented in language, which is supernaturally given, it follows that there is and can be no science without divine and supernatural revelation which represents to the mind or reflective reason what God affirms or presents to it intuitively. But what is sensibly represented that lies within the order of our intelligence is seen, when so represented, to be only the reproduction or reaffirmation, or affirmation by us, of what God affirms intuitively and in affirming which he creates us rational creatures. It therefore cannot be denied without denying reason itself, which cannot be done in any possible form of words. This as to the principles of science settles in advance the question of certainty.

The difference between this doctrine and that of the traditionalists on one hand, and the doctrine of the pure rationalists on the other, is

very plain and very great. It does not deny reason or in the least distrust it, nor does it in the order of our intelligence found the conclusions obtained on the authority of revelation or tradition. Such may indeed be the case with the simple and unlearned, as St. Thomas implies when he asserts the necessity for them of the revelation of the precepts of the law of nature, but not with the learned, the cultivated, the scientific. With these the ground of assent is reason, intuitive or discursive, and therefore is the assent of knowledge strictly so called. Nor, on the other hand, does it assert the ability of reason to construct science without the aid of revelation or tradition embodied in language, even in the intelligible order. For that revelation is necessary, not as a substitute for reason, nor as a ground of certainty, but to represent in a tangible form to the reflective understanding the spiritual or intelligible object presented by God himself as the ideal to reason.

God affirms himself immediately as the creator, object, and light of the intellect, but for the intellect to be able on its side to affirm the same, God must be sensibly represented in language through the medium of the word God, creator, object, light to the reflective understanding. We cannot demonstrate and know

that God is unless he is represented to the mind, or unless we are told that he is, any more than we can demonstrate the truth or falsity of a thesis that we have never heard of, or that has never been stated to the understanding, and as God can be represented to the mind only by revelation or tradition, though living, moving, and having our being in him, though really asserting in every act, every thought, every word, every argument, that which really is God, we should yet never know him, or that he is that very universal, eternal, necessary, and immutable idea which is always intuitively present and which is to the understanding as the correlative of the contingent, the finite, the mutable, the transitory. The light would be the life of men, would shine in the darkness, and the darkness all in apprehending it, would comprehend or know it not. What in Adam was direct revelation, or divine instruction, is tradition in us, and this tradition is not necessary as the ground of science, but necessary as one of its indispensable conditions, so that we say that every act of science implies a union or synthesis of revelation and reason.

To this it may be very pertinently objected, that, if true in the ideal order, it is not true in the order of sensible things, for sensible objects

need no representation by sensible signs. Sensible objects present and represent themselves. I can know a rock, a plant, a tree, as well without knowing its name as by knowing it. No doubt of it. But the knowledge of the sensible, as I have said in treating of facts and phenomena, is not properly science, and Plato has shown that science is not in knowing particular or sensible things, but in knowing their ideas, or as I say, the ideal. It may be that our scientific men rarely attain to anything more than sensible facts, but they aspire to more, and seek from the observation of sensible particulars to induce a law which explains and governs them, and laws, that is, causes and principles are in the supersensible or intelligible, and are never, and Hume and Kant have shown they never can be, the object of sensible observation or experience. There is in this no distrust of the senses; in their normal state their testimony is unimpeachable, and they depose truly as far as they go, and hence in the mystery of the Real Presence or Transubstantiation, the report of the senses is accepted, for every theologian will maintain that all that the senses perceive, or all that is sensible in the bread and the wine remains unchanged, and only that which is non-sensible is transubstantiated, so that the conclusion drawn from

the report of the senses, which is ordinarily true, is in this case rendered by a miracle not valid. Mankind credit, and cannot be made to discredit them. They never have, and never ought to have, any respect for a philosophy or a theology that requires them to distrust their senses, any more than for one that requires them to distrust their reason. A doctrine that can assert itself only by making war on the human faculties and antagonizing the common sense of mankind, is by that fact alone convicted of error and sophistry. All that is contended here is, not that the senses are untrue, or that the sensible does not really exist, but that the sensible lies below the regions of science proper, and intelligence of it alone is only an intelligence which man shares with most animals, and which in no language is called science or knowledge.

But in all thus far advanced we have not proceeded much if any beyond the limits of the second class of rationalists described. Revelation or tradition, which must have been revelation to the first man, and which is embodied and transmitted with more or less purity and integrity in language, is shown to be necessary to the intellectual process, but not as the ground of intellectual assent. All is built by its aid,

but nothing is built on it. It is thus far asserted as representative, not as authoritative, and the error of the traditionalists is therefore avoided. Faith has not thus far been demanded, and therefore no argument to prove the validity or authority of tradition, which we have used as a means, not as a ground of science. If language could be assumed to have been universally preserved in its unity and integrity, and tradition embodied in it to have therefore undergone no alteration or corruption, the proof we have given of its origin in the direct and immediate supernatural revelation to the first man would suffice to establish both its validity and authority even in matters of science. But this cannot be assumed, and except in the language of the church, evidently is not true, and it is precisely because it is not true, because language has been corrupted and no longer faithfully represents the affirmations of intuition that so many errors in philosophy and science obtain. The ideal presented in intuition is not faithfully reflected in language, and therefore it is that the, understanding which as St. Thomas says can never be false, is led into so many errors. Hence the connection of the church even with science as its guardian and protector, for in her and in her alone is lan-

guage, therefore the primitive revelation, or tradition, preserved in its purity and integrity. Her language alone preserves in its purity, and without diminution or addition, the original instructions given by our Creator to our first parents, which faithfully represent the ideal affirmed in intuition, and therefore we must consult her language in order to make our science conform to reality.

But still science is not taken on the authority of the church any more than on the authority of revelation, and as yet revelation leaves us in the order of the intelligible, in which we know God intuitively only as the ideal, only as he, so to speak, faces our intelligence or faculty of intelligence, not as he is in his essence, or as he is in himself. I have presented reality as the sensible, the intelligible, and the superintelligible, which is the essence. The sensible and the intelligible have their origin and ground in the essence, which is superintelligible and is therefore to the human intellect impenetrable mystery. It must be known to render our science of the sensible and the intelligible complete, and perfectly satisfactory. But that cannot be in this life, or in the other by natural means precisely because it is naturally superintelligible. It cannot be revealed so as to become



science, and is a mystery to the understanding after revelation as before, and is apprehended only by faith. Now, what is the relation of faith to reason, and where and how does faith supplement reason, advance, confirm, or in any way affect science? This is the question to be considered in the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER VI.

### FAITH AND SCIENCE.

In the fifth chapter we have considered revelation not as an object of faith, but as a means or instrument of science, and have said no more than might be accepted by rationalists of the second class described in the outset. But the second point made against rationalism of every form is that the science which is restricted to the intelligible is incomplete and unsatisfactory to reason herself, because it does not attain to the superintelligible in which the intelligible has its root.

Complete or perfect science which attains to things in their causes and to causes in their essence is not attainable in this life either with

or without revelation. The revealed mysteries are mysteries still, and are objects of faith, not of science properly so called. The question then arises, if revelation does not and cannot complete science, enable us to see God in his essence, or as he is not merely to us but in himself, which is promised to the saints, as says the Apostle, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is,"—if, I repeat, revelation of the superintelligible does not give us this complete and perfect science, what does it do, or what is its value under the relation of science? Or, what is the real relation of faith to knowledge, and what light, if any, does it throw on science, or additional security does it give to science in the order of the intelligible?

Faith is not sight, and does not seize directly its object either by intuition or by discursion, and hence the apostle speaks of faith as the substance, hypostasis, of things to be hoped for and the evidence of things not seen. It neither presents its object directly to the understanding, nor represents an object intuitively presented or affirmed. So much must be conceded in the outset, because its object is superintelligible, above both reason and the senses, yet faith is an act of the understanding, an in-

tellectual act, and is in the intellect as its subject, *tanquam in subjecto*, as we have already seen; it must therefore have some relation to science and be in some sense knowledge. Were it not so, faith would be an irrational act, and the revelation of the superintelligible even to faith would be impossible, and in believing revelation nothing would be believed.

Men of literary and scientific culture, who in our age reject the Christian revelation are little affected by the persiflage of a Voltaire, the verbal and textual difficulties with the Bible so strenuously insisted on by unbelievers in the last century, or the arithmetical and chronological difficulties in the Jewish history set forth with so much earnest by a Colenso in the last half of the present century; but they regard a revelation of the superintelligible, or, as they phrase it, of the supernatural, as impossible to be made. What the alleged revelation affirms is either above reason or it is not. If above reason, or our understanding, the revelation reveals nothing, and is a mere form of words without any meaning for the human intellect; if it is not above reason, it only represents what is intelligible to reason, and therefore reveals nothing superintelligible.

The objection is grave and would be unan-

swerable and conclusive against any alleged revelation to man above reason, if we supposed, as some do, that there are two created orders, the one above the other, conflicting or not conflicting with each other, without real relation or connection between them. Hence they who assert two parallel orders, two creations, the one called natural, and the other supernatural, with no real or dialectic relation between them, have never vindicated and never can vindicate the revelation of what they call the supernatural order, against this formidable objection. The answer to the objection is in denying the supposition of two such distinct and unrelated orders, and in showing that the intelligible and the superintelligible do not constitute two orders save in relation to our faculties, but are in reality only parts of one uniform whole. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural is real, as is the distinction between creature and creator. The supernatural is God and what he does immediately, and natural is that which is created and that which God does mediately through natural laws or second causes, as I have already explained. Creation is supernatural, considered either in its origin or end, and miracles are supernatural because they are not explicable by natural causes and can be wrought

only by the finger of God. But in the sense defined supernatural is as intelligible as natural, and even more so, for the natural is intelligible only by the supernatural, as it is only by the creative act of God it exists.

But there is no real distinction between the intelligible and the superintelligible, and they are distinguished at all only in relation to our faculties. They are identical, not two orders, but one only, to a mind large enough to comprehend the whole at one view. There is no distinction in God himself between his being and essence, the *esse divinum* and the *essentia divina*, none between his essence and his attributes, or between one attribute and another, for he is, as say the theologians, most simple being and most pure act. His essence or what he is in himself is superintelligible to us from excess of light, in the happy phrase of Sir Walter Raleigh, "obscure from abundant claritie," which dazzles and blinds our eyes if we attempt to look it full in the face. In creatures again there is no distinction between substance and essence and properties. What we apprehend by our senses, what we understand by our intellect, and what transcends our reason and is not enlightened by it is one and the same thing. Creatures are really distinguished from God by

the divine creative act, but at the same time united to him by a real nexus, so that God and the created universe form only one dialectic whole, in which the superintelligible is simply the part that reason is too feeble to illumine and which it therefore leaves in the shadow or in the dark. There is then no obstacle on the side of the object to a revelation of the mysteries, and our apprehension of the great truths contained in them.

Revelation re-presents the part of reality which reason leaves unilluminated by her light; but this very part itself is presented to us intuitively in its principles, for the principles of science, without which science is impossible, are the principles of things or of the order of being. There is no knowledge or intellectual fact without the ideal, ideas, called by some philosophers necessary ideas and absolute ideas, which are and must be given intuitively, for they are a priori, prior to experience and necessary to render experience even possible. These ideas are of two classes. In one class are the necessary, the universal, the infinite, the perfect, the immutable, the eternal; in the other are the contingent, the particular, the finite, the imperfect, the mutable, the temporal or temporary. The second class are all relative to the first and depend-

ent on it; consequently cannot be presented intuitively without it because they cannot exist without it.

The ideas in the first class are all reducible to the single category of being, for the necessary, universal, &c., abstracted from being are simple nullities, as are all abstractions without their concretes, and therefore incapable of being intuitively presented. Besides, abstractions are formed by the mind operating on the intuition of the concrete, and therefore are not *a priori* and do not precede the operations of the mind, create and constitute the reason. They must then be concrete, real, and consequently reduced to the category of being, they are one real, necessary, universal, infinite, perfect, immutable, and eternal being, that is to say, God, who is, as all theologians say, *ens necessarium et reale*.

The ideas of the second class may all be reduced to the category of existence, or existences, as distinguished from real and necessary being. No doubt, being and existence are often used as synonymous or convertible terms, and for ordinary purposes, when it is not necessary to mark the distinction between them, no harm comes from so using them; but in strictness existence is not being, but from being, expressed by the prefix *ex*, from or by, and shows that ex-



istences are from being, and are not being in themselves, but in another, as says the Apostle, "In God we live and move and have our being." Being is independent, self-existent, complete in itself, therefore necessary, universal, infinite, perfect, immutable, underived and eternal; existence is contingent, derived, dependent, and incapable of sufficing for itself.

The contingent, or second category, is presented in intuition, not as ens or being, as the psychologists pretend, but as contingent, as relative, therefore in its real relation to necessary being or God. It is this intuition of existences in their real relation to God that forms the principle or basis of induction, the inductive sciences—the whole inductive philosophy, and gives validity to the argument for the existence of God drawn from marks of design, wisdom, contrivance, the adaptation of means to ends, observed in the natural order. If the ideal intuition presented nature as simple being or ens, and not in its distinction from being and in its relation to it, there could be no logical passage "through nature up to nature's God," and so far as logic could conclude anything, it would be that nature herself is real and necessary being, and nothing above it or beyond it be concluded or conceived. The inductive argument for the existence of God,

the main argument on which St. Thomas relies, and the only one to which modern cultivators of the natural or exact sciences will listen for a moment, would and could have no force, if ideal intuition did not present the contingent as contingent in its real relation to non-contingent being. That relation is the relation of the effect to the cause, or of creature to creator, for it can be no other. There is no possible way in which contingent existences can proceed from being except by the creative act of being. Hence ideal intuition presents or affirms being, existences, and the creative act of being, which at once distinguishes existences from God and unites them to him. Gioberti, whatever may be said or thought of him in other respects, has stated correctly the ideal formula to be "*L' ente crea l'esistenza*," being, or God, creates existences.

This formula is accepted by every theologian, for it asserts only what is asserted in the first verse of Genesis and in the first article of the creed, but many deny it to be intuitive, or affirmed in ideal intuition, and maintain that it is obtained only as the result of reflection or discursive reason. The objection is founded on mistaking ideal intuition, which is *a priori* and precedes every intellectual act, and creates and constitutes the intellect itself, for empirical intui-

tion, or immediate vision, which is an intellectual act, as is evident from the formula being opposed on the ground that it implies that we have even in this life and by our natural powers intuitive vision of God, which is as bad philosophy as theology. Intuition may be either empirical or ideal; empirical intuition stands opposed to discursion, and is knowing by looking directly on or immediately beholding the object; ideal intuition means what is immediately affirmed objectively to the mind as idea, as the principle of the mind itself, and stands for what is given by the creator in distinction from that which is obtained by the operation of the understanding, and in it the object is shown, not beheld. It is intuition because immediately shown to the mind, not because it is immediately beheld by it.

The ontologists who contend that we know God by intuition in the empirical sense, or that we immediately behold him by our own intellectual act are well refuted by St. Thomas, and by the facts of experience. All experience, all common sense agrees with the assertion of the Scriptures that "no man hath seen God at any time," as I have explained in the fifth chapter. Nor is it pretended that the formula itself, Being creates existences, is intuitively given, but that which it expresses. The formula is ob-

tained by reflection, and never could have been obtained even by reflection without revelation re-presenting through language or sensible signs what is first presented in ideal intuition, as already explained. The formula is the last achievement of philosophy, not its commencement, and thousands and millions of men have lived, thought, reflected, reasoned, philosophized without ever having attained to it. You find no recognition of the creative act, of creation, in any gentile philosophy. The gentiles had evidently lost the tradition of creation, and substituted for it generation, formation, or emanation, as modern heterodox philosophers substitute evolution, development, or manifestation. The new-born infant, the savage, or the rustic, unless taught the Catechism, cannot say, "God created heaven and earth and all things therein;" indeed, no man can say it from intuition alone, not even the greatest philosopher that ever lived, unless previously taught it by revelation or tradition.

But that which is stated in the formula, or which the formula expresses, is given immediately in intuition, and reflection aided by language can find it there, under the form of what is sometimes called reason, sometimes the principles of reason, sometimes absolute or neces-

sary ideas, and by the peripatetics and Kantists the categories of reason, and recognized by all as that to which in all matters of demonstration or proof the ultimate appeal is made, and on which all scientific assent in the last analysis is given. The considerations already presented prove the ideal identical with the real, and affirmed to the understanding by the reality itself, not by the mind's own act, nor as mere subjective forms of the mind, as Kant pretended.

Taking the formula now as established, we find that it is adequate and expresses all the real and all the knowable, all the knowable because all the real. Knowledge may fall short of the real, but can never exceed it. Whatever is real is either God or creature. Whatever exists and is distinguishable from God is creature, and whatever is and is not creature is God. There is no middle term possible. This is plain common sense, and excludes that intermediary world of ideas or abstractions which seems to have been asserted by Aristotle, and revelled in by some of the scholastics, and so effectually demolished by Reid, the founder of the Scottish school. The peripatetics seem to have imagined a *mundus logicus*, distinct from the *mundus physicus*, and intermediary between God and creature, and between real and unreal, which

you can range neither in the category of being nor in that of existence. Leibnitz, that master-mind in Germany in the seventeenth century, was not wholly clear from it when he made the possible precede the real, and objected to St. Anselm's argument in his *Proslogium* for the existence of God that to be conclusive it must first be proved that God is possible, and hence his disciple Wolff places possibility outside of reality, instead of placing it in the power or ability of the real. Hegel does not escape the same error, any more than do his Buddhist prototypes, for he places first *das reine Seyn*, or pure being, that is, simple possibility, which he is very right in maintaining is identical with *das Nichtseyn*, or not-being. Cousin falls into the same error in regard to his ideal or spontaneous reason, which evidently is not creature, and he maintains is not God, and the same mistake is committed by Rosmini, whose "*ens in genere*" he allows to be neither God nor creature, and yet he holds that the idea of it is the first idea of the mind, and by which the mind knows all that it does know, from which the logical conclusion would be that it knows nothing.

The peripatetic categories are the forms of logic; but logic itself, what is that? Is it real or unreal? St. Thomas is the only one of the



scholastics who probably, if the question had been asked him, would have given it a rational answer. He was not only a great saint, but one of the greatest philosophical geniuses that ever lived. What he would have answered we know from what he says of the ideal, or idea, that it exists in *conceptu cum fundamento in re*. This with St. Thomas means, not simply that the ideal is real, but the real in face of the human intellect, precisely what we mean by the intelligible. Reduce the categories to being, existence, and their relation, and you have in strict accordance with the doctrine of St. Thomas, the ideal formula as Gioberti himself understands and explains it. The office of the phantasmata, the intelligible species, and the intellectus agens, which St. Thomas borrows from the peripatetics, is merely that which we have assigned to sensible representations, and reflection or active reason in seizing the ideal intuition, and in using it in demonstrating or proving the principles and facts presented by experience. They do not, with him, constitute a merely representative world, a logical world, intermediary either between the real and the unreal, or between God and creature, for he teaches that the object reached by the intellect is not the intelligible species, but the intelligible thing itself.



Returning now to the formula, we find that it asserts the principles of all reality, of the entire order of reality, and the entire order of science, and that these principles are intelligible, and known, consequently that the sensible and the intelligible, the intelligible and the superintelligible, the natural and the supernatural are by the creative act united in one dialectic whole, and in their principles are intelligible, and even intuitively known. Hence what is revealed in the mysteries is not something foreign to the intelligible, but a part of that whole of which the principles are the principles of all science, and are presented to us in ideal intuition.

The impossibility of a revelation on the ground that the superintelligible, or matter revealed, is of an order distinct from the intelligible without any real relation with it, cannot be insisted on, for that which is above the reach of our natural faculties is in the same real order with that which is within their reach and forms with it only one complete whole. There is a real relation between the two parts, and a real analogy between that which is revealed and that which is known or knowable. Indeed, throughout the universe there is a complete system of analogies or symbols in which the lower symbolizes the higher, the sensible the intelligible,

the intelligible the superintelligible, the natural the supernatural, creation itself the Creator. Revelation, availing itself of these natural analogies or symbols, is able to shadow forth to us that which in itself surpasses our power of direct apprehension, and thus faith is knowledge by analogy, or analogical knowledge. We do not see what is revealed in the mysteries directly face to face, but indirectly as reflected from these analogies most strikingly explained by the Apostle, now, by faith, "we see through a glass darkly, per speculum in aenigmate," as mirrored in the analogies borrowed from the world known to us.

If we study carefully the Holy Scriptures, and the discourses of our Lord, we shall find that they illustrate what they advance, even the profoundest mysteries they reveal, and enable the understanding to grasp something, by analogies taken from the natural world and the domestic and social relations of men. Birds, plants, flowers, the eagle, the dove, the rose, the lily, the grass of the field, the mustard-seed, the fig-tree, and the olive-plant; the vine and its branches, the vineyard and the husbandman; kingdom, master, servant, rich and poor, husband and wife, father and son; all the analogies and symbols of nature are pressed into the ser-

vice of superintelligible truth, and go far towards bringing it within the sphere of reason, and the surprise is that by meditation and steady contemplation the mind can penetrate so far into the hidden sense of the mysteries, not that it can penetrate no further. Some men whose authority has not been impeached have broached the "*metaphysica sublimior*," which pretends, now that the mysteries are revealed, to be able by natural reason to demonstrate not only that the mysteries do not contradict reason, but that they are true, using revelation in relation to the superintelligible as we have shown it is used in relation to the intelligible; but this, however, seems to me going too far and not making the proper account of the evident limitations of reason.

The fact already noted, that we can never bring ourselves to believe that the limit of our faculties is the limit of reality is not without important bearings, not only on the insufficiency of reason for full and universal science, but on the ability or aptitude to receive a revelation of the superintelligible. This fact, which has been noted in all ages and is undeniable, Gioberti calls a faculty, and names it "*sovrintelligenza*," the faculty of superintelligence, but he stands alone, I believe, in so naming it, and by faculty

is usually understood a power in the human soul to attain to its special object, but this is not a power by which the soul knows or attains to the superintelligible, which would be a contradiction in terms and inadmissible. This is rather the sense of the lack of power than the power itself. It is the soul's sense of her own impotence, and her own potentiality, or that she is in potentia to more than she is, but not a power by which she does or may attain to more. It is negative rather than positive, and the most that can be said is that it is an attitude, I hardly dare say aptitude, of the soul to receive a revelation of the superintelligible. Some philosophers, chiefly of the transcendental school, call it the faculty of faith and rank it in the hierarchy of the soul above reason; they also regard it as a secret sense, an intimate perception of the infinite, clear to itself, but wholly unintelligible to reason or understanding, a sort of spiritual sense, constituting those who have it strong, spiritual men, gnostics in the highest sense, and quite superior to ordinary mortals, able, as some of them say, "to see the invisible, and to look into the very abyss of being." But these seem to confound a conscious want of the soul with a power of the soul, and to conclude the presence of the power from a deep and abiding sense of its ab-

sence. Schleiermacher regards it as a sense of dependence, or the soul's sense of her own insufficiency, and makes it the basis of the religious sentiment which he thinks may be strong in men who have no religious belief, no, not so much as the belief in the existence of God. The sense of dependence, or the soul's sense of her own insufficiency, is felt in a greater or less degree by all men, even by those who profess to believe in the Godship of man. But the mysterious psychological fact or faculty in question seems to be something more than a sense of dependence, and an intimation, vague and indefinite though it be, that there is a reality beyond that which is apprehensible by our natural powers, which creates in it a longing to be more than we are and to have what we have not, which makes us dissatisfied with every limited good, with the visible, and to sigh for the invisible and the unattainable, so that the eye is never satisfied with seeing, the ear with hearing, nor the heart with understanding.

Plato notes the fact and regards it as the soul's reminiscence of what she was in a pre-existing state, and explains it as her regret of a lost freedom and grandeur, which causes her to beat her head against the walls of the dungeon in which she is confined while united to the

body, and sigh for deliverance when she may wing her way up to the empyrean, where she will repose again in the bosom of the Divinity. Some theologians, half agreeing with Plato, find in it the evidence of a primitive fall, and explain its existence by original sin, and others suppose it a gracious striving of the spirit of God within us to remind us that God designs us for a supernatural beatitude, and never suffering us to repose in the creature or to be satisfied with the highest conceivable natural good. But however theologians and philosophers may explain it, all take note of it, and bear witness to its existence as a remarkable and mysterious psychological fact, inseparable from the soul in this present state of existence.

St. Thomas maintains that man has a natural desire to know God in his essence, as he is in himself, and therefore implicitly for the beatific vision, what constitutes the blessedness of the saints when their pilgrimage is ended and they have safely arrived at home. It is not, in the view of St. Thomas or any of the great fathers and theologians, something supernatural in man, not something superinduced on human nature, not a reminiscence of the freedom and grandeur of a pre-existence, not the wail of the soul over a lost Eden and a primitive innocence,



but the sense of an unattained and by her own powers unattainable destiny. It is the soul's sense of her own incompleteness, of the unrealized possibilities or potentialities of her own nature, that is, that she lacks the necessary complement of her existence, and of her capacity to be more than she is, or to receive her fulfilment, or in other words, that she has in her by the divine aid a capacity for progress. But as the soul's complement or fulfilment is not in the intelligible, nor in the natural, it is in some sort an intimation or a prolepsis of the superintelligible, and of a supernatural destiny, which fits or renders her apt to receive the natural revelation of the mysteries, in which is supplied to faith and to hope precisely what her nature lacks, and is necessary to complete or fill up the design for which she was created and exists. Revelation through faith supplies the part of science that she felt was missing, and as it comes to her in faith she receives it not as something foreign or strange, but as a sweet melody that has been once heard, but now forgotten and impossible to recall.

This psychological fact or faculty, for a faculty after all it may be, if considered in relation to the object presented by faith which actualizes it, transforms possibility into power, connects



the act of believing with the act of knowing as revelation through the unity of truth connects the object believed with the objects known or knowable, and really, not artificially, mechanically, or fictitiously; so that faith is really, as we have defined it, analogical science. Faith in the revealed mysteries,—I speak of faith here as simple intellectual assent, *fides humana*, not of faith as a virtue, *fides theologica*, which requires the action of the will, and not possible without the assistance of grace or the *donum fidei*,—is therefore as simple, as natural, and as easy as the belief of such historical events within the intelligible order as have not fallen under our personal observation, when they are duly authenticated by competent and trustworthy testimony. Revelation places the truth of the mysteries in a relation to science strictly analogous to that borne by past or distant historical events, and even to that borne by the facts which he himself has not personally observed used by the inductive philosopher in constructing the science of geography, geology, philology, zoology, biology, or the so-called sociology, a real science, but with a barbarous name. These facts are received on testimony as well as the revealed mysteries, and the testimony sufficient in the one case is sufficient in the other. This follows.

necessarily from the fact we have established that the intelligible and superintelligible are in the order of reality only one order, that what is within the reach of reason and what is above reason are really only parts of one uniform dialectic whole, expressed in that divine judgment, type and ground of all real and possible judgments, which we call the ideal formula, or ideal intuition. The mysteries are implicitly affirmed in that intuition, and revelation is their analogical explication as history is the explication of that portion which passes into the actual experience of mankind.

But in showing the possibility of revelation and the relation of faith in the mysteries to science we have gone further and actually presented no mean proof at least of the truth of the mysteries, and through that truth of the historical fact that man has received a supernatural revelation. It is argued that the mysteries are superintelligible and therefore incapable of being known by us without supernatural revelation. It is argued also that if the order to be revealed has no real connection with the intelligible order, but is an order wholly separate from it, and wholly above it, no revelation of it is possible, because nothing in the intelligible indicates it, implies it, or offers any analogy to it,

by which the mind can either directly or indirectly apprehend or get hold of it, and therefore if made would be a mere form of words signifying nothing. I have answered this objection first, by showing that the superintelligible is only so in relation to us, and is implicitly affirmed to reason in ideal intuition, second by showing that it is demanded by the soul as the complement of its own existence and science, and finally by showing that it can be and is brought indirectly to the understanding by natural symbols or analogies borrowed from the sensible and intelligible worlds, chiefly from the sensible.

Now it is evident at a glance that only the truth could be thus analogically presented to the understanding. There must be a real and, so to speak, a natural relation between the analogue and the analogies, between the symbols and the reality symbolized, or else there would and could be no symbol or analogy in the case. But such relation is not possible in the case of falsehood, which being nothing can have no analogies with anything real or with anything natural or real symbols. A revelation of falsehood would be as impossible as the ideal intuition of the unreal, for it would present no analogue, nothing to be analogically represented. Such revelation could find in nature no

analogies and could use natural analogies or sensible and intelligible analogies only by forcing, mutilating, or distorting them. On the other hand, a revelation that meets the sensible and intelligible analogies without forcing, mutilating, or distorting, them gives full significance to the symbolism of nature, is and must be true, for only the truth could supply the analogues, and only God knows all natural symbolism well enough to give it throughout a full and consistent meaning. There can be no doubt that such is the fact with regard to the Christian revelation, as I shall show if I come to treat of the mysteries separately, and therefore the Christian revelation is true and made by God himself.

But this argument from analogy, conclusive as it may be, does not stand alone; but is more than confirmed as to the fact of revelation by the testimony of history. In showing that what is revealed is in the real world of the same order with what is intelligible, that it is even implicitly affirmed in ideal intuition which presents the principles of all the real whether natural or supernatural, intelligible or superintelligible, and that it bears a real analogy to what is known and responds to an internal demand or deeply felt want of the soul, I have shown that

revelation as a fact falls into the category of ordinary historical facts, and is as easily proved as any other fact of history, and in the same way,—by competent and adequate testimony. Whether revelation has been made or not is simply an historical question, and must be determined, as any other historical question, by the documents and monuments in the case.

It is no part of my present purpose to produce the documents and monuments, or the historical testimony to the fact that the revelation has been made, or to prove that it is a well-authenticated historical fact, for this has been done by the Christian apologists, both orthodox and heterodox, in a manner and with an erudition that leaves nothing to be desired. The historical testimony has been shown to be complete, an unbroken chain of evidence, with not a link wanting, and stronger than can be adduced in favor of any other facts of ancient history. I content myself with this simple assertion, which cannot be successfully controverted, because the difficulties of unbelievers do not arise, and never have arisen, from any conviction on their part of the defectiveness or insufficiency of the testimony, regarded as simple historical testimony, but from the conviction of its incompetency. They hold that historical testimony is not ger-

mane to the question, and consequently no amount of such testimony would or could duly authenticate the fact of revelation. They contend that the supernatural in any form or degree is absolutely unprovable. Hume expresses their common sentiment when, assuming a miracle to be contrary to the course of nature, he says, it is far more reasonable to believe that all the world lies than it is to believe that nature ever goes out of her course, for that men will lie is well known from experience, but of nature going out of her course there is no experience. We have no experience of nature acting against her own laws. Miracles therefore cannot by any amount of testimony be proved. To prove a miracle would demand a greater miracle, and to prove that greater miracle would demand another still greater, and thus on in an ever augmenting series *ad infinitum*, which is physically impossible and logically absurd.

Hume's false assumptions and transparent sophistry will be replied to when treating of miracles; here it is sufficient to say that the real difficulties felt by unbelievers are philosophical rather than historical, and the difficulty with the apologist is that while unbelievers have philosophy enough to object, they have too little to be answered. Had they more real philosophical



science they would themselves see that their objections all rest on a principle really untenable, or on a misapprehension, or misrepresentation of facts. Thus Hume's famous argument, the substance of which we have just given, is based on the assumption that the supernatural is never a fact of experience, which is not only false, but a manifest begging of the question, and also on the assumption that a miracle violates the laws of nature, or diverts nature from her course, which is not true, for a miracle is simply a sensible or intelligible fact not explicable by natural laws or natural causes, and therefore must be attributed to a supernatural cause, and therefore as to the proof stands on the same footing with nature herself, for nature is explicable only by being referred to a supernatural cause or creator, as affirmed in the ideal formula, or ideal intuition. It is because the objections are not to the sufficiency but to the competency of historical testimony that I have felt it necessary by establishing the ideal formula, the relation of the natural and supernatural, and of the intelligible and the superintelligible, to show the real relation between faith and science, and thus proving that historical testimony is germane to the question and as competent to establish the fact of revelation or a miracle as the fact of the



wars between the ancient Greeks and Persians, or the Gallic and civil wars of Julius Caesar.

Referring for the historical proofs of the fact of revelation to the works of the Christian apologists both orthodox and heterodox, having by my philosophical and theological explanations shown the competency of such proofs and removed the real objections unbelievers or pure rationalists find to admitting them, there remains to be considered in this chapter the aid which the analogical knowledge which we call faith affords to science properly so called, or the service it renders in supplying the defect pointed out in pure rationalism.

I say defect, for I do not agree at all with those who declaim against reason as a false or illusory light. I know no truer light than reason as far as it goes, and it is to reason that revelation itself is made and accredited. The intellect, as St. Thomas maintains, is true, and is never false. All that is pretended is that it is incomplete, and does not take in all reality, which can be done only by the divine mind, or the intelligence of God. There are no greater sophists in the world than they who would build up revelation on the ruins of reason, or found faith on scepticism; and it is to guard us against so fatal an error that the Holy See requires us to hold

that the existence of God, the immateriality of the soul, and human liberty can be proved with certainty by reason prior to faith. By far the larger part of the propositions contained in the syllabus of errors attached to the papal encyclical of December 8, 1864, and which the Holy Father censured are errors which tend to undermine reason, rational morality, and civil society. Whether all the church teaches harmonizes or not with reason, nothing is more certain than that she teaches her children to respect reason and to recognize it as a true light as far as it goes, and hence Melchior Cano enumerates natural reason among the *loci theologici*, or sources whence the theologian is to draw in determining what is the faith or its true interpretation.

It should also be remarked that faith exclusively taken does not include all the gracious assistance we receive in the conduct of life, or in the fulfilment of the purpose of our existence, and moreover, that faith itself gives us aid beyond that which it gives directly to science, and that its indirect aid is far greater than its direct aid even to science. This is said to prevent any misapprehension on the part of theologians who, while I am treating of faith as simple belief, may fear that I forget that faith is also a theo-

logical virtue, and not elicited without the subjective as well as the objective aid of divine grace.

But to return to the question. Faith certainly does not supply the defect of reason by elevating us to the beatific vision. It gives us no direct knowledge beyond the sphere of the intelligible, but analogical knowledge of the whole superintelligible reality embraced in the revealed mysteries, and gives to science in regard to the superintelligible the precise sort of aid which history gives to science in regard to the intelligible, that is, the history of events of which we are not eye witnesses, and theology is as really and truly a science as history itself. I know as well that God is Trinity, that the second person in the Trinity became incarnate to redeem fallen man and elevate him to supernatural union with God, that he is created for God and can find his beatitude only in being regenerated by the Holy Ghost in him, and glorified with him in the glory of the Father, as I know there was such a person as Alexander the Great, as Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, or George Washington, or as I know any of the events recorded in ancient or modern history of which I have not been an eye-witness,—as well as I know the facts of any of the inductive

sciences, which I know only by the report of others. Now, as we could hardly construct any science without borrowing from the testimony of others, and as the larger part of every inductive science really depends on history, so would our science dwindle almost to nothing if we eliminate from it all that we owe directly or indirectly to the revelation of the mysteries.

Faith, indeed, is only representative knowledge, and we do not know through it what the superintelligible is in itself, but we do know that it exists, that it is real, and is only for a time hidden from us, and in due time it will be seen with open vision. We know also its grand outlines, and have only to wait till of age, till we have arrived at the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus, till we have finished our course, reached the goal, to have these outlines filled up and our knowledge completed by a real union with the divine intelligence itself. True, we must as yet walk by faith, not by sight, but it is with the full assurance that faith will soon be converted into sight. The son while a minor serves, is under obedience, no less than the slave, but he looks forward to the day of his majority when he knows he shall be free, while the slave can see no term to his minority but death. Faith does not indeed present directly the reality the

soul hungers and thirsts for, but it assures the soul that the reality that meets her wants, that appeases her craving, fulfils her instinctive desires, and justifies her sense of something beyond what she is or has, is no vain illusion, no morbid dream, but really does exist, is attainable, and is not already attained because the progress of the soul is not yet completed, and its majority is not yet reached. Faith thus proves itself to be, as the Apostle says, the substance (hypostasis the substance, not being) of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Faith, though not bringing to the soul complete or perfect satisfaction, promises it that satisfaction, and thus enables it to repose securely in the knowledge it has, frees it from all anxiety or perturbation, and permits it to wait tranquil and serene till the day when faith loses itself in sight, or hope in fruition shall arrive.

Certainly revelation cannot remove scientific scepticism, or those doubts which call in question the validity of science and trustworthiness of reason or the reality of her light when they have once arisen and become fixed, for the certainty given by revelation can never be greater than the certainty of the reason to which it is made and authenticated, and no one who doubts reason can have faith in revelation. A more ab-

surd method of evangelical demonstration was never adopted than that of beginning by the rejection of reason as a false light, a deceptive guide. But faith in revelation prevents doubts of science from being generated in the mind, not by stopping inquiry or investigation, but by answering it beforehand. Scepticism in its proper sense, that is, a doubt not simply of revelation, but of science, the truthfulness of the senses and understanding is impossible in practical life as well as in speculation. No man doubts that he doubts, or as Byron says, doubts that doubting is doubting, for doubt is an intellectual act, and affirms the truth of reason as much as an act of belief. Doubt never extends really to doubt of the existence of the doubter. But the inability of reason to reconcile all the contrarieties and to clear up all the mysteries of life or to answer all the questions the soul asks, gives occasion for the mind to become perplexed, the soul to be disturbed, and the affections unfixed and floating to be sources of misery instead of joy and delight. Enveloped in mystery, darkness before and behind, within and without, the mind loses her reckoning, knows not where she is, what to think, what to rely on, and feels that nothing is certain, but that all things are floating and fleeting. This sad state of the mind and soul is

striking in most of the later Greek poets, is detected, some think, in Shakspeare, especially in his Hamlet, and is unmistakable in Goethe and Byron, Shelley and Lamartine, in Goodwin, Brockden Brown, Dana, Bulwer, Balzac, and Georges Sand, and it leaves its mark on the literature and art of every unbelieving age. Wherever we find it it is a sure indication of the loss of faith in tradition or the corruption or loss of the tradition itself.

Faith in divine revelation in proportion as it is known and believed in its purity and integrity prevents this state of mind, this perplexity, perturbation, these inward doubts and questionings, not by stifling mental activity, but by answering them beforehand, by assuring the mind that these difficulties do not arise from the controversies or discrepancies of things themselves or lack of dialectic order and consistency in the world of reality, but solely from its ignorance or inability to take in the whole, from the fact that it sees only parts, and these as *disjecta membra*, not in their living synthesis as one dialectic whole, and by giving it the assurance that this ignorance on its part is only temporary and will dissolve in light on the day of its majority. "Now," says the Apostle, "we know in part and prophesy in part, but when that which is perfect



shall come that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child I spake as a child, I thought as a child, but when I became a man I put away the things of a child. We see now through a glass darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know as I am known."

Add now to the simple intellectual belief in revelation what theologians call the grace or infused habit of faith, the *donum fidei*, which though it gives no extension to our mental vision or understanding, enables the mind to believe with a supernatural firmness and energy, and it is evident that faith, while it is in no sense the ground of science, is full security against any doubts of the reality of science, or those inward questionings which throw doubts on reason herself,—not indeed because it is in itself more certain than reason, but because it is a firm persuasion of the mind that reason as well as revelation is true, and that whatever she dictates or affirms is to be received as unquestionable. Faith taken in its theological sense is in the order of the end, the teleological order, in which creation is consummated and man is perfected, attains to his supreme good, realizes his destiny or end for which he is created, now future to us, but pres-

ent to God. Faith initiates us into this order, is the first step in the return of existences towards God as their final cause and only beatitude, and is itself initial beatitude, initial intuitive vision of God in his essence or as he is in himself, and in him of the essences of all things. In it is begun that new life in Christ of which the end is glorification with him in the glory of the Father. With this faith the contrarieties of life disappear, the soul feels herself no longer confined in a narrow prison beating her head against the thick walls of her dungeon, but feels herself enlarged and her lungs expand with the free and pure air of heaven, and has even a foretaste of the joys of eternity.

But the question of science I have thus far considered in a speculative, rather than a practical sense. Science should always be in order to practice, as the end of knowledge is not simply to know, but to act, and its use is in enlightening the will and directing the executive powers of the soul. Science availeth little till it is converted into wisdom, which is science applied to the true purposes of existence, or the real end of man. The great quarrel of Socrates with the sophists of his time was precisely here, and he censured them because they gave to science no moral aim, and neglected to consider it as

having any relation to the conduct or practical duties of life. He sought to make it serve a moral purpose, which is what was meant by his laboring to bring philosophy down from the clouds to the earth. No representation could be further from the truth than that in the "Clouds" of Aristophanes. Plato was true to the spirit of his master and his philosophy was directed to fitting man for a return to union with God. Wisdom, or moral science, is the more important part of science, is in fact the crown of all science.

Now moral science is even less practicable without the revelation of the mysteries than speculative science, and it is precisely in relation to moral science that faith renders the most aid. Reason knows that the end of man is not in nature, that the soul's supreme good, which is the same thing, is not to be found in the creature, or in any finite good, and is able to say that if man have an end, if he have a supreme good, it is in the supernatural; but she cannot say that he has such good, what it is, whether it is attainable, and if attainable, by what means. Faith steps in here to the relief of reason, removes its doubts and supplies its defects. It assures us that man has a supreme good, that it consists in a supernatural union with or pos-

session of God, in being made a partaker of his divine nature; it teaches that it is attainable, and instructs us as to the means and appliances necessary to gain it. In all this it supersedes not but it supplements reason, and prepares science for its conversion into wisdom, which is the principal thing. Hence it is moral science deteriorates as men lose their faith in revelation, and forget its instructions, and hence, too, we find the highest types of virtue and the sublimest examples of sanctity and moral heroism only with those who retain divine revelation in its purity and integrity.

Nor is the indirect service that faith renders to science, whether speculative or moral, to count for nothing. We do not always find the largest science accompanying the strongest faith, but we never find it where there is not strong and energetic faith, or where the tradition of revelation has been lost or retained only in a fragmentary or debased form. In Greece the great philosophers are the earnest men, of strong but an impure faith, like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, not the professional sophists, who were without faith as without principle. With the Jews, a believing and earnest people, who had revelation in its purity, we find indeed not philosophy as a detached or separate science,

but we find the rational or scientific element of thought more highly cultivated and more fully developed, and really a higher, broader and truer philosophy than in any gentile nation. The Jewish Scriptures afford ample proof of this in the notices they give us of the intellectual and moral culture of the nation. The epochs in which faith flourishes are those in which philosophy receives its most vigorous growth, and whenever faith withers and droops philosophy loses all its sap and soon becomes dry and dead. The great ages of faith, as the first four centuries of our era, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the seventeenth century and our own are the great ages of philosophy, while the fifteenth, sixteenth, and eighteenth centuries, marked by the decline of faith, are equally marked by the decline of philosophy. Faith since the Apostles went forth from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to convert the world to the Gospel, faith never came nearer suffering a total eclipse than in the last century, and never was reason more dishonored than by a shallow materialism which was then put forth in her name. In the present century faith partially revives, and few men would now place the supreme good in the pleasures of the senses, regard the soul as a sensation transformed with the Abbe Condil-

lac, and define man with Doctor Cabanis "a digestive tube open at both ends," reduce him first to a man-plant and then to a man-machine with LaMettrie, or ascribe man's superiority over the horse with Helvetius to the accidental fact that his forearms terminate in flexible fingers instead of an inflexible hoof. If the chemical physiology of animals and plants still has its advocates it is now pretty generally conceded that the phenomena of life are due to a more subtle principle than is detected in the chemical laboratory. Even a Draper admits an immaterial principle in man and Agassiz the existence of God, though neither finds much for either to do. But still there is an upward tendency, and the positivists, who are disposed to say with the astronomer Lalande: "I have never seen God at the end of my telescope," find it necessary to assert "*le grand etre*," and to offer him prayers and sacrifices.

Philosophy is the chief of the sciences, of the inductive sciences as well as the deductive, for it is the science of the ideal, and without the ideal no induction, or what Kant calls a synthetic judgment *a posteriori*, is possible. Ages and nations in which philosophy is strong and rigorous are ages of scientific invention and scientific progress. The greater part of the inventions and discoveries which have wrought such



mighty changes date from the seventeenth century or the middle ages; the last century and the present have only extended the application of principles which more vigorous ages had discovered.

I am not depreciating the value of experimental science, nor the vast materials for the inductive or synthetic sciences accumulated by the industry and curiosity of the physicists and naturalists of this age, and the warmest admirers of the scholastics must admit that they neglected almost entirely the observation of facts, and added little to the stock accumulated and transmitted by Aristotle and Pliny. The man who permitted himself to make experiments like Albertus Magnus or Friar Bacon, was by the people only emerging from barbarism suspected of magic or too close an intimacy with evil spirits. Nor am I making philosophy as now understood the ancilla or slave of faith, any more than I am making faith the ancilla or slave of science. The Holy See has defined or required philosophers and theologians to hold that faith and reason are mutual helpers, or mutually assist each other, and my purpose is to show how they do mutually assist one another. I do not build reason on faith, nor faith on reason; but there can be no faith without reason,



and no full development of reason without faith. Each serves the other, and supplies what the other lacks, plainly indicating that man was never intended for what is called pure nature, that even if God consistently with his own nature and essence could have created man in a state of pure nature and left him in it, he has not done so, but from the first designed him, as revelation teaches us, for a supernatural end or destiny, to which he cannot, of course, attain without supernatural assistance or what theologians call grace, that is, the immediate action or efficacious presence of the Holy Ghost.

Faith needs reason, as I never cease to repeat, but reason also needs faith, as I have shown, not only faith in history, but also in the mysteries affirmed by revelation, and it is in relation to these mysteries that reason receives its grandest developments. The science of reason has almost entirely been created by efforts to explain, to apprehend, to establish, to defend, or to overthrow or disprove these mysteries. Theology, though it takes its data from revelation, is in reality a human or rational science, whose aim, according to St. Augustine, is to produce, defend, and confirm the faith that conducts to true beatitude. None of the mathematical or of the inductive sciences make for their construction any-

thing like so heavy demands on reason, or so call forth and exercise her higher powers, as theology, and in most men reason is too weak or too little developed to see any reason at all in the wonderful achievements of reason in the field of theology. Nothing so tests the strength of reason or shows so fully its power as the investigations and discussions of the theologians in regard to the Trinity, the Incarnation, Redemption, Grace and human ability, Predestination and human liberty, virtue and its rewards, and sin and its consequences. To the light and superficial these investigations and discussions seem frivolous and a waste of time, and men gain the reputation of wits by sneering at them, or attempting to turn them into ridicule, but there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the philosophy of a Gibbon or a Voltaire, and their wit can excite mirth only in those who understand nothing of the high themes against which it is directed. The salvation of even reason herself was involved in that simple Greek diphthong about which Gibbon sneeringly says mankind cut each other's throats for a hundred years. The debate between the Homousoians and the Homoeousians, though apparently about a single diphthong, involved the highest possible interests of humanity for

both time, and eternity, as will be shown when we come to speak specially of the Incarnation, and as is evident also to reason herself from the fact that man has no natural destiny, and that his supernatural destiny is unattainable save through the incarnation of the Word, which could never have taken place if the Word was only like God, and not God himself.

These investigations and discussions have carried us far into the secret nature of things, and given us a knowledge of the intelligible relations of things, of God, the human soul, human nature, of the universe, of the relation of man to the universe and of man and the universe to God. Even the unbeliever born in Christian lands and brought up in Christian schools has a stronger and better developed reason than had the unbeliever under paganism, and an Auguste Comte is much in advance of old Epicurus or any of the herd from his sty. Eliminate from intellectual and moral science all that reason owes to her efforts to understand the mysteries in their relation with one another, and with our natural powers, and our actual science would be reduced to the dimensions of that of the child or the savage. The difference between the child and the full-grown man, or between the savage, the North American Indian, and the New Zea-

lander and the Italian, Frenchman, Englishman, German, or citizen of the United States shows what reason owes to faith in the mysteries. It is easy then to understand the indirect aid rendered to reason even in the order of the intelligible and to show to those who regard faith as antagonistical to reason that they are not well read up in the facts of the case, and that the vision of the true believer extends over a wider horizon, and is clearer and distincter than that of the infidel or rationalist.

It was the writer's intention to treat in detail all the dogmas and mysteries of faith, and he still hopes to do so; but these will be reserved for another volume, if he should live to complete that labor. In the meantime he commits to the world this attempt to show the principle of the harmony of faith and science, the medium of their reconciliation, with the hope that the way in which abler, more learned and scientific men can take up and solve the problem may be in some degree indicated, and the solution facilitated.

THE END.



# INDEX.

- Abelard, 123.  
 Absolute, 30.  
 Abstract, 46.  
 Abstractions, 47, 54, 59, 82, 149, 181.  
 Adam, 139, 154, 155.  
 Agassiz, 210.  
 Albertus Magnus, 211.  
 Alexander the Great, 200.  
 Analogy, 185, 193.  
 Analysis, 20.  
 Animals, Intelligence of, 97, 109.  
 Anselm, St., 88, 91, 182.  
 Antagonism of Reason and Faith, 16.  
 Apologists, Christian, 195.  
 Arianism, 24.  
 Aristophanes, 207.  
 Aristotle, 12, 23, 41, 59, 73, 78, 90, 112, 137, 145, 181, 211.  
 Athenagoras, 24.  
 Augustine. St., 11, 15, 24, 62, 65, 66, 90, 91, 139, 144, 212.  
 Bacon, Friar, 211.  
 Bacon, Lord, 128.  
 Balmes, 21, 53, 60.  
 Balzac, 204.  
 Being, 176; Real and Necessary, 63; Real and Possible, 89.  
 Berkeley, 42, 126.  
 Boetius, 22, 93.  
 Bonald. Vte. de, 131, 147, 149, 163.  
 Bonaparte. N., 200.  
 Bonaventure, St., 91.  
 Bossuet, 126.  
 Brown, Brockden, 204.  
 Brownson, O. A., 20, 57, 66, 68, 70, 73, 88, 93.  
 Buffier, Father, 131.  
 Bulwer, 204.  
 Byron, 119, 203, 204.  
 Cæsar, Julius, 200.  
 Cabanis, 210.  
 Calvin, 28.  
 Campanella, 123.  
 Cartesian Method, 136.  
 Categories, 59, 77, 176, 181, 182.  
 "Catholic World, The," 67, 68.  
 Causation, Idea of, 52.  
 Cause, 69, 77, 112, 132, 166; C. of Nature, 153.  
 Certainty, 58, 202.  
 Channing, 102.  
 Chaucer, 156.  
 Cicero, 140.  
 Civilization, 10.  
 Clarke, J. F., 33.  
 Classification, 110.  
 Clement of Alexandria, 24.  
 Colenso, 172.  
 Colleges, 25.  
 Collier, 126.  
 Comte, 43, 111, 133, 135, 214.  
 Conception, 53, 54, 58.  
 Concrete, 82.  
 Condillac, 42, 126, 145, 209.  
 Consciousness, 49, 64, 82, 125.  
 Conservatives, 13.  
 Contingency, 50.  
 Correlatives, 49 69.  
 Cousin, V., 45, 46, 55, 58, 84, 97, 122, 133, 146, 148, 182.  
 Creation, 53, 173, 180; C. of Man, 157; C. of the Soul, 94, 143, 163.  
 Creative Act, 63, 88, 90, 178.  
 Damascen, St. John, 75.  
 Dana, 204.  
 Dante, 156.  
 Darwin, 7, 43, 111.  
 "De Civitate Dei," 11, 14  
 Deduction, 125.

- Deists, 56.  
Democritus, 12, 107.  
Demonstration, 81, 90, 92, 143, 181.  
Descartes, 28, 30, 31, 40, 42, 49, 58, 62,  
123, 124, 127, 130, 136.  
Doubt, 119, 124, 203.  
Draper, 210.  
"Dublin Review, The," 72.  
Eclectics, The French, 97.  
Education, 105; Religious E., 25;  
Defect of E., 25.  
Effect, 69, 77.  
Emerson, 33, 56, 103.  
Epicurus, 12, 23, 107, 214.  
Essence, 116, 117, 169; E. of God,  
117, 174, 206.  
Evolution, 110.  
Existence of God, 76, 86, 92, 125, 141,  
177.  
Facts, 113; not known intuitively,  
83.  
Faith, 136, 171, 190, 191, 199, 205, 207,  
211; Loss of F., 140; F. and Reason,  
16, 99; Their Antagonism, 16.  
Fathers of the Church, 22, 123, 139.  
Fenelon, 88, 91, 126, 144.  
Fichte, 41.  
Fournier, 30, 74.  
Forces, Identity of, 37.  
Froissart, 156.  
Froschammer, 94.  
Galileo, 67.  
Genera and Species, 61.  
Generalizations, 38.  
Generation, 61.  
Gentile Philosophers, 53.  
Geocentric, Theory, 67.  
Gerdil, 91, 144.  
German Philosophers, 97.  
Gibbon, 213.  
Gioberti, 83, 91, 144, 149, 178, 186.  
God, Essence of, 117, 174, 206; Ex-  
istence of, 76, 86, 92, 125, 141, 177;  
Intuition of, 65, 91, 144; Veracity  
of, 99, 141, 179.  
Godwin, 204.  
Goethe, 204.  
Gower, 156.  
Grace, 96, 205.  
Greek Philosophers, 208.  
Greek Poets, 204.  
Gregory the Great, St., 15, 66.  
Hamilton, Sir W., 45, 102, 114, 119,  
122, 130, 131.  
Hegel, 41, 149, 182.  
Hegelians, 12.  
Heliocentric Theory, 67.  
Helvetius, 210.  
Hobbes, 128.  
Homœousians, 213.  
Homœousians, 213.  
Hume, 69, 128, 131, 166, 196.  
Huxley, 7, 43, 111.  
Ideal, The, 65, 94, 144, 184.  
Ideal Formula, 79, 151, 173.  
Idealism, 42, 125, 145.  
Ideas, 60, 72, 80, 175; Innate, 62, 127;  
Necessary, 46, 62, 144.  
Incarnation, The, 62, 214.  
Induction, 177.  
Inductive Philosophy, 85.  
Intellectus Agens, 59.  
Intelligible, The, 174, 184.  
Intelligence in Animals, 97, 109.  
Intuition, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54, 58, 63, 65,  
71, 86, 90, 143, 148, 152, 163, 169, 175,  
178, 184; I. of God, 65, 91, 144, 179.  
Islam, 24.  
Jefferson, Th., 133.  
Jews, 208.  
John, St., 113, 171.  
Joinville, Sire de, 156.  
Jouffroy, Theodore, 133.  
Justin, St., 24.  
Kant, 40, 49, 60, 79, 81, 97, 122, 123,  
129, 131, 137, 166, 181, 210.  
Kleutgen, 71.  
Lalande, 210.  
Lamartine, 204.  
La Mettrie, 210.  
Language, 88, 147, 149, 164, 168;  
Unity of L., 158.  
Languages, 156.  
Law of Nature, 96, 142, 164.  
Laws of Nature, 196.  
Leibnitz, 68, 80, 91, 129, 182.



- Leroux, 126, 147.  
 Leucippus, 12, 107.  
 Liebig, 111.  
 Limits of Reason, 101, 107, 120.  
 Linnæus, 110.  
 Littre, 111.  
 Locke, 60, 128, 146.  
 Logic, 79.  
 Love, 103.  
 Louvain Professors, 30, 74.  
 Lubbock, 7.  
 Lucretius, 108.  
 Lugdunensis Philosophy, 67.  
 Luther, 28, 31.  
 Maistre, Cte. de, 147.  
 Malebranche, 91, 126, 144.  
 Man, Creation of, 157; End of, 207.  
 Mansel, 130, 131.  
 Materialism, 209.  
 Methexis, 80.  
 Method of Philosophy, 64.  
 Mill, J. S., 45.  
 Mimesis, 80.  
 Miracles, 173, 196.  
 Moral Science, 207.  
 Mysteries, 96, 136, 171, 175, 184, 185, 191, 212, 214.  
 Natural, The, 156, 173.  
 Naturalists, 19, 211.  
 Nature, 121, 132; Cause of N. 153; The Law of N., 96, 142, 164; Laws of N., 196; Pure N. 135, 212.  
 Nescience, 120.  
 Newman, 130, 131.  
 Ontologism, 29, 44, 68.  
 Ontologists, 85, 179.  
 Orders of Science and Reality, 27.  
 Origen, 24.  
 Owen, 111.  
 Pantheism, 31, 85.  
 Pantheists, 56.  
 Pascal, 131.  
 Paul, St., 22, 66, 76, 117, 121, 145, 177, 185, 204.  
 Pelagians, 96.  
 Percy, 161.  
 Peripatetic Method, 23.  
 Peripatetics, 59, 115, 144, 181.  
 Phantasmata, 59.  
 Phidias, 71.  
 Philologists, 157.  
 Philosophy, 5, 6, 63, 122, 210 211; Inductive P., 85; Method of P., 64; Text Books of P., 28, 44; P. of Religion, 27; Epicurean P., 23; Stoic P., 23; Thomist P., 67.  
 Plato, 12, 22, 23, 73, 79, 90, 127, 137, 166, 188, 207, 208.  
 Pliny, 112, 211.  
 Pomponazzi, 123.  
 Porphyry, 22.  
 Positivists, 15, 19, 112, 119, 136.  
 Principles, 112, 135, 143, 166; P. of Science and Reality, 54, 84, 184; P. of Natural and Supernatural Science, 27.  
 Progress, 10.  
 Proposition, Self-evident, 92.  
 Protagoras, 12.  
 Proudhon, 16.  
 Psychologism, 30, 40 44.  
 Psychologists, 62, 85.  
 Pyrrhonism, 119.  
 Pythagoras, 23.  
 Radicals, 13.  
 Raleigh, 174.  
 Ramiere, 71.  
 Rationalism, 95, 108, 113, 120, 132, 170.  
 Rationalists, 19, 100.  
 Reason, 98, 198, 211; Distrust of R., 43; Limits of R., 101, 107, 120.  
 Redemption, 62.  
 Reflection, 88, 148.  
 Reid, 60, 116, 122, 129, 181.  
 Relativity of Science, 101, 114.  
 Religious Sentiment, 106.  
 Reminiscence, 188.  
 Representation, Sensible, 145, 149, 164.  
 Revelation, 96, 108, 137, 162, 164, 167, 171, 185, 190, 202, 208.  
 Rosmini, 84, 91, 148, 182.  
 Rothenflue, 30, 74.  
 Saint-Simonian Doctrine, 15.  
 Sand, Georges, 204.

- Scepticism, 202.  
 Schleiermacher, 188.  
 Scholastics, 58, 211.  
 Science, 107, 167, 170, 201, 207;  
     Ground of S., 142, 168; Moral S.,  
     207; Materials for S., 111; Rela-  
     tivity of S., 101, 114.  
 Scientists, 38, 56, 211; Labors of S.,  
     111.  
 Scotus Erigena, 123.  
 See, The Holy, 71, 131, 141.  
 Senses, 166, 203.  
 Sensible, The, 107, 116, 185; S. Rep-  
     resentation, 145, 149, 164.  
 Sensism, 145, 209.  
 Sentiment, Religious, 106.  
 Shakspeare, 204.  
 Shelley, 204.  
 Socrates, 137, 206, 208.  
 Solomon, 104.  
 Solutions, 10.  
 Sophia, 134.  
 Sophists, 161.  
 Soul, Creation of the, 94, 143, 163;  
     Immateriality of the S, 141; Its  
     Sense of Want, 190.  
 Sovrintelligenza, 186.  
 Species, 60, 61.  
 Spencer, H., 12, 43, 45, 101, 107, 108,  
     111, 117, 119.  
 Spinoza, 55, 124, 126.  
 Stoic Philosophy, 23.  
 Storchenau, 68.  
 Suarez, 88.  
 Subjectivism, 125.  
 Substance, 55, 115, 117.  
 Substans, 56.  
 "Summa Contra Gentiles," 11, 14.  
 Superintelligible, 99, 104, 169, 174,  
     184, 192.  
 Supernatural, 121, 132, 153, 173.  
 Superstition, 105.  
 Symbol, 185, 193.  
 Synthesis, 20, 64, 204.  
 Telesio, 123.  
 Testimony, 191, 201.  
 Theology, 122, 200, 211.  
 Thomas Aquinas, St., 11, 15, 21, 24,  
     29, 39, 48, 51, 52, 54, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66,  
     68, 69, 73, 75, 78, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96,  
     100, 130, 142, 143, 144, 145, 164, 168,  
     182, 183, 189, 198.  
 Thomist Philosophy, The, 67.  
 Thought, 64, 81, 114, 148.  
 Topsy, 113.  
 Tracy, Destutt de, 126.  
 Tradition, 134, 137, 160, 164, 167.  
 Traditionalists, 18, 141, 147, 163.  
 Transcendentalists, 33, 187.  
 Transubstantiation, 166.  
 Understanding, 97.  
 Unity of Language, 158.  
 Unknowable, 90, 101.  
 Unknown, 101, 140.  
 Veracity of God, 99, 141.  
 Volney, 140.  
 Voltaire, 172, 213.  
 Ward, 72.  
 Washington, 200.  
 Wisdom, 206.  
 Wolff, 68, 182.  
 Youths leaving College, 25.

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